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ABSTRACT 
ESSAYS ON HOUSING TAX POLICY AND DISCRIMINATION IN THE MORTGAGE 
MARKET 
 
By 
 
WILLIAM HAROLD MARTIN 
 
March 2015 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. Kurt Schnier 
Major Department: Economics 
This dissertation explores the impact of tax policy and institutions on decisions in the 
market for housing.  Two essays address the impact of tax policy on home values, neighborhood 
accessibility, and public finance; a third essay presents an experimental test for discrimination in 
mortgage lending. 
The first essay is joint work with Andrew Hanson.  In it, we estimate the sensitivity of 
mortgage interest deducted on federal tax returns to the availability of the Mortgage Interest 
Deduction (MID).  Our primary results show that for every one percentage point increase in the 
tax rate that applies to deductibility, the amount of mortgage interest deducted increases by 
$303–590.  We also compute the elasticity of mortgage interest and deadweight loss of the tax 
policy. 
The second essay simulates changes to average home prices in twenty-seven cities that 
would result were the MID reformed.  I use local variation in housing parameters to simulate 
home price changes for three different reforms: eliminating the MID, converting the MID to a 
fifteen percent credit, and capping the MID at fifteen percent.  City price changes vary in 
response to a single policy by as much as 12.8 percentage points.  Spatial variation within cities 
  
is also notable, with areas high in income experiencing steeper price declines and areas of lower 
income experiencing shallow declines.  To varying degrees, each reform reduces price 
differences across neighborhoods, making more neighborhoods affordable to any given income 
class. 
The third essay is joint work with Andrew Hanson, Zack Hawley, and Bo Liu.  We 
design and implement an experimental test for differential response by Mortgage Loan 
Originators (MLOs) to requests for information about loans.  Our e-mail correspondence 
experiment is designed to analyze differential treatment by client race and credit score.  Our 
results show net discrimination of 1.8 percent by MLOs through non-response.  We also find that 
MLOs offer more details about loans and are more likely to send follow up correspondence to 
whites.  The effect of being African American on MLO response is equivalent to the effect of 
having a credit score that is 71 points lower. 
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Introduction 
Housing is among the largest markets in which consumers participate.  It is also heavily 
influenced by a variety of public policies and institutions.  In this dissertation I explore the 
impact of a specific tax policy, the Mortgage Interest Deduction (MID), on different aspects of 
the housing market.  I also explore the role that racial discrimination plays in access to mortgage 
lending.  A recurring theme throughout the dissertation is an examination of the heterogeneous 
effects of policies and institutions on different social groups, including income class and race. 
The first essay is joint work with Andrew Hanson.  We use data on federal tax returns to 
estimate the sensitivity of mortgage interest deducted to the availability of the MID.  Our 
primary results show that for every one percentage point increase in the tax rate that applies to 
deductibility, the amount of mortgage interest deducted increases by $303–590.  This work 
complements a variety of studies1 that examine different margins on which the MID affects 
consumer behavior by capturing the joint effect of those decisions through mortgage interest 
payments as reported in tax returns.  We also compute the elasticity of mortgage interest and 
deadweight loss of the tax policy.  Finally, we calculate the change in tax expenditure by income 
class for each alternative policy that we consider.  The tax expenditure of the MID is highest for 
middle and upper-middle income classes.  The high elasticity estimates we find suggest that 
behavioral response to MID reform would substantially reduce the tax revenue generated from 
MID reform compared with static estimates, which is consistent with observations by Poterba 
and Sinai (2011). 
                                                 
1 Notable studies include Glaeser and Shapiro (2003), Dunsky and Follain (1997; 2000), Hendershott and Pryce 
(2006), and Poterba and Sinai (2008; 2011). 
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In the second essay I combine data on federal tax returns with local household data from 
the American Housing Survey to simulate the impact of MID reform on average home prices in 
twenty-seven cities.2  I employ the user cost model to simulate home price changes at both the 
city and neighborhood levels for three different reforms: eliminating the MID, converting the 
MID to a fifteen percent credit, and capping the MID at fifteen percent.  I also propose 
improvements to the user cost model by calibrating key parameters that are often taken on 
assumption in the existing literature.  I find that price effects vary substantially across cities; for 
instance, eliminating the MID would decrease prices by as much as 15.7 percent in Washington, 
D.C. and by as little as 3.2 percent in Memphis.  There is also substantial variation between 
neighborhoods that closely correlates to income levels.  I find suggestive evidence that the MID 
reinforces income class barriers between neighborhoods, and I estimate that the affordability gap 
between neighborhood income quartiles decreases by as much as 17.7 percent under MID 
reform. 
The third essay is joint work with Andrew Hanson, Zack Hawley, and Bo Liu.  We 
design and implement an experimental test for differential response by Mortgage Loan 
Originators (MLOs) to requests for information about loans.  Using an email audit technique, we 
test whether mortgage loan officers discriminate against potential clients on the basis of race.  
We find a net difference in response rate of 1.8 percent favoring whites.  A subset of our subjects 
are exposed to stated credit scores, allowing us to compare racial discrimination to credit 
discrimination.  We find that the response rate differential of being African American is 
equivalent to having a lower credit score by 71 points.  We also find that MLOs offer more 
details about loans and are more likely to send follow up correspondence to whites. 
                                                 
2 Previous studies that simulate city-level prices include Capozza et al. (1996) and Harris (2013). 
3 
 
On the whole, this work provides evidence of the heterogeneous effects of policy and 
institutions in the housing market.  The first essay shows how consumer behavior and tax policy 
interact to produce an uneven distribution of benefits across income classes and distortions in the 
housing market.  The second describes the uneven distribution of the MID across space, owing to 
differences in home prices, take-up rates through itemization and marginal tax rates.  The third 
essay describes the differential impact race has on access to credit. 
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Chapter I  
Housing Market Distortions and the Mortgage Interest Deduction3 
1. Introduction 
The largest government intervention in housing markets is the mortgage interest 
deduction (MID).  The Executive Office of the President (2011) estimates that the MID amounts 
to $98.5 billion in foregone revenues in 2012, and $609 billion between 2012 and 2016.  There is 
a large and growing literature suggesting that the MID distorts housing market decisions, mainly 
by increasing the demand for mortgage debt in favor of equity financing (Jones 1995; Ling and 
McGill 1998; Dunsky and Follain 2000; Hendershott and Pryce 2006; Poterba and Sinai 2011), 
or increasing the size of home (Hanson 2012b). 4  The MID may also distort decisions by 
inducing renters to become owners, incentivizing the purchase of a second home, purchasing a 
larger lot, choosing a longer term mortgage, changing the speed that debt is paid off, and 
inducing those who would otherwise claim the standard deduction to itemize their tax deductions 
(or to increase other itemized deductions).  The existing body of work on the distortions caused 
by the MID may not be sufficient to measure the full deadweight loss from the subsidy because it 
does not jointly capture all of these distortions. 
To capture the full distortion caused by the MID, we measure how sensitive mortgage 
interest deduction claims are to the interaction between MID availability and marginal tax rates.  
This is analogous to Feldstein (1995; 1999) relating the full distortion from of the income tax to 
the sensitivity of taxable income, rather than a more narrow measure like hours worked or labor 
                                                 
3 This essay is based on joint work with Andrew Hanson of Marquette University. 
4 Policy makers have taken notice that the MID is responsible for larger home purchases and some have offered 
policies to directly related to this.  Congressman John Dingell (D-MI) has proposed limiting the MID based on the 
square footage of a home.  See (Hanson 2013) for an analysis of this type of proposal. 
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force participation.  We relate the distortion from the MID to the sensitivity of mortgage interest 
deducted to capture the full distortionary effect of the deduction, rather than a more narrow 
measure like home size or self-reported levels of housing debt.  While we consider many of these 
more narrow measures interesting in their own right,5 a more comprehensive measure is 
necessary to accurately portray deadweight loss from the MID.6  
Using Internal Revenue Service ZIP code level data, we first estimate the sensitivity of 
MID claims to state level variation in top marginal income tax rates and availability of the MID.  
In addition to weighted least squares, we use several comparison groups to estimate this 
relationship, as well as estimating with instrumental variables.  Our primary results show that for 
every one percentage point increase in the top marginal tax rate, the amount of mortgage interest 
deducted increases by $303–590.  We then combine the empirical estimates with the user cost 
model of housing to produce elasticities of mortgage interest deducted with respect to the after-
tax cost of housing – these estimates range from -0.78 to -1.862.  With these elasticities in hand 
we estimate the total amount of deadweight loss caused by the MID to be between 16 and 36 
percent of the tax expenditure.  We also use our elasticity estimates to consider how sensitive 
federal revenues are to changes in MID policy, including switching the deduction to a credit or 
eliminating it entirely. 
The remainder of the paper begins by briefly discussing the existing literature on MID 
induced distortions.  Section 3 discusses our identification strategy for empirically estimating the 
sensitivity of mortgage interest deductions to availability and generosity of the deduction.  
                                                 
5 For example, from a policy perspective it is important to know if the MID is inducing home ownership, as this may 
aid in bringing home ownership rates to the socially optimal level if there are externalities from ownership.  
Evidence in (Glaeser and Shapiro 2003) and (Hanson 2012b) suggests that the MID is unrelated to ownership rates. 
6 An important limitation of our data is its inability to capture “wasted” deductions.  The IRS does not observe 
wasted deductions as tax filers do not report mortgage debt unless they itemize deductions.  This constrains our 
study to the extent that changes in policy considered here ignore the impact on wasted deductions. 
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Section 4 details the data we use in estimation, and Section 5 discusses our main empirical 
results and how they relate to elasticity, deadweight loss, and tax revenue estimates.  The final 
section of the paper concludes. 
2. Background and Related Literature 
The literature examining distortions from the mortgage interest deduction prior to 1990 
primarily focused on how deductibility alters the debt-financing decision of home purchasers. 
Smith, Rosen and Fallis (1988) summarize this literature and describe the primary distortion 
from the tax treatment of housing to be a substantial increase in homeownership rates, by as 
much as 4 percentage points.  The literature up to that time focused on identifying the 
relationship between ownership and generosity of the mortgage interest deduction using time-
series variation in the U.S. homeownership rate.  Later work, that shows no relationship between 
ownership rates and generosity of the MID, uses both time series and cross section variation  
(Glaeser and Shapiro 2003; Hanson 2012b).  
Beginning in the mid-1990s, the literature shifted focus to examine distortions from the 
MID in the home finance decision.  Jones (1995), using Canadian data, finds a significant effect 
of marginal tax rates on the amount of mortgage debt in a household’s portfolio.  Ling and 
McGill (1998) use 1985 and 1989 American Housing Survey data to estimate the effect of a 
variety of factors on mortgage debt, including income tax rates.  They find that mortgage debt is 
highly sensitive to the potential tax savings it offers.  Dunsky and Follain (1997; 2000) examine 
the impact of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) on the demand for mortgage debt using data 
from the Survey of Consumer Finances. TRA86 made tax savings on mortgage interest generally 
smaller by lowering marginal rates and increasing the standard deduction.  Dunsky and Follain 
find an elasticity of demand for mortgage debt with respect to the tax price of approximately -1. 
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Hendershott and Pryce (2006) estimate the sensitivity of mortgage debt to changes in the 
limits of deductibility, using data from the United Kingdom.  They also estimate tax revenue 
changes that would occur in response to changes in deductibility policy.  They then simulate the 
response of mortgage debt and tax revenue to the policy change of altogether removing the UK 
MID.  Using multiple specifications on multiple age brackets and across two regions they find 
declines in the loan-to-value ratios in response to a shift from full MID to no MID that range 
from 6.7 percent to 50.7 percent. 
Poterba and Sinai (2008; 2011) consider the tax expenditure implications of property tax 
and mortgage interest deductions.  They estimate elasticities of mortgage debt with respect to the 
after-tax interest rate to average -0.715 (they include several different estimates across income 
groups).  They model the way households might respond to an elimination of the MID and 
conclude that revenue from such a policy change would be $72.4 billion if households do not 
rebalance their portfolio in the face of tax adjustments and $58.5 billion if households do 
rebalance their asset portfolios. 
We extend the literature on the distortionary effects of the MID by offering a 
comprehensive measure of the response to changes in policy generosity by examining the effect 
on dollars deducted.  This measure captures the full distortion potential of the MID by 
encompassing all decisions that it may affect including: inducing renters to become owners, 
incentivizing the purchase of a second home, purchasing a larger lot, choosing a longer term 
mortgage, changing the speed that debt is paid off, and inducing those who would otherwise 
claim the standard deduction to itemize deductions (or increase other itemized deductions).  In 
contrast to previous work that relies on self-reported survey data, our data is only nominally self-
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reported, as tax returns carry penalties and the threat of audit when information is given 
inaccurately.     
3. Identification Strategy for Elasticity Estimates 
We use two primary techniques to identify the effect of the mortgage interest deduction 
on the amount of mortgage interest that tax filers deduct: weighted least squares (WLS) and 
instrumental variables (IV).7 Both identification strategies use variation in state MID policy 
combined with state marginal tax rate differences to identify the effects of the MID on interest 
deducted.  While the federal MID is available to all income taxpayers who itemize deductions, 
not all states have an income tax and not all states that have an income tax allow an MID. 
Following (Hanson 2012b), the WLS estimates use a variety of comparison groups to 
identify the effect of the MID on dollars of mortgage interest deducted including: all states, only 
other income tax states, and only states with a top marginal income tax above the median.  
Figure 1 shows the variation in MID policy we use to categorize states into groups.  As the figure 
shows, there are several states that choose not to allow an MID, while several others do not have 
an income tax and therefore do not allow an MID.  The WLS estimation may be biased if states 
choose MID policy endogenously – that is, if tax filers with large amounts of mortgage interest 
cause states to adopt an MID.  IV estimation mitigates this concern by instrumenting for state 
MID policy using adoption of all federal itemized deductions to explain the existence of a state 
level MID. 
                                                 
7 We also explored using regression discontinuity (RD) estimation across state borders with differing MID policies.  
This technique failed to produce results that were statistically meaningful.  One reason why the RD technique fails 
in this application is that areas near borders do not have a large number of ZIP codes, so statistical precision suffers. 
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Figure 1. State Tax Policy Regarding the Mortgage Interest Deduction 
 
 
3.1 Weighted Least Squares 
We use weighted least squares, rather than ordinary least squares, as our primary 
estimation technique to ensure our regressions are representative of the population of tax filers.  
Our data are at the ZIP code level (see data section for complete description), and since ZIP 
codes contain uneven numbers of tax filers we weight the regressions to get an appropriate 
estimate.  We weight our regression using the square root of the number of MID claims in each 
ZIP code and estimate the effect of the MID on the dollars of mortgage interest deducted with 
the following regression:  
𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝐷𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 = 𝛼 + β1𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑖 ∗ 𝑀𝐼𝐷𝑖 + 𝐙𝒊
′ + 𝜀 (1) 
Figure	1:	State	MID	and	Income	Tax	Policy	
MID not allowed 
MID allowed 
No state income tax  
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where 𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝐷𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 is the average amount of mortgage interest deducted per MID claim 
for each ZIP code, 𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑀𝑇𝑅 is the top marginal tax rate in the state, 𝑀𝐼𝐷 is an indicator variable 
equal to one if the state allows the MID and zero if it does not.8 𝒁 is a set of control variables that 
includes the average adjusted gross income (AGI) of tax filers, the proportion of tax filers 
claiming dependents, the proportion of tax filers completing a joint return, the average amount of 
all other itemized deductions per tax filer (and the square of this term), the proportion of filers 
subject to the alternative minimum tax, and the average dollar amount of alternative minimum 
tax (AMT) paid per AMT filer.9 We correct all standard error estimates in equation 1 for 
heteroskedasticity using the White (1980) correction following the explanation in (Winship and 
Radbill 1994), to account for the effects of the weighting procedure on standard errors. 
Using equation 1 to estimate the effect of the MID on the dollars of mortgage interest 
deducted relies on three primary assumptions.  First, tax filers in states without an MID make a 
valid counter-factual for what tax filers in states with an MID would deduct in the absence of the 
state level MID.  Second, there are no omitted variables influencing the amount of mortgage 
interest deducted that are correlated with availability of the MID.  Third, the MID is not 
endogenous – individuals with larger deductions do not cause states to have an MID.  
Controlling for observed factors alleviates some concerns about omitted variables.  Supposing 
unobservables might be correlated with income tax rates, we attempt to alleviate this concern by 
using alternative comparison groups of states with similar state income tax rates.  We use two 
alternative comparison groups: states without an MID but that have an income tax, and states 
                                                 
8 (Hanson 2012b) explains the benefits of using a proxy for an individual’s marginal tax rate, rather than the actual 
marginal tax rate, which is likely endogenous.  This explanation is based on the argument in (Angrist and Pischke 
2009) that proxies can reduce bias in estimation. 
9 An alternate set of controls includes a zip-code level housing price index, the results of which are presented in 
table 4.  See section 5 for a discussion of this specification. 
11 
 
without an MID but with a top marginal income tax rate higher than the median states of 
Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana and Missouri (each with a top marginal income tax rate of 6.00 
percent). 
3.2 Instrumental Variables 
Using alternative comparison groups may eliminate some of the unobservable differences 
between states that allow an MID and states that do not; however, it is still possible that 
unobservables exist and are correlated with MID policy.  It is also possible that classic 
endogeneity is still present – residents with high amounts of mortgage debt lobby states to enact 
mortgage interest deductions.  As a further guard against the possibility that omitted variables or 
reverse causality are a problem in equation 1, we estimate an IV specification. 
Our instrument for state level MID availability follows (Hanson 2012b), and is an 
indicator variable of whether a state follows the federal definition of itemized deductions.  An 
instrument in this case requires a variable correlated with a state allowing a deduction for 
mortgage interest, but only correlated with home size through its correlation with state MID 
policy.  A state’s adoption of the federal definition of itemized deductions is arguably 
uncorrelated with many of the potential sources of omitted variable bias and reverse causality 
between the MID and home size because it implies that the residents of the state did not actively 
lobby to get a MID.  States that take the federal definition of itemized deductions allow all 
federal deductions, not just the MID, so it is unlikely that having this policy is strongly correlated 
with resident preferences for housing consumption.  States still actively choose to allow the 
federal definition of itemized deductions, but this would most likely be the result of influence 
from a number of beneficiaries of such a decision as there are a variety of itemized deductions 
12 
 
including for medical and dental expenses, state and local taxes, gifts to charity, and business 
expenses incurred. 
Our first stage for the instrumental variables regressions is: 
𝑀𝐼𝐷𝑖 = 𝛼 + β1𝐹𝑒𝑑𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑖 + 𝐙𝒊
′ ∗ +𝜀 (2) 
where 𝐹𝑒𝑑𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚 is a dummy variable equal to one if a state follows the federal definition of 
itemized deductions, and zero otherwise, and 𝒁 is the same set of control variables from equation 
1.  We obtain the predicted values of 𝑀𝐼𝐷𝑖 for each ZIP code and use them in the second stage 
regression weighted by the number of tax filers in each ZIP code: 
𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝐷𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 = 𝛼 + β1𝑀𝐼𝐷?̂? ∗ 𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑖 + 𝐙𝒊
′ + 𝜀 (3) 
Table 1 shows the first stage IV results.  These results show a strong correlation between 
states that follow the federal definition of itemization and allowing a state level MID.  In both the 
specification with control variables and without them, the F-statistic is well above the customary 
10 that suggests instrument validity, showing that the correlation between the instrument and the 
potentially endogenous MID policy is quite strong. 
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Table 1. First Stage Instrumental Variable Results 
 No Controls Controls 
State Uses Federal Itemization Schedule 6.857*** 6.549*** 
 (0.0424) (0.0519) 
Adjusted gross income (in thousands)  -0.0230*** 
  (0.00292) 
Claiming dependents (proportion of)  1.279*** 
  (0.270) 
Joint filers (proportion of)  2.025*** 
  (0.285) 
Itemized deductions net of mortgage interest  0.0721*** 
    (in thousands)  (0.0120) 
Itemized deductions net of mortgage interest  -7.35e-06*** 
    (in thousands), squared  (2.44e-06) 
Alternative Minimum Tax (in thousands)  0.119*** 
  (0.0144) 
Filers paying AMT (proportion of)  7.020*** 
  (1.134) 
Constant 0.619*** -0.818*** 
 (0.0266) (0.174) 
   
Observations 31,399 31,399 
Instrument F-test (1, 31397) 26,140.68  
Instrument F-test (1, 31390)  15,948.56 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 
Source: IRS SOI personal income tax data from 2007, aggregated at the ZIP code level.  
State tax policy collected from individual taxing authorities. 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<.01 
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4. Data 
We use Internal Revenue Service (IRS) data on the universe of tax filers for 2007 to 
estimate equations 1 – 6.  The unit of observation in the IRS data is the ZIP code, broken into 
seven classes of AGI.  For our primary analysis we combine the data across seven classes into 
one observation per ZIP code (revenue estimates make use of the individual AGI classes).  The 
data is limited in several ways.  To protect taxpayer privacy, AGI classes with fewer than 10 
observations are combined with the next lowest class.10 Taxpayers whose income forms an 
undisclosed percentage of a ZIP code total are excluded entirely from the data.  Also, the IRS 
uses the self-reported ZIP code of each taxpayer and does not make any attempt to correct 
invalid ZIP codes or impute missing ZIP codes.  We view these limitations as minor, given the 
detail they provide about MID claims across geography. 
The data include counts of taxpayers who claim the MID as well as the total amount of 
mortgage interest deducted for all ZIP codes in the U.S. – from this we form the dependent 
variable, average MID claimed per return.  The IRS data contain other relevant information 
about dollar amounts and number of filers which we use to construct several control variables 
including: average adjusted gross income of tax filers, the proportion of tax filers claiming 
dependents, the proportion of tax filers completing a joint return, the average amount of all other 
itemized deductions per itemizer, the proportion of filers subject to the alternative minimum tax, 
and the average dollar amount of alternative minimum tax paid per AMT filer. 
                                                 
10 Many ZIP codes contain no information for the top AGI classes, indicating that their observations were combined 
with lower income classes.  As this might have impacted our analysis of alternate MID tax policy on individual AGI 
classes, we conducted revenue estimates with both the full sample and excluding any ZIP code with one or more 
missing AGI classes.  No estimate varied more than 3 percent when computing the subsample estimates.  We report 
only the full sample estimates here. 
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Although our data is only for one year of tax returns, we believe the advantages that it 
offers in terms of the micro-level of geography and the detail on both MID claims and dollars 
claimed are sufficient counter-weight to concerns about external validity across tax years.  
Indeed, subsequent releases of the IRS ZIP code file do not include as detailed of information 
about MID claims.11 Furthermore, the MID claimed in any given tax year is not the result of 
decisions made in that year alone – it is instead the product of many preceding years of decisions 
to contract for mortgage debt, with recent years weighted more heavily in the total due to the 
amortization schedules used in home loans. 
Table 2 provides summary statistics for the relevant variables we construct from the IRS 
tax return data.  The mean value of mortgage interest deduction is the mean of all ZIP code 
means, at $8,103.  Itemized deductions, AGI, and AMT are also means of the ZIP code means. 
 
Table 2. Summary Statistics 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Number of tax returns 38,541 3,869.71 6,122.61 10 98,117 
Mortgage interest deduction (in 
thousands) 
38,541 8.103 5.218 0.00 48.100 
Itemized deductions net of 
mortgage interest (in thousands) 
38,541 13.589 27.963 0.00 4.255 
Adjusted gross income (in 
thousands) 
38,541 48.569 105.247 -0.949 13.892 
Alternative Minimum Tax (in 
thousands) 
38,541 2.207 4.002 0.00 294.300 
Filers paying AMT (proportion of) 38,541 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.56 
Claiming dependents (proportion) 38,541 0.30 0.11 0.00 0.79 
Joint filers (proportion of) 38,541 0.38 0.13 0.00 0.94 
Source: IRS SOI personal income tax data from 2007, aggregated at the ZIP code level. 
                                                 
11 While the IRS provides data for  prior years up through 2008, prior year data does not break out the MID from 
itemized deductions; 2008 data provides MID amounts by ZIP code, but not number of claims, making the 
construction of our dependent variable impossible.  We check the consistency of our results by substituting average 
MID per return rather than per claimant.  While the estimate of this variable has a different interpretation, we find 
estimates for 2007 and 2008 agree within at most a margin of 12 percentage points on the coefficient of interest in 
table 3.  These tables are available from the authors upon request. 
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We combine the IRS data with state MID policy and top marginal tax rates using author 
assembled data from state tax forms for tax year 2007.  Two zip codes are listed in multiple 
states, which is a data anomaly.  Because we exploit state policy variation, we categorically 
exclude all returns in the two ZIP codes that erroneously cross state borders.   
5. Estimation Results, Elasticities, and Deadweight Loss 
Table 3 shows estimation results for equations 1 and 3.  These results show that the 
generosity of the mortgage interest deduction (as measured by the interaction between MID 
availability and state top marginal tax rate) is positively correlated with the amount of mortgage 
interest tax filers deduct.  The WLS results, shown in columns 1 – 6, suggest that for every 
percentage point increase in the top marginal tax rate, tax filers deduct an additional $303-590 of 
mortgage interest.  The magnitude of the coefficient of interest depends on the comparison group 
we use, with smaller magnitudes when the comparison group is “all other” states, and larger 
magnitudes when the comparison group is only states with an income tax rate above the median.  
The magnitude is slightly larger for specifications without control variables, and is statistically 
meaningful at less than the one percent level for all specifications. 
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Table 3. Effect of Mortgage Interest Deductibility on Annual Mortgage Interest Claimed 
 All Observations State Income Tax > 0 
State Income Tax > 
median IV: All Observations 
 
No 
Controls Controls 
No 
Controls Controls 
No 
Controls Controls 
No 
Controls Controls 
Top marginal tax ratea * (state  388.8*** 340.2*** 493.5*** 455.0*** 589.9*** 574.6*** 376.2*** 303.0*** 
    mortgage interest deduction 
    allowed = 1) 
(13.81) (12.01) (15.24) (11.53) (20.51) (15.14) (13.59) (11.54) 
Adjusted gross income (in thousands)  41.19***  28.02***  -0.637  38.21*** 
  (4.450)  (4.437)  (3.226)  (4.098) 
Claiming dependents (proportion of)  5,851***  7,441***  9,431***  6,054*** 
  (508.8)  (562.0)  (680.6)  (501.2) 
Joint filers (proportion of)  -3,023***  -2,761***  -4,995***  -2,710*** 
  (450.7)  (478.6)  (572.1)  (438.1) 
Itemized deductions net of mortgage   -95.20***  -49.42***  33.89**  -91.77*** 
    interest (in thousands)  (17.84)  (17.98)  (16.48)  (15.93) 
Itemized deductions net of mortgage   -0.0110  -0.0103  -0.0109**  -0.0112 
    interest (in thousands), squared  (0.0105)  (0.00768)  (0.00509)  (0.0107) 
Alternative Minimum Tax (in   174.9***  65.24**  57.29*  229.9*** 
    thousands)  (36.13)  (26.97)  (32.75)  (21.86) 
Filers paying AMT (proportion of)  42,141***  51,638***  64,786***  42,432*** 
  (2,621)  (2,454)  (2,165)  (2,552) 
         
Observations 32,779 32,779 27,289 27,289 18,062 18,062 31,399 31,399 
R squared 0.108 0.532 0.148 0.593 0.157 0.591   
Source: IRS SOI personal income tax data from 2007, aggregated at the ZIP code level.  State tax policy collected from 
individual taxing authorities. 
atax rate given in percent terms, i.e. 5.00 percent given as 5.00 
Note: All regressions are weighted according to number of returns.  Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<.01  ** p<.05  
* p<.10 (Clustering by Core Based Statistical Area results in standard errors between seven and ten times those reported above, 
with results still significant at the p<.01 level.  It also reduces the estimable sample.) 
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We also estimate each sample in WLS and IV using an alternate set of controls that 
includes a local home value index.  We use the average monthly ZIP code level home value 
index (HVI) for 2007 constructed by Zillow, a private firm that collects and uses real estate data.  
Adding this control departs fundamentally from our general equilibrium framework – whereas 
our other estimates permit the impact of the MID on all dimensions of the market (including 
home values) to be captured in the subsidy, the set of specifications that include HVI as a control 
breaks out one of the dimensions on which the MID presumably distorts markets. 
Table 4 reports the results of regressions that control for local home prices.  The 
coefficient of interest is now considerably lower, ranging from $96-240 for a one percent 
increase in the MID subsidy.  The effect is muted by the coefficient on the HVI, which ranges 
from $24-26.  This implies a linear change of one point in the HVI index leads to an increase of 
$24-26 in mortgage debt.   
These estimates reflect the impact of higher home values on a household’s decision to 
incur a dollar of mortgage interest in a separate coefficient from the one we focus on up to this 
point.  An argument can be made that controlling for home values improves counterfactual 
balance; however, home values are functionally related to the amount of mortgage debt a person 
carries.  Because of this, the meaning of the coefficient of interest is changed in these 
specifications – it no longer measures total response to the tax subsidy, but the response net of 
housing value change.  We prefer not to break apart mortgage debt response into some of its 
constituent components since our data does not allow an exhaustive breakdown to clearly 
interpret the separate coefficients.  Therefore our estimates going forward will not carry this 
alternate set of controls.  Given estimated coefficients roughly one-third of our preferred 
specifications, estimated elasticities can be cut to approximately one-third of those shown below.  
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Table 4. Effect of Mortgage Interest Deductibility on Annual Mortgage Interest Claimed 
(Including HVI) 
 
All 
Observations 
State 
Income Tax 
> 0 
State 
Income Tax 
> median 
IV: All 
Observations 
Top marginal tax ratea * (state  96.75*** 209.0*** 240.2*** 96.13*** 
    mortgage interest deduction 
    allowed = 1)  
(12.48) (12.72) (15.61) (10.71) 
Adjusted gross income (in  39.43*** 36.42*** 11.19** 40.06*** 
    thousands) (4.668) (3.563) (5.054) (4.456) 
Claiming dependents (proportion of) 11,719*** 12,112*** 12,718*** 11,888*** 
 (551.0) (516.6) (626.3) (499.3) 
Joint filers (proportion of) 6,370*** 6,192*** 5,965*** 6,333*** 
 (496.6) (470.3) (640.9) (483.9) 
Itemized deductions net of mortgage  -52.36*** -6.680 50.83*** -67.65*** 
    interest (in thousands) (19.80) (17.72) (18.91) (16.63) 
Itemized deductions net of mortgage  -0.219 -0.436*** -0.301*** -0.205 
    interest (in thousands), squared (0.149) (0.0911) (0.0704) (0.146) 
Alternative Minimum Tax (in  156.0*** 44.58 30.95 225.4*** 
    thousands) (51.83) (29.09) (29.23) (26.28) 
Filers paying AMT (proportion of) 813.8 5,705** 15,922*** 1,079 
 (3,251) (2,798) (3,459) (3,194) 
Zillow Home Value Index (per sqft) 26.44*** 24.62*** 24.37*** 26.20*** 
 (0.817) (0.832) (0.899) (0.777) 
     
Observations 9,456 7,837 5,231 9,283 
R squared 0.790 0.827 0.828  
Source: IRS SOI personal income tax data from 2007, aggregated at the ZIP code level.  
State tax policy collected from individual taxing authorities.  
atax rate given in percent terms, i.e. 5.00 percent given as 5.00 
Note: All regressions are weighted according to number of returns.  Robust standard errors 
in parentheses.  *** p<0.01  ** p<0.05  (Clustering by Core Based Statistical Area results 
in standard errors between seven and ten times those reported above, with results still 
significant at the p<.01 level.  It also reduces the estimable sample.) 
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Elasticity Estimates 
The WLS and IV coefficients provide quantity change estimates- how sensitive the 
amount of mortgage interest deducted is to a more generous MID.  Elasticity estimates require 
combining quantity change estimates with price change estimates.  To calculate price change 
estimates that are compatible with the quantity change estimates in table 3, we apply the user 
cost model of housing to a one percent change in the top marginal tax rate.  The user cost model 
relates how a change in the tax rate that applies to the MID effects the annual cost of purchasing 
housing.  There is a long literature that relates the tax treatment of owner occupied housing to the 
annual cost with the user cost model.  See Rosen (1979a; 1979b; 1985), Poterba (1984; 1992), 
Green and Vandell (1999a), Glaeser and Shapiro (2003), Himmelberg, Mayer and Sinai (2005), 
Anderson, Clemens, and Hanson (2007), and Poterba and Sinai (2008, 2011) as examples.   
We use the most recent version of the user cost model, presented in (Poterba and Sinai 
2011), as it includes several innovations from previous iterations.  Poterba and Sinai consider a 
housing specific risk premium as a cost to borrowers, while recognizing that buyers benefit from 
the reduction in risk associated with being able to pre-pay or default.  Thus, the model excludes 
the mortgage interest rate in excess of the risk free rate as a cost.  With these considerations, and 
current tax treatment, the user cost of housing with preferential tax treatment of mortgage 
interest is: 
𝑈𝐶 =  (1 − {τ𝐷𝜆 + τ𝑌(1 − 𝜆)})𝑟𝑇 +  (1 − τ𝑌)𝛽 − τ𝐷𝜆(𝑟𝑀 − 𝑟𝑇) + 𝑚 
+(1 − τ𝐷 − 𝑘)τ𝑃 − 𝜋 
(4) 
where τ𝐷 represents the marginal income tax rate applying to deductions, 𝜆 is the loan to value 
ratio, τ𝑌 is the marginal income tax rate applying to investment income.  𝑟𝑇 is the risk-free 
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interest rate, 𝛽 is a housing specific risk premium, and  𝑟𝑀 represents the mortgage interest rate.12 
𝑚 is annual maintenance and depreciation costs, and τ𝑃 is the local property tax rate.  The 
parameter 𝑘, also an innovation to the user cost model added by Poterba and Sinai (2011), allows 
flexibility in viewing the property tax as a benefit tax or an excise tax.  If the property tax is 
completely a benefit tax, then 𝑘 = 1, and we are left with only the deduction portion; if 𝑘 = 0, 
then the property tax is completely an excise tax and the full cost (minus deduction) is included; 
we assume that 𝑘 = 0.  𝜋 is expected annual home price inflation. 
The parameters we use to estimate the user cost change from a one percentage point 
increase in the marginal tax rate mostly follow(Poterba and Sinai 2011).  We construct a sample-
specific marginal income tax rate composed of an average of state marginal tax rates in each 
sample (weighted by the number of MID claims in each state) and a federal marginal tax rate of 
25 percent.  The weighted average state marginal tax rate ranges from 5.6 to 8.2 percent (the 
former belonging to all observations and the latter to the sample of states with a tax rate greater 
than the median of 6 percent).  This results in an assumed 𝜏𝐷 ranging from 30.6 to 33.2 percent.  
We also assume that the marginal income tax rate applying to investment income (τ𝑌) is 25 
percent, which is consistent with the short-term capital gains rate for 2007. 
Our standard assumption for loan to value ratio (𝜆) follows (Anderson, Clemens, and 
Hanson 2007); however, elasticity estimates are quite sensitive to this parameter so we also 
estimate elasticities using a value of 0.71, taken from the summary of prime loans securitized 
through Freddie Mac in 2007, as reported on-line by the Federal Reserve (Frame, Lehnert, and 
Prescott 2008).  We use the 2007 average interest rate on the 10-year U.S. treasury bond for 𝑟𝑇, 
                                                 
12 (Hanson 2012a) examines the possibility that mortgage interest rates are a function of the subsidy created by the 
MID.  He shows that that for every $1,000 borrowed without the MID, the interest rate on the entire loan decreases 
by between 3.3 and 4.4 percent, or that lenders capture between 9 and 17 percent of the subsidy. 
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and the average of monthly national average mortgage rates in 2007 for 𝑟𝑀 from HSH 
Associates.13 Poterba and Sinai (2011) assume a housing-specific risk premium (𝛽) of 2 percent, 
annual maintenance and depreciation costs (𝑚) of 4 percent, and an annual property tax rate (𝜏𝑃) 
of 1.04 percent- we follow in adopting these parameters.   
To construct expected house price inflation, we use data on actual house price inflation 
between 1991 and 2007.  We weight each state’s average annual home price inflation by the 
number of MID claims.  This data, reported by the Federal Housing Finance Agency,14 gives us a 
value for expected house price inflation (𝜋), of 5.78 percent.15
                                                 
13 HSH Associates is a private publisher of mortgage and consumer information.  They collect nation-wide data on 
mortgage interest rates on a weekly basis and maintain a historical series of this data on-line. National Monthly 
Mortgage Statistics: 2007. <http://www.hsh.com/natmo2007.html> 
14 Federal Housing Finance Agency, House Price Indexes available at <http://www.fhfa.gov/Default.aspx?Page=87> 
15 Expected house price inflation varies across location.  Our primary interest is in national revenue estimates, and 
our expected house price inflation reflects the weighted average of state price inflation rates used in a single user 
cost calculation.  This estimate would not suffice if discussing the impact of changing policies that vary regionally. 
For instance, an assessment of a single state’s elasticity response to modifying its own MID policy would be 
hampered by using the national-average appreciation we assume here. 
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Table 5. Elasticity of Mortgage Interest Deductibility with Respect to Tax Induced User Cost Change 
 All Observations State Income Tax > 0 
State Income Tax > 
median IV: All Observations 
No Controls Controls No Controls Controls No Controls Controls No Controls Controls 
Standard LTVa -1.21 -1.06 -1.47 -1.36 -1.62 -1.58 -1.16 -0.94 
Low LTVb  -1.02 -0.90 -1.24 -1.14 -1.35 -1.32 -0.98 -0.79 
aStandard LTV is 0.8 
bLow LTV is 0.71 
Note: User cost model from Poterba and Sinai (2011) using year-relevant data. All other parameters are equivalent (see 
paper for description of model and list of parameter values). 
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We combine user cost changes from equation 4 for a one percentage point increase in τ𝐷 
with the point estimates in table 3 to estimate the elasticity of mortgage interest deducted with 
respect to a tax induced user cost change, using the following equation: 
𝜖 =  
%∆ 𝑀𝐼𝐷
%∆ 𝑈𝐶
=
𝛽1
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑀𝐼𝐷
(1 −
𝑈𝐶𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑
𝑈𝐶𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑+1𝑝𝑐𝑡 
)
 (5) 
where 𝛽1 represents the coefficient on the interaction between the MID and top marginal tax rate 
in equations 1 and 3, depending on the specification.  𝑈𝐶𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 is the user cost calculated 
using the sample-specific marginal tax rate, and 𝑈𝐶𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑+1𝑝𝑐𝑡 is the user cost calculated by 
increasing the marginal tax rate by one percent.  Table 5 shows the elasticity estimates for all 
coefficient estimates in table 3 for both standard user cost assumptions and for the user cost 
model with a lower loan to value ratio. 
The elasticity estimates range in value from -0.79 to -1.62, depending on the point 
estimate and the user cost assumption about loan to value.  The average elasticity estimate across 
point estimates and user cost assumptions is -1.20.  The benchmark for comparison of these 
elasticities used to calculate deadweight loss in the literature is the standard assumption used by 
Poterba (1992) that the housing demand elasticity is -0.8.16 Only our most conservative elasticity 
estimate is smaller than the elasticity value assumed in Poterba, and in one case is more than 
double this value.  This suggests that examining the response of mortgage interest deducted, 
rather than housing consumption, will yield larger estimates of deadweight loss from the tax 
                                                 
16 This is the income compensated elasticity, the uncompensated price elasticity is assumed to be -1.0.  Our 
empirical estimates for the sensitivity of mortgage interest deducted to marginal tax rates control for income, so we 
take our elasticity estimates to be income compensated elasticities comparable to -0.8 used in (Poterba 1992).  If we 
were instead to treat our estimates as the uncompensated elasticity and solve for the compensated elasticity as in 
(Poterba 1992), our elasticity estimates would fall within the range of estimates presented here (between -.6 and -
1.4). 
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favored status of housing.  This is what we expect given that our measure encompasses a broader 
range of decisions. 
Deadweight Loss 
We follow the simple Harberger (1964) formula used in (Poterba 1992) to estimate the 
deadweight loss from the mortgage interest deduction.  We use total tax expenditure (𝑇) as the 
base for calculating deadweight loss instead of the aggregate housing market (price*quantity): 
𝐷𝑊𝐿 =  −
1
2
 𝜖 𝜃2𝑇, 𝜃2 = (1 −
𝑈𝐶𝑀𝐼𝐷
𝑈𝐶𝑁𝑜 𝑀𝐼𝐷
) (6) 
The user cost change resulting from the MID comes from the discount created by the 
federal MID, starting from a base with a marginal tax rate of 25 percent for τ𝐷 in the MID case 
and moving to 0 percent in the no MID case.  (The state component of τ𝐷 is omitted as we are 
only estimating the deadweight loss of the federal MID). All other user cost model parameters 
are the same as those used in equation 4. 
Table 6 shows deadweight loss estimates for a range of elasticity values (max, min, and 
average of the empirical estimates), and for both standard (0.8) and low (0.71) loan to value 
(LTV) ratios.  Table 6 also shows the percentage change in user cost created by the federal MID.  
Using the standard user cost assumptions and the Poterba and Sinai (2011) model, the MID is 
responsible for a 39 percent reduction in annual user cost.  Using the lower LTV parameter 
produces a slightly smaller user cost change of 36 percent.17 The deadweight loss estimates are 
also somewhat sensitive to the LTV choice, but are mainly driven by the elasticity. 
  
                                                 
17 Using previous versions of the user cost model, such as the version in (Poterba 1992), produce substantially 
smaller estimates of how much the MID reduces user cost.  These models generally show that the MID reduces 
annual cost by approximately 20 percent.  The elasticity estimates using these models, however, are substantially 
larger than the estimates in our paper.  On net, these models (using our updated empirical results to calculate 
elasticities) produce deadweight loss estimates that are about 10-15 percent larger than the ones we present here. 
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Table 6. Deadweight Loss from the Mortgage Interest Deduction 
 
High 
Elasticity 
Average 
Elasticity 
Low 
Elasticity 
Elasticity Estimate: -1.62 -1.20 -0.79 
    
Percent UC Changea Estimate  
MID vs. no MID: 
   
   Low LTV Assumption 35.50% 35.50% 35.50% 
   Standard Assumptions 38.77% 38.77% 38.77% 
    
Deadweight Loss (billions):    
   Low LTV Assumption $34.4 $25.4 $16.8 
   Standard Assumptions $37.6 $27.7 $18.3 
    
Percent of Tax Expenditure:    
   Low LTV Assumption 32.93% 24.27% 16.06% 
   Standard Assumptions 35.96% 26.51% 17.54% 
aPercent UC Change based on Federal tax policy only (assuming 25 percent Federal 
marginal tax rate). 
Note: Share of income spent on housing assumed to be 25 percent following (Poterba 
1992). 
 
The minimum value for the elasticity of mortgage interest deducted (-0.79) shows a 
deadweight loss of $17-18 billion annually, or about 16-18 percent of the total tax expenditure.18 
Using the maximum value elasticity shows about double the amount of deadweight loss: $34-38 
billion or 33-36 percent of the total tax expenditure.  The average elasticity value produces 
deadweight loss estimates of $25-27 billion, or 24-27 percent of total tax expenditure. 
Tax Revenue 
We also apply our estimates to generate tax revenue implications.  We consider three 
scenarios: (1) eliminating the MID altogether, (2) switching the MID to a uniform 15 percent 
credit on mortgage interest and (3) capping the MID at 28 percent (rather than a tax filer’s actual 
                                                 
18 Total tax expenditure is computed as the sum of foregone tax revenue at the imputed marginal tax rate of each 
AGI class multiplied by the mortgage interest deducted by each class.  In 2007 this amounts to $104.5 billion. 
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marginal tax rate).  We maintain internal validity by computing the effects of each policy on the 
seven AGI classes provided by the IRS data set separately before summing them in table 7.  
First, we estimate the marginal tax rate for each AGI class to be the average of the single and 
married-filing-jointly rates that would apply to the mean AGI for each class, weighted by the 
proportion of filers with joint and non-joint returns in each class.  This reflects the tax subsidy 
received per dollar of interest deducted under current tax law.  Then we compare each class’s 
user cost (using the parameters given above) under the current tax law to the three alternatives 
proposed above.  This forms the change in cost of housing to which we apply one of four 
elasticity estimates: zero (or no mortgage interest quantity adjustment) and the low, average and 
high elasticity estimates from table 3. 
As an example, by removing the MID altogether and assuming no decrease in mortgage 
interest consumption, the federal government could have raised an additional $104.5 billion in 
2007.  If we relax the assumption that no behavioral change will occur, the expected tax revenue 
falls to a range of $41-73 billion depending on the elasticity.  More specifically, we report the tax 
revenue estimates as they impact each of four income groups, providing insight into the variation 
driven by different income tax brackets.  As expected, eliminating the MID outright causes more 
revenue to be raised from earners in higher tax brackets assuming no MID quantity adjustment.  
If, however, we believe earners are responsive to changes in tax policy, revenue from higher 
income brackets falls off sharply at higher elasticities.  The static (no adjustment) assumption 
suggests earners with an AGI of less than $25,000 would pay an additional $3.4 billion versus 
earners with an AGI of more than $200,001 who would pay $25.6 billion in additional taxes.  
Contrast this with the high-elasticity dynamic scenario, where debt consumers are responsive to 
the elimination of the MID: in this scenario, the lowest income group pays more ($2.6 billion)  
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Table 7. Tax Revenue Estimates for MID Policy Changes 
 Static
a Dynamicb 
Elasticityc 
 
0 -1.62 -1.20 -0.79 
Income Class Revenue effects ($ Billions) 
Panel A: Eliminate the MID 
       AGI less than $25,000 $3.4 $2.6 $2.8 $3.0 
       AGI $25,001 - 75,000 $27.2 $15.4 $18.5 $21.4 
       AGI $75,001 - $200,000 $48.3 $20.2 $27.6 $34.6 
       AGI $200,001 and over $25.6 $2.3 $8.5 $14.3 
   Total Effect $104.5 $40.5 $57.3 $73.3 
     
Panel B: MID tax credit of 15% 
       AGI less than $25,000 -$1.7 -$2.0 -$1.9 -$1.8 
       AGI $25,001 - 75,000 $3.7 $3.2 $3.3 $3.5 
       AGI $75,001 - $200,000 $16.2 $11.1 $12.4 $13.7 
       AGI $200,001 and over $14.6 $4.6 $7.3 $9.8 
   Total Effect $32.8 $17.0 $21.1 $25.1 
     
Panel C: Cap MID at 28% 
       AGI less than $25,000 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 
       AGI $25,001 - 75,000 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 
       AGI $75,001 - $200,000 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 
       AGI $200,001 and over $5.1 $3.4 $3.9 $4.3 
   Total Effect $5.1 $3.4 $3.9 $4.3 
aStatic estimates assume no behavioral change in response to tax policy. 
bDynamic estimates incorporate behavior through elasticity operating on the change 
in user cost. 
cElasticities given are the low, average and high values derived from table 5. 
Note: Each scenario is separately applied to the seven AGI classes in the IRS SOI 
data set; classes are aggregated to four groups for reporting.  User cost model using 
standard parameters (see text for list).   
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than the highest ($2.2 billion) in additional taxes.  This reflects the large incentive high earners 
have to shift their debt consumption. 
Our model estimates substantial revenue gains from switching the MID to a 15 percent 
tax credit.  Switching the MID to a tax credit has been advocated recently by the Simpson-
Bowles Debt Commission, and in the past by President Bush’s Tax Reform Panel.  Revenue 
gains from the switch to a credit come despite using a dynamic estimate that allows for more 
mortgage interest to be deducted by lower income tax filers.  The credit achieves such gains by 
raising more revenue from the higher income classes (primarily those with income over 
$75,001).  It even reduces the tax burden on those with an AGI of less than $25,000 by nearly $2 
billion.  This simulation does not consider how making a new tax credit refundable would 
change these revenue estimates, but we expect the revenue reductions to be modest, as 
refundability would presumably also be limited to mortgages of a smaller size than the current $1 
million limit.     
The increase in revenues due to capping the MID at 28 percent is comparably quite low, 
between $3.4 and 5.1 billion depending on the elasticity estimate used. This reflects the fact that 
such a policy would only affect taxpayers in higher brackets, and only by the relatively small 
difference between 28 percent and the top tax brackets.  The results for all three tax law changes 
are summarized in table 7.19 
A key implication of these estimates is the relative uncertainty of the implications of tax 
policy changes.  Even with the novel data available to us, the estimates of elasticity range 
widely.  Table 7 should therefore be cautiously interpreted as an example of the possible changes 
                                                 
19 Recall that the IRS excludes returns that compose more than an undisclosed percentage of a ZIP code’s total AGI; 
this would cause revenue estimates here to exclude some of the wealthiest itemizers of mortgage interest.  We 
believe this is a minor issue that would not significantly impact the accuracy of the revenue estimates, as this is a 
small share of tax filers, and deductibility is capped at interest paid on $1 million in mortgage debt. 
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to tax revenue using elasticities that vary somewhat widely.  No single number presents itself as 
a take-away conclusion without making strong assumptions about which elasticity is correct.  
Table 7 is more useful to illustrate the pattern of impact that might result from a change in tax 
policy on different income classes, and to compare the relative impact of different tax policies. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper estimates the distortions caused by the mortgage interest deduction.  Using 
IRS data at the ZIP code level data we are able to exploit state variations in the availability of the 
mortgage interest deduction using both weighted least squares regression and IV estimation.  We 
found relatively consistent estimates of the total change in mortgage interest deducted across 
these estimates.  Our results show that a one percentage point increase in the tax rate that applies 
to deductibility increases the amount of mortgage interest deducted by $303–590.  Employing a 
user cost model we find this translates to elasticities of mortgage interest deducted with respect 
to the after-tax cost of housing between -0.79 and -1.62, and deadweight loss estimates ranging 
from 16-36 percent of MID tax expenditure.   
Our approach to measuring deadweight loss from the MID examines the net effect of the 
policy and incorporates the wide array of potential distortions that it may cause, rather than 
examining the more narrow outcomes highlighted in previous work. This is a useful addition to 
specific-choice estimation because it does not rely on the precision of theory behind specific 
choices – regardless of the motivating factors, our estimate captures the entire effect of tax policy 
on the quantity decision it is aimed at: the selection of mortgage interest to pay.  All of these 
choices factor into the deadweight loss of the deduction itself, and all of them are wrapped up in 
the sensitivity consumers have to the price of mortgage debt.  
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Our elasticities imply that previous estimates of the tax revenue generated by a reduction 
in the MID that do not account for full behavioral change are too large.  The tax revenue 
estimates given in table 7 provide a map for the relative magnitude of revenues gained when 
considering behavioral change under several policies.  Notably our estimates for switching to a 
tax credit generate a surprising amount of revenue and expand ownership incentives to lower 
income tax payers.  Our work also suggests that the MID is likely to be a more substantial drag 
on economic efficiency than previous estimates suggest, as we show larger elasticities that 
account for behavioral change across several dimensions.  The idea that the MID causes 
inefficiency is inherently tied to two ideas: that imputed rents should be taxed according to a 
Haig-Simons view of income, and that the MID does not encourage homeownership on the 
margin (and that homeownership creates a positive externality).  The most recent empirical 
evidence (Hanson 2012b) suggests that the MID does not encourage homeownership.  We view 
taxing imputed rents as a way to make the MID an appropriate tax policy, although we question 
the practicality of such an undertaking. 
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Chapter II  
The Impact of Housing Tax Preferences on Home Values and Neighborhood Sorting 
1. Introduction 
The mortgage interest deduction (MID) is a significant tax benefit to homeowners.  The 
Congressional Budget Office estimates that the MID cost $70 billion in foregone tax revenues in 
2013, or nearly half a percent of GDP (Congressional Budget Office 2013).  In 2011 it was 
claimed by twenty-five percent of all tax filers.  A variety of studies suggest that, to varying 
degrees, the MID encourages debt financing (Dunsky and Follain 1997; Dunsky and Follain 
2000; Hendershott and Pryce 2006; Poterba and Sinai 2011), buying larger homes (Hanson 
2012b), and becoming owners rather than renters (Green and Vandell 1999b).  Much of this 
literature is focused on either the tax consequences or the behavioral impacts of the MID reform. 
Previous work provides little discussion of the MID’s impact on home prices, yet 
consumers, bankers and policymakers are likely to view a change in housing prices as among the 
most significant consequences of reforming the MID.  Home equity is a significant component of 
homeowner wealth, and changes to home values would impact a household’s current and future 
spending ability.  The price effects of MID reform can be thought of as an adjustment cost of 
correcting what is generally seen as a market-distorting tax subsidy, and they do not fall evenly 
across space. This paper simulates the price effects of MID reform across a set of cities, and at 
the neighborhood level within select cities, advancing the literature in several ways. 
First, this study simulates average home price effects for twenty-seven different metro 
areas as well as neighborhood-level effects in nineteen metro areas.  Using city- and ZIP code-
level data on housing, I simulate changes to local housing prices for three different policy 
reforms: eliminating the MID altogether, converting the MID to a fifteen percent refundable tax 
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credit, and capping the MID at a rate of fifteen percent. I find that simulated price changes vary 
substantially from city to city: eliminating the MID results in an average home price decline in 
Washington, D.C. of 15.7 percent, whereas the average home price in Memphis, TN would fall 
by only 3.2 percent.  Price changes also vary substantially between policies.  For instance, 
converting the MID to a fifteen percent refundable credit would reduce prices in Washington, 
D.C. by only 0.6 percent and raise the average price in Memphis by 9.4 percent.  In addition, 
simulations at the neighborhood level reveal substantial variation in price changes within a metro 
area due to sharp differences in characteristics among neighborhoods. 
Second, it provides empirical support for the idea that the MID induces neighborhood 
sorting on income; this result follows from the simulated neighborhood-level price effects.  
While previous studies have observed that the marginal benefits of the MID increase with 
income level (Glaeser and Shapiro 2003; Hanson and Martin 2014), this study examines the 
distributional impact of the MID in a spatial setting.20  I break neighborhoods into income 
quartiles and compute an average “affordability gap,” or the increase in user cost necessary for 
the median household in a given income quartile to move to the median home one quartile higher 
within the same city.  I find that the average affordability gap shrinks under each reform, in one 
case by as much as 17.7 percent.  This implies that, by preferentially subsidizing wealthy 
households, the MID also subsidizes household sorting by income across neighborhoods. 
Third, it estimates key parameters in the user cost model of housing in order to calibrate 
it.  This model is used extensively in the public finance and real estate literatures to describe 
housing costs, yet its parameters are often either taken on assumption or proxy values are used.  
One troublesome parameter is the expected home price inflation rate; I use spatial variation to 
                                                 
20 Voith and Gyourko (2002) provide a theoretical discussion of the contribution of the MID and other tax 
preferences to household sorting on income. 
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produce a first-order coefficient for the proxy of long-run historic price inflation, which I use to 
improve price predictions in the model.  I also estimate the degree to which homeowners view 
local property tax as an excise tax (rather than a benefit tax).  The public finance literature 
remains unsettled on this question; previous studies that incorporate this feature in a user cost 
model typically assume a value. 
Finally, it estimates behavioral adjustments to MID policy change on two dimensions: the 
propensity of tax filers to itemize deductions and the degree to which homeowners utilize debt 
financing in response to changes in the MID.  Taking account of these behavioral adjustments in 
price simulations results in differences of up to 1.9 percentage points from a set of simulations 
that ignore behavioral adjustments. 
The paper proceeds as follows: section 2 describes prior related work; section 3 discusses 
the theoretical underpinnings of the model; section 4 briefly describes the data; section 5 
describes how the model is adjusted to simulate specific policy changes; section 6 explains the 
identification strategy for estimated parameters; section 7 presents the results; section 8 provides 
discussion and concludes. 
2. Background and Related Literature 
In the growing literature on the effects of the MID, many focus on the tax expenditure of 
reforming the MID or the behavioral impacts of the policy (Dunsky and Follain 1997; Green and 
Vandell 1999b; Dunsky and Follain 2000; Poterba and Sinai 2011; Hanson 2012b; Hanson and 
Martin 2014).  Gyourko and Sinai (2003; 2004) discuss the spatial pattern of the benefits 
received from tax preference.  In each of these studies, price effects are secondary if they are 
present at all. 
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Some studies simulate home prices, often with the user cost model, but to ends other than 
analyzing the impact of the MID or other tax preferences.  For instance, Himmelberg et al. 
(2005) is concerned with detecting housing bubbles, while Capozza et al. (2002) deals with local 
economic shocks. 
A few studies have directly modeled changing home prices in response to MID reforms.21  
Capozza et al. (1996) report the impact of eliminating both the property tax deduction and the 
MID on a set of twenty-five22 metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs).  One feature unique to their 
study is to allow local governments revenue neutrality; this makes property tax as a percent of 
home price depend on the home price, and therefore endogenous to federal housing tax 
preferences.  Their study lacks localization of other key parameters, however: loan-to-value 
(LTV) ratios are assumed to be forty percent nationally, with a rudimentary assumption about 
behavioral adjustment that homeowners might decrease the LTV ratio to twenty-five percent in 
response to eliminating the tax preferences.  When eliminating both the property tax deduction 
and the MID, they find that home prices would fall on average by seventeen percent if LTV 
ratios do not adjust, and by thirteen percent if they do. 
Bruce and Holtz-Eakin (1997) perform a dynamic simulation of the national housing 
market in response to several policies, including eliminating the property tax deduction and the 
MID.  They predict a minor, short-term price decrease.  A more recent study by Harris (2013) 
models price changes in twenty-three metro areas in response to four MID policy reforms.  
Unique to this study is the incorporation of transaction costs of selling the home, which are 
amortized over tenure length to reflect user cost more accurately. 
                                                 
21 Studies from the mid-1990s also focused on the impact of various flat or consumption tax proposals, including 
Capozza et al. (1996) and Bruce & Holtz-Eakin (1997). 
22 Capozza et al. (1996) reports the fourteen largest and nine smallest price changes using 1990 data, though they 
have data for sixty-three MSAs altogether. 
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The role of the MID as an inducement to spatial sorting is largely undeveloped in the 
literature. Voith and Gyourko (2002) offer a theory that the MID (and other tax preferences for 
housing that scale with income level) may intensify sorting on income under the condition of 
minimum lot size zoning laws in the suburbs.  To my knowledge no efforts exist to measure this 
effect empirically. 
Though there have been several evolving characterizations of the user cost model in the 
literature, there are few attempts either to empirically estimate the validity of the model or to 
validate one or more of the proxies used to populate it.  Capozza et al. (1996) discuss a 
regression that empirically tests the user’s valuation of the property tax deduction and the MID.  
The test validates the common characterization of those deductions in the user cost model. Their 
purpose is not to re-weight the proxies used in the user cost model, but to evaluate whether tax 
preferences cause price or quantity effects.  Their evidence supports the former: that tax 
subsidies such as the property tax deduction and the MID are capitalized in land prices.  Rosen 
(1979a) tests two versions of the user cost model in which property taxes are assumed alternately 
to be benefit or excise taxes, and finds no statistical difference between the assumptions.  He also 
notes the difficulty in selecting a proxy for expected price appreciation.23 
In order to assess the effects of a change in housing demand on market prices, one needs 
a model of housing supply.  Some studies either assume (Bruce and Holtz-Eakin 1997) or 
empirically estimate (Malpezzi and Maclennan 2001) supply elasticity to be higher than zero.  
Others argue that supply elasticity rests near zero (Capozza, Green, and Hendershott 1996; 
Glaeser, Gyourko, and Saks 2006; Harris 2013).  In general, it is agreed that elasticity is higher 
                                                 
23 The question of how to weight property tax in the user cost model is equivalent to the still-undecided question of 
how much property tax is capitalized in home values.  See Sirmans et al. (2008) for a description of the range of 
empirical findings. 
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at the city edge, where undeveloped land is available, than it is within a mature city structure.  
Because my simulation focuses on metropolitan areas I take the view that supply elasticity is 
effectively zero.  This is further supported by an argument put forward in Glaeser et al. (2006) 
that supply elasticity is unlikely to be symmetric due to the durable nature of housing – while 
rising prices might elicit construction starts, falling prices almost certainly don’t invoke housing 
destruction.  Two of the three policies I simulate suggest price decreases. 
In this paper, I contribute to the literature on the MID in several ways.  I offer a more 
nuanced view of the price effects of MID reform by employing highly local parameters in the 
user cost model to simulate city and neighborhood price changes.  I also capture behavioral 
adjustments to MID reform that previously have either been ignored or their values assumed.  In 
addition, I produce estimates of the user cost model to calibrate key parameters for which 
existing proxies are tenuous.  Finally, I provide a data-driven discussion of the MID as a subsidy 
to neighborhood sorting on income and the potential for such sorting to diminish under MID 
reform.  
3. Model Design 
Simulating changes to average home prices rests on three primary components: a model 
to determine home prices, model adjustments to reflect MID reforms, and estimates of key 
parameters to calibrate the model.  In this section I discuss the model used to simulate changes to 
home prices; in section 5 I adjust the model to compute average prices under three different MID 
reforms; and in section 6 I describe an estimation strategy for key parameters. 
I model price changes with the user cost model of housing.  This model derives from a 
capital-asset valuation approach to housing.24 It implies that, at a competitive equilibrium, a 
                                                 
24 An early discussion of this model appears in Poterba (1984; 1992). 
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homeowner’s marginal cost of housing services is equal to the opportunity cost of 
homeownership, which is termed his imputed rent.  For a simple, durable good with no tax 
preference and a stable value, the imputed rent is straightforward: the opportunity cost of 
obtaining the good is the interest one would have earned with the money used to purchase the 
good (or if the good is debt financed, it is the explicit outlay of interest payments for the loan).  
Assuming the interest rate is the same in either case, one can write 
 𝑅 = 𝑃𝑟 (7) 
where 𝑅 is the imputed rent over a given period, 𝑃 the purchase price and 𝑟 the period interest 
rate.  By rearranging terms, we can characterize the user cost of a unit of housing services, or 
𝑈𝐶: 
 
𝑈𝐶 =
𝑅
𝑃
= 𝑟 
(8) 
Housing is, of course, neither entirely durable nor stable in value over time.  The asset 
deteriorates, homeowners make repairs, and market conditions alter the expected future return 
from selling the asset.  Also, local communities typically charge property tax.  Adding these 
features to the model yields a user cost of: 
 𝑈𝐶 = 𝑟 + 𝜏𝑃 + 𝑚 + 𝛿 − 𝜋 (9) 
where 𝑚 and 𝛿 reflect annual maintenance and depreciation costs respectively, 𝜋 reflects the 
expected price appreciation rate, and 𝜏𝑃 is the local property tax rate. 
Property taxes are not the only tax event that affects the user’s cost.  He also receives the 
MID and a property tax deduction through the US tax code.25  For every dollar of mortgage 
                                                 
25 These are claimed by itemizing one’s income tax return.  I internalize the propensity of homeowners to itemize 
returns in the model below.  Some states allow these deductions on state tax returns, a fact I exploit in the 
identification of behavioral parameters in section 6. 
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interest (or property tax) paid, the homeowner reduces his taxable income by one dollar, and his 
tax burden falls by one dollar times his marginal tax rate (MTR), 𝜏𝑖𝑛𝑐.  His user cost becomes: 
 𝑈𝐶 = (1 − 𝜏𝑖𝑛𝑐)(𝑟 + 𝜏𝑝) + 𝑚 + 𝛿 − 𝜋 (10) 
This is the characterization of user cost presented in (Poterba 1992). 
Poterba and Sinai (2011) summarize further revisions to the user cost model of housing.  
They include: the flexibility for a homeowner to split financing between debt and equity; a 
distinct risk class for returns to homeownership; the benefit to homeowners from the option to 
prepay or default on their mortgage; and the flexibility for homeowners to characterize property 
taxes as either a benefit or an excise tax.  The full model incorporating these features is: 
 𝑈𝐶 = [1 − {𝜏𝑖𝑛𝑐 ∗ 𝜆 + 𝜏𝑦 ∗ (1 − 𝜆)}𝑟𝑇 + (1 − 𝜏𝑦) ∗ 𝛽 − 𝜏𝑖𝑛𝑐 ∗ 𝜆 ∗ (𝑟𝑀 − 𝑟𝑇)
+ 𝑚 + 𝛿 + (1 − 𝜏𝑖𝑛𝑐 − 𝜅) ∗ 𝜏𝑝 − 𝜋 
(11) 
where 𝜆 is the percent of the home value financed through debt (i.e. the LTV ratio),  𝜏𝑦 is the 
income tax rate on capital gains,  𝑟𝑇 is the risk-free rate of return in the market, 𝑟𝑀 is the 
mortgage interest rate, 𝛽 is the risk premium associated with homeownership and 𝜅 signifies the 
degree to which homeowners perceive the property tax to be a benefit tax (versus an excise 
tax).26  
In order to operationalize the user cost model to simulate a local housing market using 
aggregated data, I modify it as follows: 
 𝑈𝐶𝑗 = 𝐼(𝑔)𝑗 ∗ 𝑈𝐶𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒,𝑗 + (1 − 𝐼(𝑔)𝑗) ∗ 𝑈𝐶𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑,𝑗 (12) 
This is the weighted average user cost across market 𝑗 of households that itemize deductions 
(and face 𝑈𝐶𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒) and those that take the standard deduction (and face 𝑈𝐶𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑).  𝐼(𝑔)𝑗 is 
                                                 
26 In section 6 I present an empirical test designed to estimate 𝜅. 
40 
 
the portion of tax filers who itemize their deductions in market 𝑗.  It depends on 𝑔, the generosity 
of the MID; empirically, as the MID grows more generous, more tax filers are inclined to itemize 
their returns.  The function is therefore increasing in 𝑔. 
I make several other changes to the user cost model in order to make it sufficiently 
flexible to simulate changes to market prices with the data at hand.  First, estimates in section 7 
suggest that LTV ratios are sensitive to the deductibility of mortgage interest.27  My model 
employs 𝜆(𝑔)𝑗, the LTV ratio as a function of policy generosity in market 𝑗.28  Because I intend 
to manipulate the MID independent of the property tax deduction, I also disambiguate the 
income tax rate, 𝜏𝑖𝑛𝑐, into two variables: 𝜏𝑀−𝑑𝑒𝑑, the MTR at which mortgage interest is 
deducted, and 𝜏𝑃−𝑑𝑒𝑑, the MTR at which property taxes are deducted.  (Under current tax code, 
these two rates are the same.)  With these changes, the user cost facing itemizers becomes: 
 𝑈𝐶𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒,𝑗 = [1 − {𝜏𝑀−𝑑𝑒𝑑,𝑗 ∗ 𝜆(𝑔)𝑗 + 𝜏𝑦 ∗ (1 − 𝜆(𝑔)𝑗)}] ∗ 𝑟𝑇 + (1 − 𝜏𝑦) ∗ 𝛽
− 𝜏𝑀−𝑑𝑒𝑑,𝑗 ∗ 𝜆(𝑔)𝑗 ∗ (𝑟𝑀,𝑗 − 𝑟𝑇) + 𝑚𝑗 + (1 − 𝜏𝑃−𝑑𝑒𝑑,𝑗 − 𝜅)
∗ 𝜏𝑃,𝑗 − 𝜋𝑗  
(13) 
and the user cost facing tax filers who claim the standard deduction becomes: 
 𝑈𝐶𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑,𝑗 = (1 − 𝜏𝑦)[(1 − 𝜆(𝑔)𝑗) ∗ 𝑟𝑇 + 𝛽] + 𝑟𝑇𝜆(𝑔)𝑗 + 𝑚𝑗 + (1 − 𝜅)
∗ 𝜏𝑃,𝑗 − 𝜋𝑗 
(14) 
                                                 
27 Previous literature describes the effect of the MID on LTV ratios: see for examples Dunsky and Follain (2000), 
Hendershott and Pryce (2006), and Poterba and Sinai (2011). 
28 Further details about the estimation of 𝐼(𝑔)𝑗 and 𝜆(𝑔)𝑗 can be found in section 6. 
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Market-level parameters are employed for MTRs,29 LTV ratios, maintenance rates, property tax 
rates and expected price appreciation.30   Each market’s simulated price is therefore responsive to 
an array of local market conditions. 
This framework forms the basis by which I estimate price changes that result from policy 
changes to the MID in each market.  Working from the identity: 
 𝑅𝑗
𝑃𝑗
= 𝑈𝐶𝑗 
(15) 
I first impute rents (𝑅𝑗) for each market by multiplying the reported average prices (𝑃𝑗) by the 
user cost (𝑈𝐶𝑗).31 The new home price resulting from any change in MID policy is found by 
solving: 
 
𝑃𝑗
∗ =
𝑅𝑗
𝑈𝐶𝑗
∗ 
(16) 
where 𝑅𝑗 is the imputed rent found using current policy data, 𝑈𝐶𝑗
∗ is the user cost reflecting an 
MID policy change, and 𝑃𝑗
∗ is the home price resulting from the policy change. 
Following the argument by Glaeser et al. (2006) I assume that the price elasticity of 
supply is zero – that is, when changes to the MID change the user cost, the homeowner 
capitalizes (or de-capitalizes) the savings (or additional expense) into the home price, resulting in 
                                                 
29 I derive ZIP code-level averages of 𝜏𝑀−𝑑𝑒𝑑,𝑗.  See equation 17 in section 6 for details. 
30 I drop 𝛿 from the model because I consider 𝜋𝑗 to measure net appreciation in the local market when using historic 
appreciation rates as a proxy.  Homeowners offset annual depreciation somewhat by spending 𝑚𝑗 to improve their 
home.  If 𝑚𝑗 does not restore the home to “like-new” condition, then the quality of the housing stock declines.  In 
the typical model, 𝜋 would reflect the expected gains on the asset in constant quality condition, necessitating the use 
of 𝛿 to reflect the real-world changes in quality.  When using observed local appreciation rates as a proxy for 
expected price appreciation, any declines in quality are already built into resale prices.  This is a departure from 
Poterba and Sinai (2011), who include a conventional estimate of 𝛿 as well as a historical proxy for 𝜋 in their model. 
31 Both Capozza et al. (1996) and Harris (2013) use a measure of actual market rents when computing user cost.  My 
approach is to use imputed rent based on extensive parameter values for this purpose, and reserve market rents for 
estimating coefficients on select terms in the user cost model. 
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no change to his imputed rent. 32  I assume a supply elasticity of zero because my simulation 
focuses on metropolitan areas, where lot densities are largely established and land is fully 
utilized.  This results in larger price changes due to a given policy change than would prevail 
under a somewhat elastic housing supply curve. 
4. Data 
I use city- and ZIP code-level aggregates to parameterize the user cost model for use in 
simulation.  Table 8 describes each variable along with its source, geographic levels for which it 
is available, and whether it is used as part of an estimation or simulation.  The two primary 
sources of data are the 2011 Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Statistics of Income (SOI) and the 
2011 American Housing Survey (AHS). 
2011 IRS Statistics of Income 
The IRS makes available ZIP code-level summaries of individual income tax variables 
from personal income tax returns.  The full 2011 data file contains statistics for 32,515 ZIP 
codes.  While nominally self-reported, these data derive directly from personal income tax 
returns.  Each item in the report includes the number of tax filers that report the item and the 
gross amount reported in each ZIP code.  From these raw data I construct the variables: average 
adjusted gross income (AGI), average alternative minimum tax (ATM), average taxable income, 
proportion of tax filers claiming dependents, proportion of tax filers filing jointly, and proportion 
of tax filers claiming the MID.  In addition, I match the average taxable incomes and the 
proportion of tax filers filing jointly to the marginal income tax rates in 2011 in order to estimate 
an average marginal tax rate (MTR) for each ZIP code.  I use the formula:   
  
                                                 
32 In the typical market, just a portion of homeowners itemize deductions.  This fact is internalized in my simulations 
by averaging the user cost of itemizers and non-itemizers by their respective abundance in a given market. 
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Table 8. Description of Variables 
   Geographic Level  Used In 
Variable Description Symbol Source Z
IP
 C
o
d
e 
A
H
S
 Z
o
n
e 
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it
y
 
S
ta
te
 
N
at
io
n
 
  S
im
u
la
ti
o
n
 
E
st
im
at
io
n
 
Average adjusted gross income  SOI x       x 
Proportion of tax filers claiming 
dependents 
 SOI x       x 
Proportion of tax filers filing jointly  SOI x      x x 
Average alternative minimum tax paid  SOI x       x 
Proportion of tax filers paying AMT  SOI x       x 
Average Taxable Income  SOI x        
Home Value Index/sqft 𝑃𝑠𝑞𝑓𝑡 Zillow x  x     x 
Rental Price/sqft 𝑅𝑎,𝑠𝑞𝑓𝑡 Zillow x  x     x 
Proportion of tax filers claiming the MID 𝐼 SOI x      x x 
1= state adopts federal itemization 
schedule 
𝑈𝑠𝑒𝐹𝑒𝑑 Hanson    x   x x 
State marginal tax rate 𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑀𝑇𝑅 Hanson  x x x   x x 
Loan-to-value ratio 𝜆 AHS  xa x    x x 
Household income  AHS  xa x     x 
Number of minors in home  AHS  xa x     x 
Annual maintenance (% of home value) 𝑚 AHS  xa x    x x 
Property taxes (% of home value) 𝜏𝑃 AHS  x
a
 x    x x 
Home value 𝑃 AHS  xa x    x  
Mortgage interest rate 𝑟𝑀 AHS  x
a
 x    x x 
Risk-free interest rate (Treasuries) 𝑟𝑇 Treasury     x  x  
Capital Gains tax rate 𝜏𝑦 IRS     x  x  
Risk premium on housing 𝛽 Poterba     x  x  
Historical home price appreciation/sqft Π Zillow   x    x x 
Source: SOI indicates data from the IRS Statistics of Income report.  AHS indicates data from 
the American Housing Survey in 2011.  Zillow is a private firm reporting aggregates of 
pricing across different geographies.  Poterba indicates assumptions made in Poterba & Sinai 
(2011).  Hanson indicates data collected in (Hanson 2012b).  
aThe AHS includes two samples: the full sample identifies a household's city, while a subset 
of households are identified at the within-city zone level. 
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 𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑗 = 𝐽𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑗 ∗ 𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑗𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡(𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑗) + (1 − 𝐽𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑗)
∗ 𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒(𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑗) 
(17) 
to compute the average MTR, 𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑗, for each zipcode 𝑗.  𝐽𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑗 is the percent of tax filers 
who are married and filing jointly; 𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑗𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡( ) is a function that returns the MTR for married 
couples filing jointly with a taxable income of 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑗; and 𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒( ) is a function that 
returns the MTR for single tax filers.33 
2011 American Housing Survey 
The AHS is a survey administered by the US Census Bureau on behalf of the Department 
of Housing and Urban Development.  Both its format and scope have changed over time.  The 
2011 survey includes two samples of owner-occupying households: 63,931 households across 
144 metro areas, with a subsample of 56,391 households in twenty-nine focus cities.34  The data 
includes variables on household characteristics, dwelling characteristics and income.  Specific 
variables I use include the LTV ratio, household income, number of minors in the home, annual 
maintenance expenditure, annual property tax expenditure, home value and the mortgage interest 
rate. 
Because data are self-reported, certain anomalies occur.  The data also contains top- or 
bottom-codes for certain variables.  I exclude any observation that has one or more of the 
following conditions: a top- or bottom-code, an imputed (rather than reported) value, a home 
price of less than $1,000, a reported annual appreciation rate of greater than one hundred percent 
                                                 
33 This estimate ignores the tax-filing statuses of single head of household and married filing separately, each of 
which have MTR schedules that fall between those of married filing jointly and single, due to data limitations.  This 
method guarantees that a given ZIP code’s estimated average MTR will be equal to or higher than its actual average 
MTR, as any tax return of a status other than married filing jointly is grouped in the most aggressive marginal tax 
schedule. 
34 Location information is missing for some households.  The total number of owner-occupied households in the 
2011 AHS is 98,662. 
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or less than minus fifty percent, and either no property tax35 or property tax in excess of ten 
percent36 of the home value.  I also exclude the top percentile of reported LTV ratios because that 
variable is particularly sensitive to misstatement of the home value. 
In addition to these data sources, I use two price measures obtained from the private real 
estate data firm Zillow: home price per square foot and rental cost per square foot.  Each of these 
variables are available at the city level; rental prices are available as early as 2010, and home 
prices are available as early as 1996.  Local historical prices from Zillow are also used to 
construct historic appreciation rates. 
Variables used in Hanson and Martin (2014) include top state MTRs, the availability of 
the MID on state tax returns, and an indicator of whether states adopt the full federal itemization 
schedule.  Other parameters that do not vary according to geography include a risk-free rate of 
return whose proxy is the ten-year interest rate on treasury bonds, the federal capital gains tax 
rate, and a risk premium on housing adopted from (Poterba and Sinai 2011). 
5. Model Adjustments to Simulate Policy Changes 
Using the functions and parameters derived above, I then consider the impact on housing 
prices of three policy scenarios: eliminating the MID, converting the MID to a fifteen percent 
refundable tax credit, and capping the MID at a rate lower than the highest MTR.  
Scenario 1: Eliminating the MID 
If Congress were to eliminate the MID, it would remove the tax incentive to debt finance 
altogether.  Mathematically, this is equivalent to setting 𝜏𝑀−𝑑𝑒𝑑,𝑗 = 0 + 𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑗 ∗ 𝑀𝐼𝐷𝑗 ∗
                                                 
35 Reports of no property tax are not concentrated in one city or city zone, suggesting that zero values are more often 
failures to report rather than absence of tax in a particular locale. 
36 Likewise, public reports of the highest property tax rates in the US do not exceed 5% of home value. 
(http://www.zillow.com/blog/highest-and-lowest-property-taxes-149303/) 
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(1 − 𝑈𝑠𝑒𝐹𝑒𝑑𝑗)37 in the 𝑈𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 model from equation 13.  𝑈𝐶𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 from equation 14 
experiences no change.  This policy would reduce the benefits of itemizing deductions and raise 
the user cost for itemizing households. 
Scenario 2: The MID as a Fifteen Percent Refundable Tax Credit 
If instead Congress converted the MID from a deduction at the taxpayer’s MTR to a 
refundable fifteen percent tax credit, the incentive to finance housing debt and to itemize 
deductions would become diluted for many current itemizers (specifically those in marginal tax 
brackets exceeding fifteen percent).  It would also extend the tax benefit received from debt 
financing to those who do not itemize.  A conversion to such a tax credit is equivalent to setting 
𝜏𝑀−𝑑𝑒𝑑,𝑗 = 0.15 + 𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑗 ∗ 𝑀𝐼𝐷𝑗 ∗ (1 − 𝑈𝑠𝑒𝐹𝑒𝑑𝑗) in the 𝑈𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 model of equation 13, 
setting 𝜏𝑀−𝑑𝑒𝑑,𝑗 = 0.15 in the 𝑈𝐶𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 model of equation 14, and extending the 𝑈𝐶𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 
model as follows: 
 𝑈𝐶𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑,𝑗 = [1 − {𝜏𝑀−𝑑𝑒𝑑 ∗ 𝜆(𝑔)𝑗 + 𝜏𝑦 ∗ (1 − 𝜆(𝑔)𝑗)}] ∗ 𝑟𝑇 + 𝑟𝑇𝜆(𝑔)𝑗
+ (1 − 𝜏𝑦,𝑗) ∗ 𝛽 − 𝜏𝑀−𝑑𝑒𝑑,𝑗 ∗ 𝜆(𝑔)𝑗 ∗ (𝑟𝑀,𝑗 − 𝑟𝑇) + 𝑚𝑗
+ (1 − 𝜅) ∗ 𝜏𝑃,𝑗 − 𝜋𝑗 
(18) 
Note that the only differences between the cost for itemizers and non-itemizers are the 
property tax deduction and the MID at the state level that remain available to itemizers.  Non-
                                                 
37 Throughout the policy simulations I assume that states do not change their tax laws.  In a state that explicitly 
adopts the MID but does not allow all federal deductions, I assume it will keep this allowance regardless of the 
federal change to MID availability.  Hence 𝑈𝑠𝑒𝐹𝑒𝑑𝑗 = 0, (1 − 𝑈𝑠𝑒𝐹𝑒𝑑𝑗) = 1 and the indicators given suggest the 
state-level deduction remains intact.  In a state which allows the MID by adopting the standard federal schedule of 
itemizations, 𝑈𝑠𝑒𝐹𝑒𝑑𝑗 = 1, (1 − 𝑈𝑠𝑒𝐹𝑒𝑑𝑗) = 0, indicating that the deduction is removed due to existing laws 
harmonizing state and federal itemization schedules.  States without the MID continue not to offer it. In metro areas 
that cross state lines, 𝑈𝑠𝑒𝐹𝑒𝑑𝑗 is an average weighted by the propensity of properties in each state to be included in 
the sample, and falls between zero and one, reflecting the metro area’s average propensity to use the federal 
itemization schedule. In each case, the indicators result in the appropriate total deduction being conferred to each 
metro area consistent with no changes to state law. 
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itemizers gain the cost savings of the mortgage interest deduction and the option value of 
prepaying or defaulting on their mortgage. 
Because the deduction is converted to a refundable credit, only those itemizers who 
would itemize with no marginal incentive due to the MID will continue to itemize.  This means 
that, in the dynamic simulation of a tax credit, 𝑔 = 0 in 𝐼(𝑔)𝑗.  The tax credit does, however, 
still incentivize debt financing, leaving 𝑔 = 0.15 in 𝜆(𝑔)𝑗. 
Scenario 3: Capping the MID 
Another policy alternative is to cap the MID at a rate lower than the highest MTR (35 
percent in 2011 and 39.6 percent presently).38  This has the effect of blunting the deduction for 
wealthier borrowers while leaving it intact for middle- and lower-income borrowers.  Hanson 
and Martin (2014) explore the impact of a cap of twenty-eight percent, a policy endorsed by 
President Obama (Timiraos 2012).  The impact of such a cap on the user cost model is simply to 
set 𝜏𝑀−𝑑𝑒𝑑,𝑗 = min{𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑖, 𝑐𝑎𝑝} + 𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑗 ∗ 𝑀𝐼𝐷𝑗  in 𝑈𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 where the lower of either the 
taxpayer’s MTR or the legal cap becomes the rate at which mortgage interest is deducted at the 
federal level.  (Because it is a cap only on a federal deduction, any state that presently offers the 
MID is presumed to continue doing so.)  As in Scenario 1, 𝑈𝐶𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 remains unchanged.  
Examining a fifteen percent deduction allows a direct comparison of the differing effects of a cap 
on the deduction versus offering a refundable credit of equal size. 
                                                 
38 Because the average marginal tax bracket for most of the markets is lower than twenty-eight percent, my 
simulation is unable to pick up the effects of such a high cap – I instead simulate a cap of fifteen percent. 
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6. Identification Strategy for Model Parameters 
Estimating the Sensitivity of Behavioral Parameters to the MID 
Because consumers respond to tax incentives, I take into account two behavioral 
parameters with regard to the MID: how sensitive itemization is to the tax subsidy and how 
sensitive debt financing is to the tax subsidy. Using variation in the availability of the MID at the 
state level, I estimate the sensitivity of the percent of tax filers who itemize deductions (𝐼(𝑔)𝑖) 
and of LTV ratios (𝜆(𝑔)𝑖) to the generosity (𝑔) of the MID.  This is done with data from SOI and 
AHS and follows a comparable method to that used in Hanson and Martin (2014) to estimate 
sensitivity of MID claims to MID generosity.  I use both weighted least squares (WLS) and 
Instrumental Variables (IV) to estimate these relationships.  The basic WLS specification for 
both variables is: 
 𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑖 ∗ 𝑀𝐼𝐷𝑖 + 𝒁𝒊
′𝜷 + 𝜀 (19) 
When estimating the sensitivity of itemizing tax returns to the availability of the MID, 𝑌𝑖 
becomes the percent of tax filers who itemize returns in ZIP code 𝑖, 𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑖 ∗ 𝑀𝐼𝐷𝑖 is the 
state’s top marginal income tax rate interacted with an indicator equal to one if the state allows 
the mortgage interest deduction on state tax returns, and 𝒁𝒊
′ is a set of controls including adjusted 
gross income, the percent of returns claiming dependents, the percent of filings that are joint, the 
amount of alternative minimum tax paid and the percent of filers who pay it in each ZIP code.  
The regression is weighted by the square root of the number of tax returns in each ZIP code.  
Standard errors reflect the White (1980) correction for heteroskedasticity.  The coefficient of 
interest is 𝛽1, which reflects the change in the percent of itemizers in a ZIP code resulting from a 
one percentage-point increase in the deductibility of mortgage interest. 
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The second behavioral parameter I estimate is the sensitivity of LTV ratios to the 
availability of the MID, in which case 𝑌𝑖 becomes the LTV ratio of household 𝑖, 𝒁𝒊
′ becomes a set 
of controls including the household’s salary and the number of minors living in the household.  
The regression is weighted by the AHS national weights, which reflect how representative each 
household is of the population using census controls. Standard errors are again corrected for 
heteroskedasticity.  In this case, 𝛽1 reflects the change in LTV ratios resulting from a one 
percentage-point increase in the deductibility of mortgage interest. 
I also estimate the equations above using IV, whereby I instrument availability of the 
MID with an indicator variable equal to 1 if the state adopts the full itemization schedule from 
the federal tax code, and 0 if it deviates from the federal schedule.  This instrument is designed to 
resolve endogeneity that may arise from unobserved political influence by homeowners seeking 
preferential tax subsidies in their state tax policy.  Such targeted homeowner lobbying would 
most likely result in a state MID deduction that does not depend on adopting the full federal 
itemization schedule.  The instrument therefore captures as compliers those states that do not 
provide preferential treatment to homeowners by way of an a la carte MID deduction. 
A straightforward application of the instrument would be to fit 𝑀𝐼𝐷𝑖, the indicator of 
MID deductibility, by regressing 𝑀𝐼𝐷𝑖 on 𝑈𝑠𝑒𝐹𝑒𝑑𝑖, the instrument described above.  Because 
my outcome of interest is not 𝑀𝐼𝐷𝑖 but instead 𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑖 ∗ 𝑀𝐼𝐷𝑖, I construct an instrument to 
parallel this variable by interacting 𝑈𝑠𝑒𝐹𝑒𝑑𝑖 with 𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑖.  This scales the instrument so that 
the fitted values of 𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑖 ∗ 𝑀𝐼𝐷𝑖 translate linearly to the second stage. The first stage, then, 
is: 
 𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑖 ∗ 𝑀𝐼𝐷𝑖 = 𝑎 + 𝑏1𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑖 ∗ 𝑈𝑠𝑒𝐹𝑒𝑑𝑖 + 𝒁𝒊
′𝑩 + 𝜀 (20) 
while the second stage becomes: 
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 𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑖 ∗ 𝑀𝐼𝐷𝑖̂ + 𝒁𝒊
′𝜷 + 𝜀 (21) 
Table 9Error! Reference source not found. shows the first-stage results of this regression for 
both the SOI and the AHS samples and their respective controls.  The fit of the instrument is 
consistent across both SOI and AHS samples and is statistically significant at the one-percent 
level. 
The simulation requires the choice of a functional form for 𝐼(𝑔)𝑗 and 𝜆(𝑔)𝑗.  I use the 
linear form: 
 𝐼(𝑔)𝑗 = 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 ∗ 𝑔𝑗 (22) 
where in each market 𝑗, the percent of itemizers in the market who would itemize without any 
subsidy is given by 𝛼𝑗, the generosity of the subsidy is given by 𝑔𝑗, and the slope 𝛽𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 is the 
coefficient 𝛽1 in equations 19 and 21 when 𝑌𝑖 is percent of itemizers.  For instance, if ten percent 
of tax filers in market 𝑗 would itemize deductions without any subsidy, and the policy under 
consideration is a twenty percent mortgage interest deduction for itemizing tax filers, then the 
function predicts the proportion of itemizing tax filers as: 
 𝐼(𝑔)𝑗 = 0.10 +  𝛽𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 ∗ 0.20 (23) 
Similarly, the LTV function is: 
 𝜆(𝑔)𝑗 = 𝛾𝑗 + 𝛽𝐿𝑇𝑉 ∗ 𝑔𝑗 (24) 
where 𝛾𝑗 is the average LTV ratio that would obtain in a market without any subsidy, and the 
slope 𝛽𝐿𝑇𝑉 is the coefficient 𝛽1 in equations 19 and 21 when 𝑌𝑖 is the LTV ratio. 
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Table 9. First Stage Results of Instrumental Variables Specification 
 IRS AHS 
Variables: No Controls Controls No Controls Controls 
Instrument (𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑀𝑇𝑅 ∗ 𝑈𝑠𝑒𝐹𝑒𝑑) 0.919*** 0.911*** 0.962*** 0.962*** 
 (0.00302) (0.00384) (0.00306) (0.00306) 
Average Adjusted Gross Income (in 
$1,000s) 
 -0.00634***   
 (0.000629)   
Household Salary (in $1,000s)    0.000211 
    (0.000136) 
Percent of households claiming dependents  0.000600   
 (0.000514)   
Number of minors in household    0.00951 
    (0.0104) 
Percent of households filing jointly  0.0207***   
  (0.00104)   
Average Alternative Minimum Tax Paid (in 
$1,000s) 
 0.0882***   
 (0.0109)   
Percent of households paying Alternative 
Minimum Tax 
 -0.942**   
 (0.449)   
Constant 0.643*** -0.120* 0.338*** 0.321*** 
 (0.0239) (0.0672) (0.0274) (0.0273) 
     
Observations 26,622 26,622 22,661 22,661 
F-Test 92,941 56,113 98,774 99,159 
Note: The fitted variable is the state income tax rate interacted with an indicator equal to one if 
the state allows the mortgage interest deduction (MID) on state tax returns. The first two 
columns contain observations from ZIP codes in the IRS Statistics of Income (SOI) in 2011, 
and the fitted values are used in table 10.  The second two columns contain observations from 
households in the American Housing Survey (AHS) in 2011, and the fitted values are used in 
table 11.  Regressions are weighted by the square root of the number of tax returns in each ZIP 
code.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<.01  ** p<.05  * p<.1   
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Estimating Parameters in the User Cost Model 
The user cost model in equation 15 can be used in a number of ways.  In section 3 I 
complete the right-hand side with real-world proxies for each parameter and then vary one or 
more of the parameters to obtain a percent change in the user cost associated with parameter 
changes.  This use makes two key assumptions: 1) that the user cost reflects the true opportunity 
cost to consumers (i.e. it is correctly specified) and 2) that the selected proxies for each 
parameter are representative of the true values.  The second assumption seems particularly 
tenuous for the parameter 𝜋, or expected price appreciation.  How does one know what 
consumers use to form beliefs about future home prices?  Additionally, there is no clear proxy 
signaling the degree to which homeowners view property tax as a benefit tax, a belief 
characterized by the parameter 𝜅.  Because of these shortcomings I briefly explore an 
econometric test of the user cost model that provides a data-driven estimate for these two 
parameters. 
In order to test the validity of parameters on the left-hand side, I substitute a real-world 
proxy for imputed rents: actual market rents, 𝑅𝑎.  I then conduct regression analysis of the model 
with (
𝑅𝑎
𝑃
) = 𝑈𝐶𝑎 as the dependent variable.  Specifically, I use median rental housing prices per 
square foot and median home values per square foot for 𝑅 and 𝑃 respectively.39 
I examine two specifications using WLS.  In both cases the unit of observation 𝑖 is the 
ZIP code.  The first specification is: 
 𝑈𝐶𝑎,𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝜏𝑃𝜏𝑃,𝑖 + 𝛽ΠΠ𝑖 + 𝒁𝒊
′𝜷 + 𝜖𝑖 (25) 
                                                 
39 Using rents and home values normalized per square foot reduces the problem that renters and homeowners select 
different units due to heterogeneous preferences, income constraints etc. to the extent that these preferences manifest 
themselves in quantity differences.  Data is not available to control for differences in unit quality. 
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where 𝑈𝐶𝑎,𝑖 is the ratio of market rents to market prices (per square foot) in market 𝑖, 𝜏𝑃,𝑖 and Π𝑖 
are property tax rate and the 13-year average annual price appreciation in market 𝑖 respectively, 
and 𝒁𝒊
′ is a vector of all other user cost parameters that vary over geography. The coefficients of 
interest are 𝛽𝜏𝑃 which is related to 𝜅 in the user cost model as (1 − 𝜏𝑖𝑛𝑐 − 𝜅) = 𝛽𝜏𝑃, and 𝛽Π, 
which can be viewed as a weight placed on the selected proxy of expected price appreciation in 
order to construct 𝜋 (i.e. 𝛽Π ∗ Π = 𝜋).40 
This specification leaves out important features of the user cost model: namely, the 
interactions across continuous variables as seen in equation 11(11), and interactions with the 
percent of itemizers in equation 12(12).  In a second specification, I regress 𝑈𝐶𝑎,𝑖 on each space-
varying parameter as well as on the percent of itemizers; each parameter in 𝑈𝐶𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑  is 
included again without such an interaction: 
 𝑈𝐶𝑎,𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝜏𝑃1𝜏𝑃,𝑖 + 𝛽Π1Π𝑖 + 𝛽𝜏𝑃2𝜏𝑖𝑛𝑐,𝑖 ∗ 𝜏𝑃,𝑖 + 𝛽𝜏𝑃3𝐼𝑖 ∗ 𝜏𝑖𝑛𝑐,𝑖 ∗ 𝜏𝑃,𝑖 + 𝛽Π2𝐼𝑖
∗ Π𝑖 + 𝒁𝒊
′𝜷 + 𝜖𝑖 
(26) 
where 𝒁𝒋
′ contains all variables and interactions that are not of interest.  This equation creates a 
more complicated derivation of the partial effect of property taxes on the user cost (given before 
as simply 𝛽𝜏𝑃).  It is now not a single regression coefficient, but a function of the MTR and the 
percent of itemizers: 
 𝜕𝑈𝐶𝑎
𝜕𝜏𝑃
⁄ = 𝛽𝜏𝑃1 + 𝛽𝜏𝑃2 ∗ 𝜏𝑖𝑛𝑐,𝑖 + 𝛽𝜏𝑃3𝐼𝑖 ∗ 𝜏𝑖𝑛𝑐,𝑖 
(27) 
Likewise, the partial effect of anticipated home price inflation on the user cost is no longer 𝛽Π 
but is now given as: 
                                                 
40 Note that the user cost in equation 11 includes parameters that are assumed to be fixed across space: namely the 
tax rate on long-term capital gains (𝜏𝑦), the risk-free rate of return (𝑟𝑇) and the risk premium of homeownership (𝛽).  
These parameters will accrue to the constant in the regression. 
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 𝜕𝑈𝐶𝑎
𝜕𝛱⁄ = 𝛽Π1 + 𝛽Π2 ∗ 𝐼𝑖 
(28) 
I compute these partial effects at the sample means of the MTR and the percent of itemizing tax 
filers in order to obtain single values of 𝜅 and 𝜋 to use in the simulation. 
7. Results 
Sensitivity Estimates of Behavioral Parameters to the MID  
I present simulated outcomes for each of the three policy scenarios in two ways: first, 
assuming that the behavioral parameters 𝐼(𝑔) and 𝜆(𝑔) do not adjust with changing MID policy, 
referred to as a static simulation – and second, assuming that they do adjust, referred to as a 
dynamic simulation. 
Table 10 presents results for the sensitivity of the percent of tax filers who itemize to the 
generosity of the MID.  The key variable of interest is the indicator of MID availability crossed 
with the state’s top MTR.  The reported coefficient is the change in percent of itemizers resulting 
from a one percentage point increase in the generosity of the MID.  The first two specifications 
include ZIP codes in all states regardless of income tax.  In the uncontrolled regression, a one 
percentage-point increase in MID generosity leads to an increase in itemizers by 0.56 percentage 
points.  Based on this result, if tax filers were offered an additional penny back through the 
channel of itemized deductions for each dollar of mortgage interest they pay, the rate of 
itemization would rise from 30.68 percent of tax filers (the constant in the first specification) to 
31.24 percent.  When controlling for the set of covariates listed in section 6, the effect of a one 
percentage point increase in the MID on the proportion of filers who itemize is moderated to 
0.44 percentage points. 
The next two specifications employ the instrumental variable discussed in section 4.  The 
IV results in table 10 show slightly stronger effects of the MID on the proportion of itemizers 
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than those in the WLS specifications, with coefficients of 0.69 and 0.57 for the uncontrolled and 
controlled regressions respectively. 
 
Table 10. Impact of the Mortgage Interest Deduction on the Percent of Itemizing Tax Filers 
 WLS IV 
Variables: 
No 
Controls Controls No Controls Controls 
State marginal tax rate interacted with 
    State MID policy (𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑀𝑇𝑅 ∗ 𝑀𝐼𝐷) 
0.559*** 0.440*** 0.688*** 0.573*** 
(0.0337) (0.0195) (0.0373) (0.0215) 
Average Adjusted Gross Income (AGI)   
    (in $1,000s) 
 0.0175**  0.0246*** 
 (0.00727)  (0.00744) 
Percent of tax filers claiming dependents  -0.101***  -0.105*** 
 (0.00372)  (0.00381) 
Percent of tax filers filing jointly  0.406***  0.399*** 
  (0.00837)  (0.00853) 
Average Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) 
    paid (in $1,000s) 
 -0.108***  -0.205*** 
 (0.0372)  (0.0403) 
Percent of tax filers paying AMT  1.752***  1.714*** 
 (0.0517)  (0.0525) 
Constant 30.68*** 17.47*** 30.29*** 17.65*** 
 (0.186) (0.530) (0.190) (0.539) 
     
Observations 27,787 27,787 26,622 26,622 
R-squared 0.025 0.633   
Note: The dependent variable is given in percentage points, i.e. 30.0% = 30.0.  Regressions 
are weighted by the square root of the number of tax returns in each ZIP code.  Robust 
standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<.01 
 
Table 11 describes the sensitivity of LTV ratios to the generosity of the MID.  
Specifications follow the same pattern as in table 10.  The first column suggests that a one 
percentage point increase in MID generosity results in an increase of LTV ratios by 0.23 
percentage points.  When controlling for household income and number of children present, the 
coefficient rises slightly to 0.27 points.  These results are marginally significant at the ten percent 
and five percent levels respectively.   
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The next two specifications employ the same IV strategy as before.  They also reflect 
somewhat higher sensitivity of LTV ratios to the MID, with coefficients of 0.28 and 0.33 for the 
uncontrolled and controlled regressions, which are significant at the five percent and one percent 
level respectively. 
 
Table 11. Impact of the MID on the Loan-To-Value (LTV) Ratio of Homeowners 
 WLS IV 
Variables: No Controls Controls No Controls Controls 
State marginal tax rate interacted with 
    State MID policy (𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑀𝑇𝑅 ∗ 𝑀𝐼𝐷) 
0.230* 0.272** 0.278** 0.326*** 
(0.119) (0.117) (0.121) (0.120) 
Household salary (in $1,000s)  -0.0102  -0.0109 
  (0.00720)  (0.00733) 
Number of minors in household  5.754***  5.837*** 
  (0.462)  (0.477) 
Constant 74.69*** 71.08*** 74.88*** 71.22*** 
 (0.791) (0.976) (0.799) (0.989) 
     
Observations 24,196 24,196 22,661 22,661 
R-squared 0.000 0.019   
Note: The dependent variable is given in percentage points, i.e. 30.0% = 30.0.  
Regressions are weighted by the household weight provided by the Census.  Robust 
standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<.01  ** p<.05  * p<.1 
 
I will present two versions of each simulation below: one in which the sensitivity of the 
percent of itemizers and of LTV ratios are assumed to be zero; and one in which the sensitivity is 
assumed to be the highest reported in each case (i.e. itemizers increase by 0.69 points and LTV 
ratios increase by 0.33 points per one percentage point increase in generosity of the MID). 
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Table 12. WLS Tests of User Cost Parameters 
Variables: (1) (2) 
Property tax rate (𝜏𝑃) 0.588*** 2.612** 
 (0.142) (1.067) 
Property tax rate interacted with the average marginal tax rate  
    (𝜏𝑃 ∗ 𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑀𝑇𝑅) 
 -7.643 
 (5.663) 
Percent of itemizers (𝐼) -0.0689*** 0.0772 
 (0.00574) (0.189) 
Property tax rate interacted with percent of itemizers (𝜏𝑃 ∗ 𝐼)  -8.108*** 
  (2.741) 
Property tax rate interacted with average marginal tax rate and  
    percent of itemizers (𝜏𝑃 ∗ 𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑀𝑇𝑅 ∗ 𝐼) 
 36.44*** 
 (13.43) 
13-year average annual home price appreciation rate, by city (Π) -0.379*** -0.595*** 
 (0.0448) (0.0994) 
Home price appreciation rate interacted with percent of itemizers  
    (Π ∗ 𝐼) 
 0.523** 
 (0.223) 
   
Interacted across user cost model No Yes 
   
𝜅 at sample mean of interacted terms 0.2269 0.2349 
𝛽Π value at sample mean of interacted terms 0.3790 0.4030 
   
Observations 2,577 2,577 
R-squared 0.771 0.796 
Note: Observations are ZIP code area averages based on SOI, AHS and Zillow 
variables.  𝜅 is derived from the identity 𝛽𝜏𝑃 = (1 − 𝜏𝑃−𝑑𝑒𝑑 − 𝜅) in specification 1, and 
𝛽𝜏𝑃 = (1 − 𝐼 ∗ 𝜏𝑃−𝑑𝑒𝑑 − 𝜅) in specification 2. Regressions are weighted by the square 
root of the number of tax returns in each ZIP code.  Robust standard errors in 
parentheses.  *** p<.01  ** p<.05 
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User Cost Parameter Estimates 
Table 12 presents results of the WLS tests of parameters 𝜅 and 𝜋 in the user cost model. 
𝜅 is found to be approximately 0.23.41  This suggests that homeowners on average view property 
taxes as delivering twenty-three cents of benefit per dollar of tax, with little difference in the 
simple and fully interacted models. 
Values for 𝛽Π are relatively stable between specifications, ranging from 0.38 to 0.40.  
Recall that, given a measure of historic annual price appreciation (Π), these are the weights 
placed on the measure to convert it to a homeowner’s expected future price appreciation.  In this 
case, Π was characterized as the 13-year city-level annual price appreciation rate per square foot 
of the median priced home.  These values suggest that a one percentage point increase in this 
appreciation rate would raise their expectation of future appreciation by between 0.38 and 0.40 
points.  I use the value 0.40 to weight Π in the simulations below.42 
MID Policy Effects on Parameters and User Cost by Metro Area 
Table 13 reports the percent of itemizers and the LTV ratios in each of twenty-seven 
cities under each of three policies: eliminating the MID, converting it to a fifteen percent credit, 
or capping it at a rate of fifteen percent.  There is significant local variation in present itemizing 
behavior: the city with the fewest itemizing tax filers is Memphis, at twenty-two percent; the city 
with the most itemizing tax filers is Washington, D.C., with fifty-one percent.  LTV ratios show 
similarly great variation: San Francisco has the lowest average LTV ratio of fifty-eight, while 
Phoenix has the highest at 104 percent.
                                                 
41 A substantial literature discusses capitalization of property taxes into home values, which is the equivalent of 
determining 𝜅 in the user cost model.  Disagreement across that literature leads me to adopt this estimate as a 
sample-specific average capitalization rate, and an improvement on polar assumptions that have been used in other 
user cost exercises. 
42 These estimates should be viewed as exploratory improvements to the user cost model; further investigation into 
proper proxies for these parameters is warranted. 
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Table 13. Behavioral Parameter Changes Resulting from MID Policy Changes 
 Current Parameter 
Values 
Parameter  Values in Dynamic Simulations 
 Eliminate the MID 15% Credit 15% Cap 
City Itemize LTV Itemize 
LTV 
itemize 
LTV 
standard Itemize 
LTV 
itemize 
LTV 
standard Itemize 
LTV 
itemize 
LTV 
standard 
Atlanta, GA 37% 91% 25% 85% 91% 25% 90% 90% 35% 90% 91% 
Birmingham, AL 32% 70% 21% 65% 70% 21% 70% 70% 31% 70% 70% 
Boston, MA* 41% 58% 26% 51% 58% 26% 56% 56% 36% 56% 58% 
Charlotte, NC 38% 74% 26% 68% 74% 26% 73% 73% 36% 73% 74% 
Chicago, IL* 39% 68% 27% 62% 68% 27% 67% 67% 37% 67% 68% 
Cincinnati, OH 34% 73% 22% 67% 73% 22% 72% 72% 32% 72% 73% 
Dallas-Fort Worth, TX 25% 69% 13% 63% 69% 13% 68% 68% 23% 68% 69% 
Denver, CO 37% 74% 25% 67% 74% 25% 72% 72% 35% 72% 74% 
Detroit, MI* 32% 98% 21% 93% 98% 21% 98% 98% 31% 98% 98% 
Indianapolis, IN 30% 75% 19% 69% 75% 19% 74% 74% 29% 74% 75% 
Los Angeles, CA 34% 67% 22% 61% 67% 22% 66% 66% 32% 66% 67% 
Memphis, TN 22% 75% 11% 70% 75% 11% 75% 75% 21% 75% 75% 
Minneapolis-St Paul, MN* 45% 75% 26% 66% 75% 26% 71% 71% 41% 74% 75% 
New York, NY* 35% 62% 18% 54% 62% 18% 59% 59% 32% 61% 62% 
Philadelphia, PA* 43% 61% 30% 54% 61% 30% 59% 59% 40% 59% 61% 
Phoenix, AZ 28% 104% 17% 99% 104% 17% 104% 104% 27% 104% 104% 
Pittsburgh, PA 26% 61% 14% 55% 61% 14% 60% 60% 24% 60% 61% 
Portland, OR 42% 72% 30% 66% 72% 30% 71% 71% 40% 71% 72% 
Providence, RI 38% 72% 26% 66% 72% 26% 71% 71% 36% 71% 72% 
Sacramento, CA 38% 88% 26% 82% 88% 26% 87% 87% 36% 87% 88% 
San Diego, CA 37% 71% 25% 65% 71% 25% 70% 70% 35% 70% 71% 
San Francisco, CA 42% 59% 26% 51% 59% 26% 56% 56% 37% 56% 59% 
San Jose, CA 48% 66% 32% 58% 66% 32% 63% 63% 42% 63% 66% 
Seattle, WA* 40% 64% 27% 57% 64% 27% 62% 62% 37% 62% 64% 
St. Louis, MO 32% 71% 20% 65% 71% 20% 70% 70% 30% 70% 71% 
Virginia Beach, VA 35% 70% 24% 64% 70% 24% 69% 69% 34% 69% 70% 
Washington, DC* 51% 66% 32% 57% 66% 32% 62% 62% 46% 64% 66% 
Source: Computations based on variables from SOI, AHS and Zillow. 
Note: The first two columns reflect the current values for each metro area. Subsequent columns identify the value the variable takes in the dynamic version 
of each simulation, where household behavior is allowed to adjust.  *Denotes cities using national AHS weights. 
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Table 14. Percent Change in User Cost Resulting from MID Policy Changes 
 Policy 1: Eliminate the MID Policy 2: Convert MID to 15% Credit Policy 3: Cap MID at 15% 
 Static Dynamic Static Dynamic Static Dynamic 
City Itemize Standard Itemize Standard Itemize Standard Itemize Standard Itemize Standard Itemize Standard 
Atlanta, GA 18.6% 0.0% 17.5% 0.0% 2.7% -12.9% 2.7% -12.9% 2.6% 0.0% 2.6% 0.0% 
Birmingham, AL 15.9% 0.0% 14.8% 0.0% 1.3% -12.3% 1.3% -12.3% 1.3% 0.0% 1.3% 0.0% 
Boston, MA* 26.0% 0.0% 23.5% 0.0% 8.9% -12.5% 8.7% -12.6% 8.9% 0.0% 8.7% 0.0% 
Charlotte, NC 17.5% 0.0% 16.2% 0.0% 2.8% -12.0% 2.7% -12.0% 2.7% 0.0% 2.7% 0.0% 
Chicago, IL* 14.1% 0.0% 12.9% 0.0% 2.7% -9.2% 2.7% -9.3% 2.7% 0.0% 2.7% 0.0% 
Cincinnati, OH 14.3% 0.0% 13.2% 0.0% 2.5% -9.8% 2.5% -9.8% 2.5% 0.0% 2.5% 0.0% 
Dallas-Fort Worth, TX 14.3% 0.0% 13.2% 0.0% 2.5% -9.7% 2.5% -9.7% 2.5% 0.0% 2.5% 0.0% 
Denver, CO 19.6% 0.0% 18.1% 0.0% 3.8% -12.7% 3.7% -12.8% 3.7% 0.0% 3.7% 0.0% 
Detroit, MI* 14.0% 0.0% 13.3% 0.0% 2.2% -9.8% 2.2% -9.8% 2.2% 0.0% 2.2% 0.0% 
Indianapolis, IN 15.8% 0.0% 14.6% 0.0% 2.4% -11.2% 2.3% -11.2% 2.4% 0.0% 2.3% 0.0% 
Los Angeles, CA 30.6% 0.0% 28.0% 0.0% 4.9% -18.4% 4.9% -18.4% 4.8% 0.0% 4.7% 0.0% 
Memphis, TN 15.5% 0.0% 14.5% 0.0% 1.5% -11.6% 1.5% -11.6% 1.5% 0.0% 1.5% 0.0% 
Minneapolis-St Paul, MN* 35.7% 0.0% 33.1% 0.0% 16.3% -13.0% 16.2% -13.1% 6.2% 0.0% 6.4% 0.0% 
New York, NY* 38.5% 0.0% 35.3% 0.0% 14.5% -15.8% 14.4% -15.8% 5.3% 0.0% 5.4% 0.0% 
Philadelphia, PA* 20.4% 0.0% 18.6% 0.0% 5.0% -11.8% 4.9% -11.8% 5.0% 0.0% 4.9% 0.0% 
Phoenix, AZ 23.4% 0.0% 22.2% 0.0% 2.5% -16.4% 2.5% -16.4% 2.4% 0.0% 2.4% 0.0% 
Pittsburgh, PA 13.6% 0.0% 12.5% 0.0% 2.4% -9.2% 2.4% -9.2% 2.4% 0.0% 2.4% 0.0% 
Portland, OR 18.4% 0.0% 17.0% 0.0% 2.9% -12.4% 2.9% -12.5% 2.9% 0.0% 2.9% 0.0% 
Providence, RI 24.5% 0.0% 22.7% 0.0% 5.4% -14.2% 5.4% -14.2% 5.3% 0.0% 5.3% 0.0% 
Sacramento, CA 26.9% 0.0% 25.1% 0.0% 4.5% -16.7% 4.5% -16.7% 4.4% 0.0% 4.3% 0.0% 
San Diego, CA 31.5% 0.0% 28.9% 0.0% 6.5% -17.9% 6.4% -18.0% 6.3% 0.0% 6.2% 0.0% 
San Francisco, CA 36.0% 0.0% 32.3% 0.0% 13.2% -15.6% 12.9% -15.7% 13.0% 0.0% 12.8% 0.0% 
San Jose, CA 35.8% 0.0% 32.5% 0.0% 12.9% -15.6% 12.7% -15.8% 12.8% 0.0% 12.5% 0.0% 
Seattle, WA* 23.8% 0.0% 21.7% 0.0% 6.2% -13.4% 6.1% -13.5% 6.2% 0.0% 6.1% 0.0% 
St. Louis, MO 15.9% 0.0% 14.7% 0.0% 2.5% -10.9% 2.5% -10.9% 2.5% 0.0% 2.5% 0.0% 
Virginia Beach, VA 25.5% 0.0% 23.6% 0.0% 2.5% -17.5% 2.5% -17.5% 2.4% 0.0% 2.4% 0.0% 
Washington, DC* 44.7% 0.0% 41.1% 0.0% 20.4% -15.3% 20.2% -15.4% 10.8% 0.0% 11.0% 0.0% 
Source: Computations based on variables from SOI, AHS and Zillow. 
Note: Each price simulation involves simulating two user costs: one for itemizers and another for standard deduction tax filers.  These user costs are weighted 
according to the predicted number of each type of filer in a region.  Figures above reflect the percent change to the user cost resulting from each policy change.  
An increasing user cost implies a falling home price in order to maintain constant imputed rent.  *Denotes cities using national AHS weights. 
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Table 13 also reports the simulated change to these parameters under each of the three 
policies considered.  Itemizers are expected to fall by between thirty-six (Los Angeles) and fifty 
(Memphis) percentage points, and LTV ratios are expected to fall between five (Phoenix) and 
fourteen (Washington, D.C.) percentage points for itemizers if the MID were eliminated.  The 
change to itemizers is nearly identical under the policy converting the MID to a fifteen percent 
credit, whereas the effect on LTV ratios is less (and is also spread across itemizers and standard 
deduction tax filers, since the incentive to debt finance is not restricted to itemizers under this 
policy).  Changes are more muted under the policy where the MID is simply capped at fifteen 
percent. 
Table 14 summarizes the changes to user cost under each policy, broken down by 
changes for itemizing tax filers and changes for standard deduction tax filers.  Recall that the 
user cost is the unit-cost of housing services.  If capital prices remained fixed when policy 
changes, these are the changes in annual cost of ownership households would face.  For example, 
if the MID were eliminated, homeowners did not adjust their behavior toward itemizing or debt 
finance, and prices remained fixed at current levels, then column one suggests the annual 
expense of an owner-occupied home would rise by 18.6 percent in Atlanta and by 44.7 percent in 
Washington, D.C.  Itemizers generally experience smaller increases to user cost under dynamic 
simulations because they can shift from debt to equity finance at the rate estimated in table 11. 
Price Effects of MID Policy Changes on Metro Areas 
Table 15 reports the simulated price changes for twenty-seven selected cities under two 
versions of each policy: static, where no changes to itemizing or LTV ratios occur, and dynamic, 
where each of these parameters is allowed to adjust by the factors estimated in tables 10 and 11 
respectively.  Six scenarios are presented for each city.
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Table 15. Simulated Effects on Home Prices of Policy Changes to the Mortgage Interest Deduction 
 Current 
Avg. 
Price 
Policy 1: Eliminate the MID Policy 2: Convert MID to 15% Credit Policy 3: Cap MID at 15% 
 Static Dynamic Static Dynamic Static Dynamic 
City Price % Chg Price % Chg Price % Chg Price % Chg Price % Chg Price % Chg 
Atlanta, GA 187.4 176.9 -5.6% 176.4 -5.9% 203.4 8.6% 202.3 8.0% 185.8 -0.8% 185.3 -1.1% 
Birmingham, AL 182.1 174.1 -4.4% 174.0 -4.4% 198.7 9.2% 198.2 8.9% 181.4 -0.4% 181.2 -0.5% 
Boston, MA* 395.7 363.6 -8.1% 360.8 -8.8% 417.6 5.5% 412.0 4.1% 384.2 -2.9% 379.9 -4.0% 
Charlotte, NC 205.5 194.1 -5.6% 193.7 -5.7% 221.1 7.6% 219.9 7.0% 203.7 -0.9% 203.1 -1.2% 
Chicago, IL* 261.7 249.6 -4.6% 247.9 -5.2% 275.8 5.4% 273.1 4.4% 259.2 -0.9% 258.2 -1.3% 
Cincinnati, OH 172.2 165.1 -4.2% 164.4 -4.5% 183.4 6.5% 182.2 5.8% 170.9 -0.7% 170.4 -1.1% 
Dallas-Fort Worth, TX 190.4 184.6 -3.0% 183.3 -3.7% 204.7 7.5% 202.9 6.6% 189.3 -0.5% 188.7 -0.9% 
Denver, CO 276.6 260.3 -5.9% 259.9 -6.0% 298.8 8.0% 297.4 7.5% 273.3 -1.2% 272.2 -1.6% 
Detroit, MI* 155.0 149.0 -3.8% 148.2 -4.4% 165.6 6.9% 164.4 6.1% 154.0 -0.6% 153.6 -0.9% 
Indianapolis, IN 180.4 173.1 -4.1% 172.7 -4.3% 195.2 8.2% 194.4 7.7% 179.3 -0.6% 178.8 -0.9% 
Los Angeles, CA 475.5 439.8 -7.5% 438.2 -7.8% 541.4 13.9% 536.6 12.8% 469.6 -1.3% 467.3 -1.7% 
Memphis, TN 148.3 144.1 -2.9% 143.5 -3.2% 163.1 10.0% 162.2 9.4% 147.9 -0.3% 147.6 -0.5% 
Minneapolis-St Paul, MN* 234.3 208.2 -11.1% 205.7 -12.2% 240.8 2.8% 236.4 0.9% 229.3 -2.1% 226.8 -3.2% 
New York, NY* 435.9 396.6 -9.0% 392.3 -10.0% 473.7 8.7% 465.6 6.8% 430.1 -1.3% 426.7 -2.1% 
Philadelphia, PA* 275.6 256.6 -6.9% 254.8 -7.6% 292.2 6.0% 288.6 4.7% 270.8 -1.8% 268.9 -2.4% 
Phoenix, AZ 201.3 191.0 -5.1% 190.5 -5.4% 228.8 13.7% 227.7 13.1% 200.2 -0.6% 199.7 -0.8% 
Pittsburgh, PA 158.4 153.6 -3.0% 152.6 -3.7% 169.5 7.0% 168.0 6.1% 157.5 -0.6% 156.9 -0.9% 
Portland, OR 295.3 276.6 -6.3% 276.0 -6.6% 316.9 7.3% 314.9 6.6% 292.2 -1.0% 291.2 -1.4% 
Providence, RI 264.0 245.0 -7.2% 243.4 -7.8% 286.9 8.7% 283.6 7.4% 259.6 -1.7% 257.9 -2.3% 
Sacramento, CA 298.6 275.5 -7.7% 274.7 -8.0% 332.0 11.2% 329.7 10.4% 294.5 -1.3% 293.2 -1.8% 
San Diego, CA 445.6 407.4 -8.6% 406.3 -8.8% 498.8 11.9% 494.6 11.0% 437.4 -1.8% 434.6 -2.5% 
San Francisco, CA 812.8 725.7 -10.7% 722.4 -11.1% 864.6 6.4% 854.7 5.1% 779.0 -4.2% 768.4 -5.5% 
San Jose, CA 681.5 599.2 -12.1% 596.7 -12.4% 715.0 4.9% 706.6 3.7% 649.7 -4.7% 640.9 -5.9% 
Seattle, WA* 376.8 348.7 -7.5% 347.5 -7.8% 404.2 7.3% 400.8 6.4% 369.1 -2.1% 366.5 -2.7% 
St. Louis, MO 173.0 165.8 -4.2% 165.0 -4.6% 186.5 7.8% 185.1 7.0% 171.8 -0.7% 171.3 -1.0% 
Virginia Beach, VA 242.4 225.6 -6.9% 225.2 -7.1% 274.3 13.2% 272.6 12.4% 240.7 -0.7% 240.1 -0.9% 
Washington, DC* 389.0 330.8 -14.9% 327.8 -15.7% 394.1 1.3% 386.8 -0.6% 373.1 -4.1% 367.0 -5.6% 
Note: Average home prices are in $1,000s. Percent changes are the percent change of the policy simulation from current prices. Static simulations hold city-level 
itemization and debt-finance levels constant; dynamic simulations allow city-level itemization and debt-finance levels to vary according to the largest elasticity 
derived in tables 10 and 11 respectively.  *Denotes cities using national AHS weights. 
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The first column reports the current average home price in each city.  San Francisco has 
the highest average home price of $812,800, and Detroit has the lowest of $155,700.  The next 
two columns report the simulated home price and the percent change from current home prices if 
the MID were eliminated and if homeowners did not adjust their behavior toward itemizing or 
debt finance.  As a rule, prices would fall under this scenario, but the degree varies significantly 
depending on the city.  At one extreme, Washington, D.C. would experience a 14.9 percent drop 
in home prices from $389,000 to $327,800.  The most modest change would occur in Memphis 
where prices would fall by only 2.9 percent, from $148,300 to $144,100. 
The next two columns report the consequences of eliminating the MID, but with the 
assumption that homeowners would adjust their behavior toward itemizing and debt financing.  
The differences from the static simulation are modest: Washington, D.C. would face a price drop 
of 15.7 percent rather than 14.9 percent, and Memphis would see a drop of 3.2 percent rather 
than 2.9 percent.  Most cities would experience a slightly smaller price decrease under the 
dynamic scenario than under the static one, but there are exceptions (such as Memphis). 
The next set of columns simulates the conversion of the MID from a tax deduction to a 
refundable tax credit of 15 percent.  The consequence of this policy varies significantly from city 
to city.  Simulated home prices are now expected to increase rather than decrease.  In general, 
this suggests that the price drop experienced by itemizers whose MTRs are above 15 percent 
(and who therefore decrease demand for housing in the face of higher costs) is offset by 
capitalization from homeowners who claim the standard deduction and to whom user costs have 
just become lower.  Under the static assumptions, Washington, D.C. obtains the lowest increase 
in home prices of 1.3 percent while prices rise the most in Los Angeles, by 13.9 percent.  In 
general, cities with few itemizers and low MTRs are likely to see greater price increases under 
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this policy.  The dynamic simulation follows a similar pattern of rising prices, with only 
Washington, D.C. experiencing a price decrease of 0.6 percent. 
The final set of columns simulates the consequences of capping the MID at a rate of 15 
percent.  This policy would decrease home values in all cities, but again at significantly different 
rates: at the low end, Birmingham would experience only a 0.5 percent decline in prices; at the 
high end, San Jose, CA prices would fall by 5.9 percent.  Markets that suffer a greater drop under 
this policy have higher average MTRs. 
Price Effects of MID Policy Changes within Metro Areas 
A key strength of this study is to observe the spatial variation of MID policy impact 
within cities. I use ZIP code-level parameters to simulate price changes within a city; the results 
are presented in figures 2 – 10 below. 
Figure 2 shows a selection of ZIP codes in Atlanta, GA for which user cost parameters 
are known.  While the entire city would lose value if the MID were eliminated, neighborhood 
differences are stark, ranging from decreases of twenty-one percent to just three percent.  In 
general, the northeast quadrant of the suburbs shed about thirteen percent of their value, while 
neighborhoods closer to the city on the south and west side lose between three percent and ten 
percent.  A select set of neighborhoods close to the city suffer steep price losses: ZIP code 
30327, a wealthy area north of the central city, faces losses of twenty-one percent. 
Figure 3 presents Atlanta where the MID is converted to a fifteen percent refundable 
credit.  The spatial pattern is now broken up into price increases and price decreases: price 
changes range from minus twelve percent to plus eighteen percent.  In areas where itemizers are 
few and incomes (and their attending MTRs) are low, prices rise substantially.   ZIP code 30297, 
a south-side exurb which loses a modest four percent under the first policy, gains the most under 
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the credit: eighteen percent.  Relatively few areas lose value under this policy – to do so implies 
that the gains to standard deduction tax filers (and to itemizers with MTRs lower than fifteen 
percent, a truly rare breed) are outweighed by the losses from itemizers with MTRs exceeding 
fifteen percent.  Those that do lose value are the north-eastern suburbs.  ZIP code 30327 suffers 
the largest declines in home value under this policy of twelve percent.  Moreover, certain areas in 
the exurbs that lie beyond those most affected by this policy experience little or no change in 
price at all. 
Figure 4 presents Atlanta with an MID capped at fifteen percent.  Price changes across 
neighborhoods range from decreases of thirteen percent to zero percent.  Because the simulation 
works with ZIP code average MTRs, it does not pick up any change in price in areas where the 
average MTR is at or below fifteen percent.  Areas with the greatest losses are again high-
income, high-MTR neighborhoods in the northeast corridor. 
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Figure 2. Eliminating the MID in Atlanta, GA 
 
Note: Average price changes across ZIP codes range from -21 to -3 percent. 
 
Figure 3. Converting the MID to a 15% Credit in Atlanta, GA 
 
Note: Average price changes across ZIP codes range from -12 to +18 percent. 
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Figure 4. Capping the MID at 15% in Atlanta, GA 
 
Note: Average price changes across ZIP codes range from -14 to 0 percent. 
 
The case of Los Angeles, CA appears in the next three figures.  In figure 5 the 
consequences of eliminating the MID are severe: certain neighborhoods experience up to a forty 
percent drop in price.  Yet as in Atlanta, the effect varies greatly across neighborhoods, with 
some experiencing as little as a three percent decrease in price.  Converting the MID to a fifteen 
percent credit in figure 6 also yields intense and varied price changes: wealthy coastal areas face 
declines of up to twenty-eight percent, whereas the central city and outlying exurbs enjoy price 
increases of up to thirty-six percent.  Even in figure 7, the modest proposal of capping the MID 
at fifteen percent causes some neighborhoods to experience as much as a twenty-seven percent 
decrease in prices. 
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Figure 5. Eliminating the MID in Los Angeles, CA 
 
Note: Average price changes across ZIP codes range from -40 to -3 percent. 
 
Figure 6. Converting the MID to a 15% Credit in Los Angeles, CA 
 
Note: Average price changes across ZIP codes range from -28 to +36 percent. 
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Figure 7. Capping the MID at 15% in Los Angeles, CA 
 
Note: Average price changes across ZIP codes range from -27 to 0 percent. 
 
The final three figures present the case of Pittsburgh, PA.  In figure 8, price decreases 
from eliminating the MID range from merely fifteen percent to one percent, with the losses 
clustered in the northwest suburbs.  Figure 9 shows the consequences of converting the MID to a 
fifteen percent credit: price changes range from decreases of five percent to increases of eleven 
percent, with all but a handful of neighborhoods experiencing gains.  Figure 10 presents the 
effect of capping the MID at fifteen percent, where price decreases range only as far as ten 
percent and many neighborhoods experience no price effect at all. 
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Figure 8. Eliminating the MID in Pittsburgh, PA 
 
Note: Average price changes across ZIP codes range from -15 to -1 percent. 
 
Figure 9. Converting the MID to a 15% Credit in Pittsburgh, PA 
 
Note: Average price changes across ZIP codes range from -5 to +11 percent. 
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Figure 10. Capping the MID at 15% in Pittsburgh, PA 
 
Note: Average price changes across ZIP codes range from -10 to 0 percent. 
 
Sorting Effects of MID Policy Changes across Income Classes 
One consequence of the MID becomes apparent when observing the within-city 
distribution of its effects: the MID increases price disparities across neighborhoods, which tend 
to sort by income.  The end result is that the MID reinforces stratification between income 
classes across a city.  Wealthy residents who receive a generous subsidy through the MID can 
bid up the value of housing in neighborhoods they inhabit with tax-subsidized interest payments.  
As the marginal buyers, their bids rise higher than they otherwise would without the MID, 
thereby increasing the affordability gap between low- and high-income neighborhoods.  Low-
income homeowners who do not receive the MID (or receive it less intensely) could not win bids 
for housing even if their pre-subsidy preferences for housing were equal to those of their 
wealthier neighbors. 
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A corollary to this observation is that reforming the MID would make more 
neighborhoods more affordable for lower income classes.  Graphically, this can be seen in any of 
the figures, though it is most obvious from maps describing the effects of a refundable credit.  
Under that policy, areas with high MTRs and many itemizers suffer price declines, while areas 
with lower MTRs and few itemizers enjoy price increases.  Lower income classes could choose 
to take the increase in buying power and apply it to housing in higher income neighborhoods 
more easily than in the absence of MID reform.  While no reform is likely to fully subvert class 
stratification across neighborhoods, any of the three reforms discussed would reduce the 
incentive to sort on income. 
Table 16 quantifies the potential for residents in lower income neighborhoods to move up 
to higher income neighborhoods.  In the first two panels, ZIP codes within each of nineteen cities 
are sorted into quartiles by income.  Panel A indicates the increase over current housing 
expenditure required for an average household in an income quartile to move to the median 
house in the average neighborhood one income quartile above it.  This additional required 
expenditure can be thought of as an affordability gap between neighborhoods of different income 
classes, a gap which a household must be willing to close to relocate to a higher-income 
neighborhood.  Under current policy, the lowest income quartile of neighborhoods within their 
respective cities must spend 47.1 percent more to buy the median home in an averagely priced 
neighborhood in the second income quartile of their city.  The gap shrinks to 43.1 percent or 43.0 
percent if the MID were eliminated (under static or dynamic assumptions respectively), a 
reduction in the affordability gap of 8.6 to 8.7 percent.  The gap shrinks further under the credit, 
to 41.8 percent or 41.5 percent, a reduction of the affordability gap of 11.3 to 11.9 percent.  
Capping the deduction reduces the affordability gap by the least, to 46.4 percent or 46.0 percent.  
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Table 16. Percent Change in Housing Expenditure Required for Upward Mobility within a City 
  AGI 
Average 
Mean 
Home Price Current 
No MID 15% Credit 15% Cap 
Quartile Static Dynamic Static Dynamic Static Dynamic 
          
 Panel A: Moving to an Average ZIP Code in the Next Income Quartile within a City 
1 $34.5 $156,792 47.1% 43.1% 43.0% 41.8% 41.5% 46.4% 46.0% 
2 $47.9 $213,379 34.0% 29.5% 29.2% 28.7% 28.2% 31.7% 30.6% 
3 $62.9 $269,995 61.8% 52.7% 52.4% 51.7% 50.9% 56.2% 54.3% 
4 $108.6 $421,406 - - - - - - - 
          
 Panel B: Moving to the Lowest-Priced ZIP Code in the Next Income Quartile within a City 
1 $34.5 $156,792 
-
15.6% -17.5% -17.6% -17.7% -17.9% -15.9% -16.1% 
2 $47.9 $213,379 
-
13.4% -16.8% -16.6% -16.0% -16.3% -14.6% -15.1% 
3 $62.9 $269,995 3.7% -2.4% -2.4% -2.8% -3.2% 0.6% -0.3% 
4 $108.6 $421,406 - - - - - - - 
          
 Panel C: Moving to an Average ZIP Code in the Next Home Price Quartile within a City 
1 $36.4 $146,653 51.1% 47.0% 47.0% 45.5% 45.3% 50.2% 49.8% 
2 $49.2 $207,444 32.8% 29.0% 28.9% 28.5% 28.2% 30.9% 30.0% 
3 $63.5 $271,214 61.0% 52.8% 52.3% 51.8% 50.9% 55.8% 54.0% 
4 $104.6 $434,638 - - - - - - - 
          
 Panel D: Moving to the Lowest-Priced ZIP Code in the Next Home Price Quartile within a City 
1 $36.4 $146,653 19.4% 16.4% 16.2% 15.2% 15.0% 18.7% 18.4% 
2 $49.2 $207,444 16.0% 10.9% 10.8% 10.4% 9.8% 14.2% 13.3% 
3 $63.5 $271,214 38.5% 28.5% 28.4% 28.4% 27.4% 34.3% 32.3% 
4 $104.6 $434,638 - - - - - - - 
Note: Percent changes reflect the increase in housing expenditure required for a household to move up one 
quartile within its own city.  Positive values indicate an increase in expenditure.  Quartiles in panels A and 
B are the within-city quartiles of ZIP codes sorted on average adjusted gross income.  Quartiles in panels 
C and D are the within-city quartiles of ZIP codes sorted on the median home value as measured by 
Zillow in June of 2011. 
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Across all policies and income quartiles, the greatest difference is seen for homeowners in the 
third quartile under the dynamic simulation of a fifteen percent credit: here the affordability gap 
is wide at 61.8 percent, but it narrows to 51.7 percent with MID reform: a decrease in the 
affordability gap by 17.7 percent. 
Panel B describes the affordability gap for moving instead to the median home of the 
lowest-priced ZIP code in the next income quartile.  Many figures here are negative, indicating 
that home prices and incomes are not perfectly correlated43 – many households could already 
move to richer neighborhoods and actually pay less to do so.  Nonetheless, any of the reforms 
would make upward mobility even more affordable.  Both Panels A and B suggest that gains in 
affordability are more substantial for the second and third income quartiles, reflecting the fact 
that high-income neighborhoods face the steepest declines in relative home price within a city 
(and making them most susceptible to lower-income classes competing for housing at post-
reform prices). 
Panels C and D re-sort neighborhoods into quartiles according to home price rather than 
income within cities.  Panel C now describes the increase over current housing expenditure 
required for an average household in a home price quartile to move to the median house in an 
average neighborhood one home price quartile above it.  For the lowest-valued quartile, moving 
up one home price quartile under current policy would cost an additional 51.1 percent in housing 
expenditure.  Eliminating the MID reduces the affordability gap to 47.0 percent. 
Panel D presents the additional expense of moving to a median home in the lowest-priced 
ZIP code in the next income quartile.  Because the quartiles are sorted strictly by home value, 
there are no absolute savings to be had from these moves as there are in Panel B.  A similar 
                                                 
43 The correlation coefficient between incomes and home prices in this sample is 0.765. 
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pattern emerges, however: the affordability gap decreases due to any reform, with the largest 
decreases coming from the credit, and with the largest decreases accruing to the second and third 
home price quartiles. 
This study does not go so far as to estimate preferences by income class for local 
amenities – it has nothing to say about any class’s willingness-to-pay to move to a different 
neighborhood.  It merely points out by how much the price of such moves falls under each MID 
reform. 
8. Conclusion 
This paper presents simulated changes to home prices in response to MID reform at city 
and neighborhood levels.  By estimating key behavioral and user cost parameters and utilizing 
local data where available, I provide a more sensitive and localized impression of the differential 
impact tax policy can have on home prices than previous studies.  I use the user cost model of 
housing to show that price effects vary greatly both across and within cities under any of the 
three policy reforms considered.  In general, eliminating the MID would reduce home prices 
most for high-income locations while leaving low-income, non-itemizing areas unchanged; 
converting the MID to a refundable tax credit would lower prices in high-income locations while 
raising prices in low-income locations where few tax filers itemize presently; and capping the 
MID at fifteen percent would marginally reduce housing prices, with effects concentrated in only 
the highest-income areas. 
One of the key lessons of this study is the impact of the current tax subsidy has on 
income sorting.  The benefits of the MID accrue disproportionately to high-income households 
(Voith and Gyourko 2002; Glaeser and Shapiro 2003; Hanson and Martin 2014).  To the extent 
the subsidy is being capitalized into home prices, it amplifies differences in those prices across 
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cities and especially across neighborhoods.  Such differences reinforce a tendency to sort on 
income: were a rich and a poor household to bid for the same house, the rich household bids with 
subsidized dollars.  Even if high- and low-income households had an equal willingness-to-pay, 
the high-income households would win the bid in every instance under current tax policy. 
The policy implications are clear: the MID encourages income sorting within cities.  
Entertaining any of the proposed reforms of the MID would, to varying degrees, reduce the 
incentive to sort – lower-income households would more easily be able to obtain homes in 
higher-income neighborhoods.  
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Chapter III  
Discrimination in Mortgage Lending: Evidence from a Correspondence Experiment44 
1. Introduction 
Allegations of discriminatory lending practices during the 2004-2008 housing boom have 
resulted in the two largest cash settlements ever between mortgage lenders and the Department 
of Justice (DOJ).  The settlements, $335 million from Bank of America’s Countrywide group 
and $175 million from Wells Fargo,45 allege that these institutions steered equally qualified 
minority applicants into higher interest (sub-prime) loans and charged higher fees than for white 
borrowers.  During this same time period, Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data 
released by the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council46 shows only an 8 basis point 
difference in the average interest rate charged to white and non-white borrowers (favoring 
whites).47  The substantial cost of discriminatory lawsuits and the lack of corroboration in the 
aggregate data begs the question, “do mortgage lenders really discriminate against minority 
borrowers?” and if so, “how is this possible in an age of computerized, nearly automatic, 
underwriting?” 
                                                 
44 This chapter is joint work with Andrew Hanson of Marquette University, Zackary Hawley of Texas Christian 
University, and Bo Liu of Georgia State University. 
45 The Countrywide and Wells-Fargo lawsuits were settled in December, 2011 and July, 2012, respectively.  The 
DOJ alleges that Countrywide charged higher fees and rates to more than 200,000 African American and Hispanic 
borrowers and steered more than 10,000 African American and Hispanic borrowers into high interest mortgages 
(Savage 2011).  Similarly, the DOJ alleges that Wells-Fargo charged higher fees and rates to approximately 30,000 
African American and Hispanic borrowers, and steered more than 4,000 African American and Hispanic borrowers 
into high interest mortgages (Department of Justice 2012).  It is typical that lending institutions do not admit guilt 
when settling a charge of discrimination with the DOJ. 
46 The FFIEC maintains summary statistics of HMDA data on its website at: 
http://www.ffiec.gov/hmdaadwebreport/NatAggWelcome.aspx.    
47 The 8 basis point difference between white and non-white borrowers is not conditional on borrower characteristics 
and is the difference in the mean interest rate reported for loans where the interest rate is known on conventional, 1-
4 family home purchase loans (excluding manufactured homes) between 2004 and 2008.  Whites have an 
approximately 27 basis point differential (favoring whites) with African American borrowers over this time period, 
not conditional on borrower characteristics.  See Gruenstein-Bocian et al. (2008) for a study that examines interest 
rate differences across race groups conditional on borrower characteristics.   
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We address these questions by testing for racial discrimination using a matched-pair 
correspondence experiment on Mortgage Loan Originators (MLOs).  MLOs are essentially 
licensed mortgage sales workers who assist customers with loan applications and have the ability 
to offer and negotiate the terms of a mortgage with applicants.  The role of information provider 
and advisor in the lending process, and the discretion MLOs have in dealing with customers 
makes them an integral part of the borrowing process from a client’s perspective.  Discrimination 
by MLOs could result in different lending outcomes between minority and majority borrowers, 
and also influence outcomes as the home buying process proceeds.  For example, a borrower 
who is delayed or who is pre-approved for a smaller loan amount may be treated differently by a 
real estate agent in terms of search effort, neighborhood choice, or expediency of service.  If 
differences in initial treatment by an MLO are severe (offering different interest rates, fees, or 
suggesting credit repair services), this could conceivably affect a home buyer in all aspects of the 
home purchase, even if they are successful in obtaining a loan. 48    
Our matched-pair experiment examines the response MLOs offer to initial contact from a 
potential client interested in obtaining information about a mortgage loan.  We design the 
experiment to test for differential treatment by client race (white or African American) and by 
credit score.  We randomly assign pairs of e-mail inquiries to MLOs according to our design to 
test for the effects of a borrower’s race, credit score, and the interaction between these two.  We 
reveal client race to MLOs using selected client names within each e-mail inquiry. We use only 
names that have a high likelihood of being given to only one race in a sample of birth certificate 
for male babies born in New York City in 1990.  We examine both the propensity for MLOs to 
                                                 
48 See Ross and Yinger (2002) for a particularly lucid explanation of discrimination in the lending process, including 
an explanation and critique of research methodology.   
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respond to our inquiries, the propensity to follow up, and the content of the response to test for 
differential treatment.      
To our knowledge, this is the first experimental test of discrimination by MLOs that uses 
e-mail correspondence.49  This is in contrast to earlier studies by Smith and DeLair (1999) and 
Ross et al. (2008), which rely on in-person interaction between MLOs and actors.  Heckman 
(1998) and Heckman and Siegelman (1993) critique using actors when testing for discrimination 
because actors may bias results if they are not identical along all dimensions except race. The 
severity of actor bias can be diminished by carefully choosing and training actors, but actors may 
also be subject to misreporting or inadvertently prompting a discriminatory response (Hanson 
and Hawley 2011). 
While we believe there is value in using in-person studies, and they offer ways to 
examine discrimination by MLOs that our study cannot, our work provides some advantages 
over in-person studies.50  Most importantly, we avoid actor bias by relying solely on electronic 
communication with MLOs, allowing us to dramatically increase the scope of the experiment 
and the geographic area covered relative to in-person studies.  Using electronic communication 
also provides a detailed record of correspondence which allows us to examine the timing and 
content of MLO responses to our inquiries.   
The use of the internet in general is becoming a standard part of the home search and 
borrowing process which has yet to receive much attention in the academic literature.  Bricker et 
                                                 
49 There are several recent studies that use e-mail correspondence to test for discrimination in the market for rental 
housing.  See Hanson and Hawley (2011) for a recent example and a review of this literature.  Also see Ladd (1998), 
Yinger and Ross (2002), and Ross et al. (2008) for a review of the literature on discrimination in mortgage markets 
in particular. 
50 See Doleac and Stein (2013) for a novel approach to avoiding the use of actors by studying discrimination using 
pictures in an on-line market.  This work varies the skin color of the seller to test for discrimination among buyers of 
iPods. 
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al. (2010) report that 41.7 percent of borrowers use the internet for information about 
borrowing,51 and over 90 percent of home buyers in 2012 reported using the internet in some 
capacity during their home search (National Association of Realtors 2012). 
Our results show that MLOs discriminate on the basis of race and treat clients differently 
by their reported credit score.  We find that on net, 1.8 percent of MLOs discriminate by not 
responding to inquiries from African Americans while responding to inquiries from white 
clients.52 We find larger net response differences across credit score types, with 8.5 percent of 
MLOs responding to clients in our high credit score group while not responding to clients who 
do not report a credit score.  We also find that credit score differences exacerbate differences in 
response between races.  Overall, the effect of being African American on MLO response is 
roughly equivalent to the effect of having a credit score that is 71 points lower.  Examining the 
content of the response shows that whites are favored even among MLOs that respond to both 
inquiries.  The primary difference in the content of response between whites and African 
Americans is the inclusion of details about the loan.  We also find that MLOs are more likely to 
send follow-up correspondence to whites than African Americans. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes an MLO’s role in 
the lending process.  Section 3 outlines the design of our experiment, while section 4 details 
implementation and sample characteristics.  Section 5 presents our primary results while section 
6 offers several robustness checks.  The final section of the paper offers concluding comments. 
                                                 
51 In addition to the internet, 39.5 percent of borrowers report using sellers of financial services as a method of 
obtaining information about borrowing.  The most commonly used source of information about borrowing is 
“friends, relatives, and associates” with 43.9 percent of borrowers using that channel (Bricker et al. 2010).   
52 The net level of discrimination measures the difference in the percentage of MLOs that only reply to an inquiry 
from a white client against the percentage of MLOs that only reply to an inquiry from an African American client.  
The gross level of discrimination or the percentage of MLOs that only reply to an inquiry from a white client is 17.8 
percent of MLOs.  The overall difference in response rates is 2.6 percentage points favoring whites- this difference 
does not match the net discrimination level because some of our experiments involved sending inquiries from same 
race clients to the same MLO.    
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2. MLOs in the Lending Process  
MLOs are typically the initial and primary contact person for borrowers seeking a 
mortgage, and have discretion over how they respond to customer inquiries.  MLOs may, for 
example suggest that a borrower attempt to improve their credit score before completing a loan 
application, or may encourage a borrower to act quickly to take advantage of low interest rates.  
They may also present different fees or interest rates to borrowers, offer encouragement or 
discourage the borrower from moving forward with the loan, or offer other financial advice 
related to obtaining a mortgage.53 
MLOs typically have contact with the client throughout the entire lending process, from 
initial inquiry through loan closing, but they are particularly important in the application process.  
Clients who have marginal credit depend on MLOs to give advice on what products to apply for, 
what steps to take to improve their credit and whether their application will ultimately be 
successful.  MLOs may communicate with an underwriter, but do not directly make decisions 
about accepting or denying a loan.  Ross et al. (2008) point out that while minorities are less 
likely than whites (controlling for observable factors) to obtain a loan,54 it is quite rare to find 
discrimination in mortgage underwriting.  Ross et al. suggest that discrimination by MLOs 
would be consistent with these facts.   
                                                 
53 The Secure and Fair Enforcement for Mortgage Licensing Act (SAFE), part of the larger Housing and Economic 
Recovery Act of 2008, included several provisions to tighten regulations of MLOs.  These provisions included 
requiring licensing of MLOs, creating a Nationwide Mortgage Licensing System (NMLS), issuing uniform licensing 
applications and reporting requirements across states, and creating a national clearing house for collecting consumer 
complaints.   
54 See Munnell et al. (1996) for a study that identifies denial rate differences between African American and white 
clients controlling for credit differences. 
82 
 
3. Experiment Design 
To test for discrimination among MLOs we design a matched pair correspondence 
experiment using e-mail to inquire about assistance with a home mortgage.55  The matched pairs 
are structured to test outcome differences due to race and credit score differences among 
potential borrowers.  Each MLO receives two e-mails in the experiment.  This design, along with 
the use of names to identify race, follows the Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) resume 
experiment.56  The audit methodology has a long history in the housing discrimination literature 
starting with Yinger’s (1986) real estate agent experiment.  
We use three credit score groups in our experiment: no credit score, low credit score, and 
high credit score.  The low credit score group reports a randomly assigned credit score between 
600 and 650; the high credit score group reports a randomly assigned credit score between 700 
and 750.57  As a precaution against exposing the experiment, we randomly assign a credit score 
for each e-mail (rather than each pair) from a uniform distribution within each category (low or 
high).  Although there is a chance the credit scores within a matched pair are exactly the same, 
most often the scores will be different within a small range.  We use the randomly assigned 
differences in credit scores to test how MLOs respond to credit score and race differences.  For 
                                                 
55 The experiment attempts to uncover discrimination from differential treatment based on minority status.  Scholars 
(and governments) have also recognized that disparate impact, or having a policy that disproportionately impacts 
minorities while lacking business purpose is discrimination.  See Turner and Skidmore (1999) for a discussion about 
the difference between differential treatment and disparate impact in mortgage lending. 
56 In general, the use of names to identify race may be concerning as names may also reveal something else about 
the characteristics of a client, such as social class (which may be important if it is correlated with ability to repay a 
loan).  We believe the inclusion of credit scores in our experiment helps minimize the concern that important 
unobservables besides race are inferred through the client name.  Doleac and Stein (2013) use pictures to identify 
race in an experimental setting to avoid this criticism. Research by Pope and Sydnor (2011) and Ravina (2012) use 
pictures to identify race in observational studies of credit markets.   
57 The low credit score range approximates the 15-30th percentile of the national distribution of credit scores 
according to the Fair Isaac Company (FICO).  The high credit score range approximates the 40-60th percentile of the 
national FICO score distribution (Federal Reserve Board 2007).  Most MLOs seem to operate using a rule on an 
acceptable credit score (like a minimum of 620); we noticed that the reported rule varied across the responses we 
received.  Our low score sample seems to straddle the rule in all areas.    
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the portion of experiments where a credit score is reported, the average credit score is 675.  For 
the high score group the average is 725 for the low score group it is 625.  
We also divide our experiment into groups by the content of correspondence.  We chose 
this design to guard against exposing the experiment.  Each group includes one of two types of 
questions to be asked of the MLO.  Using different questions across MLOs may make our 
inquiries less suspicious for company spam filters or for co-workers who discuss client e-mails.  
E-mails to one group contain a question about interest rates and a question about mortgage fees 
(all questions for this set are listed in Appendix 1 in the boxes labeled Question #1a and 
Question #1b).  E-mails to the other group contain a question about loan availability and a 
question about what information is necessary to proceed in the process of obtaining a loan (all 
questions for this set are listed in Appendix 1 in the boxes labeled Question #2a and Question 
#2b).  To further guard against exposing the experiment to MLOs, we randomly assign the 
phrases within the structure of our e-mail inquiries.  For example, we randomly assign each e-
mail one of five possible greetings (Hello, Hi, Hi There, Hey, or Dear), and ensure that the other 
e-mail sent to the same MLO does not use the exact greeting.  We view the benefits from not 
matching the text exactly (reducing the risk of exposing the experiment) as exceeding the cost 
that any of our greetings (or other text elements) might influence outcomes in a meaningful 
way.58  Appendix 1 details the exact layout of our correspondence and the randomly assigned 
text that populates each e-mail.   
  
                                                 
58 There is almost no difference in the response rate across types of e-mails.  The response rate for the question set 
#1 group is 67.2.  The response rate for the question set #2 group is 66.8.  This difference is not statistically 
meaningful. 
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Figure 11. Experiment Design 
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Note: Each cell represents an email type. Email audits were conducted across 
all pairings of cells in group 1-6 and in group 7-12.  Order was also 
randomized for each audit pair, resulting in sixty experiment types. 
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Our experiment includes 30 different matched pair types, representing all of the 
combinations between cells in figure 11.59  This allows us to examine the marginal effect of race 
and credit score (on the extensive and intensive margin), as well as to examine if there is a 
different marginal effect of credit score across races.  We randomly assign each MLO to a 
matched pair type, and randomly vary the credit score within the range for that type.  The 
matched pair, or within-subjects, design means that each MLO in our experiment receives two e-
mail inquiries.  
 We reveal borrower race to MLOs through the name associated with each e-mail inquiry. 
The source of first names is the New York City Department of Health and Human Hygiene 
(DHHH) records for babies born in 1990. The DHHH birth records provide counts of babies born 
by gender, race, and first name.  We begin by calculating the probability a baby is born either 
white or African American for each name in the sample.  We use only male baby names for this 
calculation.  The DHHH data do not report a count for names with fewer than 10 babies born in a 
given race-gender match.  This makes our probabilities for names that are very likely to be 
associated with only one race equal to one, when in fact they could be less than one.  Because of 
this censoring, and the primary concern of signaling race, we also consider the raw number of 
occurrences each name has within a given race.  After compiling a list based on probabilities and 
counts, we eliminate most names that have a Muslim or Jewish origin from our list as we want to 
minimize any confounding effects these characteristics would bring to the experiment. 
The source of surnames is Word et al.’s (2007) analysis of 2000 Census data.  This 
analysis reports counts of surnames for the general population, and by race/ethnicity of 
                                                 
59 We also randomly vary the order in which e-mails are sent.  For each matched pair type the order of the treatment 
difference (e.g. high vs. low credit score) is randomly reversed in exactly half the emails. We do this to ensure that 
that order effects do not drive any results.   
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respondents to the census.  For African American surnames we use the same criteria as first 
names, choosing those with the highest probability of belonging to African Americans.  We 
choose the surnames with the largest probability of belonging to African Americans regardless of 
total count, as the data shows a large number of African Americans with these surnames in all 
cases.  We use slightly different criteria for white surnames, as many of the names with the 
highest probabilities of belonging to whites have a strong ethnic component (for example the 
highest probabilities are Yoder, Mueller, Koch, all are from a German origin).  For white 
surnames, we choose three names (Miller, Nelson, Baker) from the most common (by count) 
names that have greater than a 0.8 probability of being white and less than a .15 probability of 
being African American.  We choose the other two names (Krueger and Schmitt) from the list 
with the highest probabilities of being white, regardless of their ethnic attachment.    
Table 17 shows the list of names used to signal race in the experiment.  The first three 
columns of table 18 show the probability a baby is African American or white given they are 
born with that name, the count of babies born with that name in 1990, and the rank (by count) for 
each name.  The last three columns of table 17 show the probability a person is African 
American or white given the surname, the count of persons with that name in 2000, and the rank 
(by count) for each name.  White names chosen with the alternative criteria are not ranked in the 
top ten for all white names, thus we report their value for rank as NA.  MLOs are exposed to the 
name associated with each inquiry in three ways: the actual e-mail address,60 the signature at the 
bottom of each e-mail (styled as “First name Surname”), and the name plate in the MLOs inbox 
(styled as “First name Surname).  
  
                                                 
60 We use Gmail addresses exclusively, and all take the form firstname.surnameXXX@gmail.com, where XXX is a 
random three-digit number. 
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Table 17. Names Identifying Race 
 First Name Last Name 
 P(Race|Name) Count Rank P(Race|Name) Count Rank 
White       
Zachary Miller 1 164 1 0.86 969910 NA 
Brendan Nelson 1 55 5 0.8 329788 NA 
Jake Krueger 1 43 9 0.97 36694 2 
Ethan Schmitt 1 38 10 0.97 35326 6 
Maxwell Baker 1 36 15 0.82 343081 NA 
Spencer Miller 1 31 17 0.86 969910 NA 
Brett Nelson 1 28 20 0.8 329788 NA 
Conor Schmitt 1 21 33 (tie) 0.97 35326 6 
Luke Krueger 1 22 31 0.97 36694 2 
Seth Baker 1 21 33 (tie) 0.82 343081 NA 
       
African American       
Jamal Washington 1 96 1 0.9 163036 1 
Jerome Jefferson 1 38 27 0.53 666125 5 
DaQuan Booker 1 68 10 0.66 35101 3 
Terrell Banks 1 66 12 0.54 99294 4 
Darnell Jackson 1 65 13 0.53 666125 5 
Tyrone Washington 1 56 14 0.9 163036 1 
Kadeem Jefferson 1 84 2 0.75 51361 2 
Reginald Jackson 1 51 18 0.75 51361 2 
Jermaine Booker 1 49 22 0.66 35101 3 
DaShawn Banks 1 39 26 0.54 99294 4 
Source: First names are taken from the New York City Department of Health and Human 
Hygiene (DHHH) records for babies born in 1990. Surnames are taken from Word et al.’s 
analysis of 2000 Census data.   
Note: For African Americans we choose the surnames with the largest probability of 
belonging to African Americans regardless of total count.  The white surnames Krueger and 
Schmitt were chosen with the same criteria.  Because we are concerned that many of the 
highest probability white surnames have a German origin, we choose three white surnames 
(Miller, Nelson, and Baker) using alternative criteria.  The alternative criteria is to use the 
most common (by count) names that have greater than a 0.8 probability of being white and 
less than a .15 probability of being African American.  White names chosen with the 
alternative criteria are not ranked in the top ten for all white names, thus we report their value 
for rank as NA.   The DHHH data do not report a count for names with fewer than 10 babies 
born in a given race-gender match.  This makes our probabilities for names that are very 
likely to be associated with only one race equal to one, when in fact they could be less than 
one.  The first name count is the number of babies born with that name for each race.  The 
first name rank is where each name ranks in the count distribution.   
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  Table 18. Frequency of Names in Experiment 
  
Frequency of 
occurrence 
Percentage of e-
mails 
White   
Zachary Miller 509 4.91% 
Brendan Nelson 535 5.16% 
Jake Krueger 526 5.08% 
Ethan Schmitt 528 5.10% 
Maxwell Baker 515 4.97% 
Spencer Miller 489 4.72% 
Brett Nelson 502 4.84% 
Conor Schmitt 508 4.90% 
Luke Krueger 547 5.28% 
Seth Baker 523 5.05% 
   
African American   
Jamal Washington 513 4.95% 
Jerome Jefferson 571 5.51% 
DaQuan Booker 543 5.24% 
Terrell Banks 518 5.00% 
Darnell Jackson 485 4.68% 
Tyrone Washington 577 5.57% 
Kadeem Jefferson 459 4.43% 
Reginald Jackson 490 4.73% 
Jermaine Booker 497 4.80% 
DaShawn Banks 527 5.09% 
   
Total 10362   
Note: Names are randomly assigned to an audit type after the 
audit type is randomly determined for each MLO.  Random 
assignment is done without replacement for each MLO so that 
names are not repeated within an audit.  Difference in 
frequency of names in the experiment is due to random 
assignment. 
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Table 18 shows the frequency each name occurs in the experiment.  Each name 
represents approximately 5 percent of the sample of e-mails sent, or about 520 e-mails. The least 
frequent name in our sample is Kadeem Jefferson, with 459 e-mails or about 4.4 percent of the 
total e-mails in our experiment.  The most frequent name in our sample is Tyrone Washington, 
with 577 e-mails or about 5.6 percent of the total e-mails in our experiment.  All differences in 
name frequency are due to the random assignment of names to matched-pair types, and random 
assignment of matched-pair types to MLOs in our experiment. 
4. Experiment Implementation and Sample Characteristics 
We identify a set of MLOs with their e-mail addresses as subjects for the experiment 
through internet search.  Collection of MLO contact information occurred from February through 
April of 2012.  We used multiple styles of internet search including Google Maps, Google.com, 
Yellow Pages (YP.com) and Better Business Bureau (bbb.org). For each MLO we identify the 
following information: name (first and last), state, website, email address, title, physical address 
and company affiliation.  When a photograph is available, we also identify their presumed 
gender and race.   
To ensure a broad sample and limit the potential for the experiment to be exposed, we 
limit sampling of MLOs operating in the same workplace.  We categorize MLO workplace 
according to their place of employment on two levels: the company and the branch.  We consider 
MLOs to work for the same company if they work for an employer with the same company name 
(for example, Bank of America or Wells Fargo).  We consider MLOs to work for the same 
branch if they advertise the same physical address on their website.  We limit our sample to 8 
MLOs per branch, but do not restrict the number of MLOs at the company level.  The average 
number of MLOs per branch in our experiment is 2.38, with an average per company of 27. 
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Table 19. Number of Audits and Response Rate across States 
  
Number 
of audits 
Overall 
response 
rate (%) 
Responded 
to at least 
one inquiry 
(%) 
Percent of 
Audit 
Population 
Percent of 
US 
Population 
Full Sample 5181 68.50% 84.93% -- -- 
Alabama 70 70.71% 88.57% 1.35% 1.55% 
Alaska 2 75.00% 100.00% 0.04% 0.23% 
Arizona 125 64.00% 81.60% 2.41% 2.07% 
Arkansas 49 57.14% 89.80% 0.95% 0.94% 
California 423 69.27% 83.69% 8.16% 12.07% 
Colorado 99 70.20% 86.87% 1.91% 1.63% 
Connecticut 69 57.97% 73.91% 1.33% 1.16% 
Delaware 15 63.33% 80.00% 0.29% 0.29% 
Florida 226 73.01% 86.28% 4.36% 6.09% 
Georgia 224 71.43% 86.61% 4.32% 3.14% 
Hawaii 28 60.71% 71.43% 0.54% 0.44% 
Idaho 34 69.12% 88.24% 0.66% 0.51% 
Illinois 304 70.89% 83.88% 5.87% 4.16% 
Indiana 143 75.87% 92.31% 2.76% 2.10% 
Iowa 60 69.17% 85.00% 1.16% 0.99% 
Kansas 37 74.32% 89.19% 0.71% 0.92% 
Kentucky 93 70.97% 83.87% 1.80% 1.41% 
Louisiana 70 72.14% 84.29% 1.35% 1.47% 
Maine 44 80.68% 95.45% 0.85% 0.43% 
Maryland 158 70.25% 85.44% 3.05% 1.87% 
Massachusetts 106 51.89% 68.87% 2.05% 2.12% 
Michigan 231 73.81% 91.77% 4.46% 3.20% 
Minnesota 95 72.63% 86.32% 1.83% 1.72% 
Mississippi 57 71.05% 85.96% 1.10% 0.96% 
Missouri 101 65.35% 87.13% 1.95% 1.94% 
Montana 16 87.50% 100.00% 0.31% 0.32% 
Nebraska 51 82.35% 94.12% 0.98% 0.59% 
Nevada 57 73.68% 94.74% 1.10% 0.87% 
New Hampshire 54 68.52% 79.63% 1.04% 0.43% 
New Jersey 111 73.87% 82.88% 2.14% 2.85% 
New Mexico 48 65.63% 83.33% 0.93% 0.67% 
New York 328 68.75% 83.23% 6.33% 6.28% 
North Carolina 64 74.22% 90.63% 1.24% 3.09% 
North Dakota 27 61.11% 74.07% 0.52% 0.22% 
Ohio 261 72.22% 91.19% 5.04% 3.74% 
Oklahoma 64 47.66% 87.50% 1.24% 1.22% 
Oregon 100 68.50% 83.00% 1.93% 1.24% 
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Pennsylvania 177 77.97% 89.27% 3.42% 4.11% 
Rhode Island 34 73.53% 82.35% 0.66% 0.34% 
South Carolina 103 63.59% 83.50% 1.99% 1.50% 
South Dakota 12 45.83% 66.67% 0.23% 0.26% 
Tennessee 58 68.97% 87.93% 1.12% 2.06% 
Texas 225 52.44% 80.44% 4.34% 8.14% 
Utah 85 46.47% 62.35% 1.64% 0.90% 
Vermont 15 83.33% 100.00% 0.29% 0.20% 
Virginia 144 58.33% 75.69% 2.78% 2.59% 
Washington 159 68.87% 86.16% 3.07% 2.18% 
West Virginia 2 75.00% 100.00% 0.04% 0.60% 
Wisconsin 110 76.82% 90.91% 2.12% 1.84% 
Wyoming 13 50.00% 76.92% 0.25% 0.18% 
Note: Sampling is intended to follow U.S. state population proportions.  The exact 
representativeness of state populations in our data depends on availability of MLO 
contact information.  Collection of MLO contact information occurred from February 
through April of 2012.  We used multiple styles of internet search including Google 
Maps, Google.com, Yellow Pages (YP.com) and Better Business Bureau (bbb.org) to 
locate MLO contact information. 
 
We balance the number of MLOs by state level geography, using the proportion of the 
US population in 2010.  For instance, Mississippi has 0.96 percent of the 2010 US population 
and we target 0.96 percent (50) of MLOs in our sample to come from that state.  Our goal is not 
perfect geographic representativeness, but rather a broad geographic sample of the target 
population of MLOs.   Table 19 shows a state-by-state count of the MLOs in our experiment. 61  
The state with the largest number of subjects is California with 423 MLOs, whereas Alaska and 
West Virginia have the smallest number, 2 each.  The difference between the proportion of 
MLOs in our sample and 2010 sample population ranges from under sampling by 3.9 percentage 
points in California to over sampling by 1.71 percentage points in Illinois.  Most states are within 
0.50 percentage points of the population proportion. 
                                                 
61 The actual sample in our experiment is not exactly proportional with 2010 state populations.  This is partly due to 
randomly selecting MLOs from this sample to be subjects and partly due to the fact that availability of MLO 
information is not uniform across geography.   
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Table 20. Mortgage Loan Originator Characteristics 
  
Number of 
Audits Frequency 
Overall Response 
Rate 
Gender    
Female  1,916  36.98% 87.37% 
Male  2,202  42.50% 84.92% 
Not Identified  1,063  20.52% 80.53% 
    
Race    
White  3,619  69.85% 86.57% 
Non-White  273  5.27% 85.71% 
     Arabic  1  0.02% 100.00% 
     Asian  57  1.10% 80.70% 
     Black  90  1.74% 91.11% 
     Hispanic  115  2.22% 84.35% 
     Indian  7  0.14% 71.43% 
     Native American  3  0.06% 100.00% 
Not Identified  1,289  24.88% 80.14% 
Note: We identified race and gender of MLOs by visually inspecting photographs 
when available on lender webpages.  Our approach was conservative in 
identifying both gender and race: if we felt there was any room for argument 
about either, we categorized the demographic information as not identified.  The 
not identified category includes all instances where there was ambiguity in 
assigning race and/or gender and when a photograph was not available.  For the 
summary statistics shown, the Non-White race category includes Arabic, Asian, 
Black, Hispanic, Indian, and Native American, the breakdown of each is shown 
within the non-white category. 
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We have 5,181 as subjects in our experiment.  A notable feature of MLOs is their relative 
demographic homogeneity.  We are able to identify the race of MLO using photographs for 
about 75 percent of our sample.  93 percent of the race-identified MLOs are white. Gender is 
more evenly split, where 53 percent of gender-identified MLOs are male.  We know of no 
existing demographic statistics to corroborate our sample as representative of the industry.  
Nonetheless, we did not specifically seek MLOs based on race or gender, and believe these 
statistics to be representative of the industry participants who list information on the internet.  
Table 20 shows complete demographic characteristics for the sample of MLOs in the 
experiment. 
Our experiment began on Monday, April 30, 2012 at 2:00 pm with a set of 200 pilot 
emails to a sub-sample of MLOs.  The full experiment commenced one week later, on Tuesday, 
May 8 at 1:00 pm.  An MLO was randomly selected to participate in one of five rounds (one 
pilot and four regular).62  A round consists of a first and second e-mail going out to the same 
group of MLOs- separated by one week.  For instance, Round 3 recipients received their first 
email on Thursday, May 10; they received their second email on Thursday, May 17.  All emails 
following the pilot were sent beginning at 1pm Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) and ending by 2pm 
EDT.  Regular rounds were conducted on Tuesdays, Wednesdays and Thursdays between May 8 
and May 29.  The schedule is designed to minimize possible confounding effects.  Mondays and 
Fridays are avoided in the experiment to minimize the impact of weekend lag times or end-of-
week effects.  The start time of each half round is held constant to minimize unobserved time-of-
day effects. 
                                                 
62 Random selection for a round depends on the number of MLOs at a branch.  Spreading a branch’s MLOs through 
multiple rounds is done to ensure no more than two emails from any of our clients arrive at an office on any given 
day.  The structure of this selection, however, is independent of treatment assignment. 
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Keeping days of the week and time of e-mail sending similar within rounds is designed to 
reduce noise in the experiment. Bias is eliminated through randomization of treatment 
assignment and treatment order.  Whichever audit type an MLO is assigned to, the order in 
which the MLO receives the treatment is randomized.  Should our efforts to eliminate 
confounding effects be inadequate, randomizing the order of treatment causes such effects to 
attenuate the outcome to zero rather than bias it.  This is a key strength of our experimental 
design. 
Given the volume of mail to be delivered (two emails to each MLO from one of twenty 
different client email accounts), we used an automated email-sending program to minimize 
human error and speed processing.  The program was set to initiate individual Simple Mail 
Transfer Protocol (SMTP) sessions for each email sent with the Gmail servers, and to wait one to 
two seconds between sending emails.  The resulting emails are indistinguishable from messages 
that would be sent directly from the Gmail web interface. 
Of the 10,362 e-mail inquiries sent in our experiment, about 1.3 percent received an 
automated response or out-of-office reply.  We do not count these as a response unless a follow 
up e-mail was sent by the MLO. 
5. Results 
The experiment provides a wealth of information on MLOs response to standard inquiries 
for assistance with obtaining a home mortgage.  We maintain all content for each MLO response 
to use in the analysis, in addition to the date/time stamp that the e-mail was sent to examine 
speed of response. 
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Response vs. Non-Response by Race 
The most basic indication of equal treatment across race and credit score types is whether 
or not an MLO responds to our inquiry for assistance with a mortgage loan.  We consider a 
response to be one that we deem genuinely written by a human; out-of-office or other automatic 
replies are not considered a response.  Our measure of response is if the MLO ever sent a 
genuine e-mail response within two weeks of our inquiry.  This measure means that we count a 
genuinely human response to have occurred even if it is not the first correspondence we received 
from the MLO.63  In several instances, we received out of office replies, and subsequent 
genuinely human responses.  In other cases we received automatically generated commercial 
replies followed by genuinely human responses.   
Table 21 shows the difference in genuine response by MLOs to our inquiries across race 
groups.  The first and second columns of table 21 show the overall response rate, while columns 
4-7 offer a breakdown at the MLO level for the sub-sample of the experiment that includes 
MLOs who received separate e-mails from both an African American and a white borrower.64  
The response rate to white borrowers for the full sample is 68.31 percent.  For African American 
borrowers, the response rate is 2.63 percentage points lower, or 65.68 percent.  As shown in the 
third column of table 21, this difference is statistically significant at the one percent level, 
indicating that MLOs are less likely to respond to inquiries from African American borrowers 
than they are from whites. 
                                                 
63 Of the responses we consider genuinely human, 99.8 percent of them were received within two weeks of our 
original inquiry.  We count the other 0.02 percent as non-responses. 
64 Recall that the full sample includes some audits where inquiries had the same race, but different credit 
characteristics. 
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Table 21. Response Rate and Mortgage Loan Originator (MLO) Level Response to Race Differences 
 Overall response rate  Response at MLO level 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  White 
African 
American (1)-(2)   
Respond 
to neither 
Respond 
to both 
White 
only 
African 
American 
only (6)-(7) 
All audits 68.31% 65.68% 2.63%  16.28% 49.77% 17.88% 16.07% 1.81% 
 [3540] [3402] p=0.0022***  [632] [1932] [694] [624] p=0.0573* 
          
White MLOs 70.67% 67.41% 3.26%  14.49% 51.96% 17.85% 15.71% 2.14% 
 [2554] [2443] p=0.0014***  [392] [1406] [483] [425] p=0.0585* 
          
Non-White MLOs 68.50% 65.57% 2.93%  13.04% 49.28% 20.77% 16.91% 3.86% 
 [187] [179] p=0.2337  [27] [102] [43] [35] p=0.4282 
          
Missing Race MLOs 61.70% 60.80% 0.90%  21.98% 43.76% 17.34% 16.92% 0.42% 
 [799] [780] p=0.3189  [213] [424] [168] [164] p=0.8693 
          
Male MLOs 69.16% 66.00% 3.16%  16.66% 50.75% 17.74% 14.85% 2.89% 
 [1496] [1479] p=0.0124**  [277] [844] [295] [247] p=0.0434** 
          
Female MLOs 70.80% 67.23% 3.57%  12.98% 51.48% 18.83% 16.71% 2.12% 
 [1382] [1264] p=0.0085***  [184] [730] [267] [237] p=0.1964 
          
Missing Gender  62.04% 62.23% -0.19%  21.35% 44.69% 16.48% 17.48% -1.00% 
    MLOs [662] [659] p=0.5351   [171] [358] [132] [140] p=0.6713 
Note: The p-value represented in column (3) is from a one-sided t-test (alternative hypothesis of a positive difference) with a null 
hypothesis that the difference in average response rate is zero.  The p-value reported in column (8) is from McNemar paired difference 
in proportions test.  This test is designed for testing the difference in proportion of respondents for paired subjects, the test statistic is 
𝜒2 = (𝑁𝑂𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝑊 − 𝑁𝑂𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝐴𝐴)
2
/ (𝑁𝑂𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝑊 + 𝑁𝑂𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝐴𝐴) where 𝑁 represents the number of MLOs only responding to one group.  The test 
statistic has a chi-squared distribution, and we calculate all p-values accordingly.  Number of MLOs shown in [].  *** p<.01  ** p<.05  
* p<.10 
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We find a slightly higher response rate difference (3.26 percentage points in favor of 
white borrowers) for the sub sample of MLOs whose race is white.  The magnitude of our results 
is similar for the sub-sample of non-white MLOs, but the small sample size of this group strains 
statistical precision.  We find a smaller difference in response rate for the sample of MLOs 
where we are not able to identify race (a 0.9 percentage point difference, favoring whites), 
although this result is also imprecise.  The level of discrimination measured by response rate 
differences between male and female MLOs is similar, 3.16 percentage points for male MLOs, 
3.57 percentage points for females, both favoring white borrowers and both precisely estimated.  
Among the sample of MLOs where we do not identify gender, we find only a small, imprecisely 
estimated difference in response rate (0.19 percentage points, favoring African Americans). 
Although we do find a statistically significant difference in response rates between 
African American and white borrowers, the MLO level results shown in columns 4-7 of table 21 
show that 66.05 percent of the MLOs in our sample treat e-mail inquiries the same- either by 
responding to both (49.77) or responding to neither (16.28) inquiry.  We measure discrimination 
at the MLO level by the net amount of discrimination, or the difference in the proportion of 
MLOs who respond only to whites, and those that only respond to African Americans.  Using 
this measure, we find a smaller level of discrimination: MLOs responding only to whites 
outnumber MLOs responding only to African Americans by 1.81 percentage points, a difference 
which is close to statistically precise at conventional levels (a p-value of 0.0573) despite the 
smaller sample size and more rigorous significance test.65 
                                                 
65 For all statistical significance tests at the MLO level, we use the McNemar test.  This test is designed for testing 
the difference in proportion of respondents for paired subjects.  The test statistic is 
 𝜒2 =  (𝑁𝑂𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝑊 − 𝑁𝑂𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝐴𝐴)
2
/ (𝑁𝑂𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝑊 + 𝑁𝑂𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝐴𝐴), where N represents the number of MLOs only responding to 
one group.  The McNemar test statistic has a chi-squared distribution, and we calculate all p-values accordingly. 
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The MLO-level results across race and gender of MLOs are similar to the response rate 
results, with smaller magnitudes and some loss of statistical precision.  We still find that white 
MLOs discriminate, but only by 2.14 percentage points on net, with statistical significance at the 
10 percent level.  Our results for male MLOs also remain largely the same, showing a slightly 
higher level of discrimination than the full sample (2.89 percentage points on net), and 
maintaining statistical precision; however, we lose statistical precision on the results for female 
MLOs. 
Response vs. Non-Response by Credit Score 
Table 22 shows the difference in genuine response by MLOs to our inquiries across credit 
score groups.  Panel A shows the overall response rate difference across the high, low, and no 
credit score groups.  Panel B shows the difference in response at the MLO level for the sub-
sample of MLOs who received separate e-mails from borrowers with different credit scores (or 
one including a credit score and the other excluding).  The high credit score group received the 
highest response rate, 69.46 percent.  The response rate for the low credit score group is 3.7 
percentage points lower, or 65.76 percent.  The difference in response rate between the high and 
low credit score group is statistically significant at the one percent level, indicating that MLOs 
are more likely to respond to inquiries from borrowers with a higher credit score. 
We find a similar gap in response rates between the high and no credit score groups of 
3.69 percentage points, with the response rate of the no credit score group at 65.77 percent.  The 
difference in response rate between the high and no credit score group is also statistically 
significant at the one percent level.  We find only a small, statistically imprecise gap between the 
response rate for the low and no credit score groups that slightly favors the no credit score group.
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Table 22. Response Rate and Mortgage Loan Originator (MLO) Level Response to Credit Score Differences 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Response Rate Differences 
  High Credit Low Credit No Credit (1)-(2) (1)-(3) (2)-(3) 
Response Rate  69.46% 65.76% 65.77% 3.70% 3.69% -0.01% 
    (includes all  [2397] [2276] [2269] p=0.0005*** p=0.0005*** p=0.5024 
    audits) 
       
Panel B: MLO Level Differences 
 
Respond to 
neither 
Respond to 
both 
Respond to Higher 
only 
Respond to Low/No 
only (3)-(4) 
High vs. Low  15.21% 49.88% 19.47% 15.44% 4.03% 
    Credit [132] [433] [169] [134] p=0.0506* 
      
High vs. No Credit 15.17% 53.00% 20.14% 11.66% 8.48% 
 [129] [450] [171] [99] p=0.0000*** 
      
Low vs. No Credit 17.80% 50.17% 17.22% 14.81% 2.41% 
  [155] [437] [150] [129] p=0.2311 
Note: The p-value represented in columns (4), (5), and (6) is from a one-sided t-test (alternative hypothesis of a positive 
difference) with a null hypothesis that the difference in average response rate is zero. The p-value reported in column (5) of 
Panel B is from McNemar paired difference in proportions test.  This test is designed for testing the difference in proportion of 
respondents for paired subjects. The test statistic is 𝜒2 = (𝑁𝑂𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝑊 − 𝑁𝑂𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝐴𝐴)
2
/ (𝑁𝑂𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝑊 + 𝑁𝑂𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝐴𝐴), where 𝑁 represents the 
number of MLOs only responding to one group.  The test statistic has a chi-squared distribution, and we calculate all p-values 
accordingly.  Number of MLOs shown in [].  *** p<.01  ** p<.05  * p<.10 
100 
 
The MLO level results show that the majority of MLOs respond (between 49.88 and 53 
percent) or do not respond (between 15.17 and 17.8 percent) to both credit score groups.  As with 
the race results, we measure equal treatment by examining the net proportion of MLOs that 
respond differently across credit score groups.  The MLO level analysis reveals about the same 
level of differential treatment between the high and low credit score groups: 4.03 percentage 
points on net, which is statistically significant at the 10 percent level (p-value of 0.0506).  The 
biggest difference is the differential treatment between the high and no credit score group, where 
the high credit score group is favored by 8.48 percent of MLOs on net.  This result is statistically 
meaningful at the one percent level. 
Comparing the race and credit score differences shows that MLOs are relatively more 
sensitive to differences in credit scores when deciding whether or not to respond to a borrower 
inquiry for assistance with a mortgage loan.  The relative difference between race and credit 
score groups depends on which response measure is used.  At the MLO level, going from a low 
to high credit score roughly doubles the difference in net unequal treatment in response/non-
response compared to the difference between African American and white borrowers.  The mean 
difference between credit score groups (100 points), assuming a linear relationship between 
credit score and response, suggests that the effect of having an African American name on MLO 
response is roughly equivalent to having a credit score that is 71 points lower.  
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Table 23. Response Rate and Mortgage Loan Originator (MLO) Level Response by Race and Credit of Credit-Seeker 
 Overall response rate  Response at MLO level 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Group 1 Group 2 (1)-(2)  
Respond 
to 
neither 
Respond 
to both 
White 
only 
African 
American 
only (6)-(7) 
Equal Credit Within Audit         
White / African  67.34% 65.72% 1.62%  16.31% 49.36% 17.97% 16.35% 1.62% 
     American [1746] [1704] p=0.1083  [423] [1280] [466] [424] p=0.1693 
          
White Higher Credit Within Audit         
White / African  71.26% 61.05% 10.21%  15.91% 48.22% 23.04% 12.83% 10.21% 
     American [300] [257] p=0.0009***  [67] [203] [97] [54] p=0.0006*** 
          
African American Higher Credit Within Audit        
White / African  65.26% 72.37% -7.11%  15.00% 52.63% 12.63% 19.74% -7.11% 
     American [248] [275] p=0.0173**  [57] [200] [48] [75] p=0.0187** 
          
Note:  Equal Credit Within Audit implies credit category is the same (high, low, no) for a given audit.  Higher credit score 
comparisons exclude low vs. no credit audits.  Including no vs. low credit score audits makes differences between race even 
larger than the differences shown here.  The p-value represented in column (3) is from a one-sided t-test (alternative hypothesis of 
a positive (or negative for African American Higher Credit) difference) with a null hypothesis that the difference in average 
response rate is zero. The p-value reported in column (8) is from McNemar paired difference in proportions test.  This test is 
designed for testing the difference in proportion of respondents for paired subjects. The test statistic is 𝜒2 =
(𝑁𝑂𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝑊 − 𝑁𝑂𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝐴𝐴)
2
/ (𝑁𝑂𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝑊 + 𝑁𝑂𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝐴𝐴), where 𝑁 represents the number of MLOs only responding to one group.  The test 
statistic has a chi-squared distribution, and we calculate all p-values accordingly.  Number of MLOs shown in [].  *** p<.01  ** 
p<.05  * p<.  
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Response vs. Non-Response by Race and Credit Score 
The design of our experiment allows us to look at differential treatment across several 
possible race-credit score combinations.  Table 23 shows results for audits where whites and 
African Americans are assigned to the same credit score category, where whites are in a higher 
credit score category, and where African Americans are in a higher credit score category.  The 
magnitude of the response rate differences and MLO level differences will be exactly the same 
for these results, as they use the same set of audits; however, the statistical tests at the MLO level 
count only differential response by individual MLOs, so statistical significance may vary.   
The magnitude of discrimination using only audits in equal credit score categories is 
slightly smaller than the level for the entire sample; we find net discrimination by 1.62 percent of 
MLOs, as opposed to 1.9 for the full sample.  The statistical significance of this relationship is 
strained, as the MLO level result has a p-value of 0.1693, outside of traditional significance 
levels, while the response rate test is close to statistical precision at the 10 percent level.  Given 
that the magnitude of these results is similar to the full sample, the loss of statistical precision 
does not seem alarming, especially considering that these results rely on a smaller sample.66 
The results across race where clients report different credit scores show that the higher 
credit score group is favored regardless of whether they are white or African American, but that 
the degree to which they are favored is larger for whites with higher credit scores.  The middle 
row of table 23 shows that whites are favored by 10.21 percent (statistically significant at the one 
percent level) of MLOs in audits where the white client reports a higher credit score and the 
African American reports either a low or no credit score.  The bottom row of table 23 shows that 
                                                 
66 We also test for differences when both scores are high, both low, and both do not include credit.  These results 
show a similar level of discrimination as the results that combine these groups, but statistical precision is even more 
strained due to smaller sample sizes in these sub groups.  
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while African Americans with higher credit scores are favored over whites with low or no credit 
score, the difference is only 7.11 percent of MLOs on net (statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level).  The MLO level results show that more MLOs choose to reply to both clients when the 
African American has a higher credit score, as opposed to replying to only the white client when 
African Americans have a lower credit score.  These results suggest that while there is a level of 
discrimination that exists regardless of credit score, discrimination increases with credit score 
differences between races.  A non-constant level of discrimination may mean that the source of 
discrimination is not taste-based, but instead a form of statistical discrimination based on 
perceived group differences. 
Content of Response 
E-mail communication with MLOs allows us to examine not only the propensity to 
respond, but also the nature of responses in our experiment.  Table 24 shows how MLOs 
responded in terms of the timing, length, and propensity to send a follow-up response in the 
experiment. 
Results show that MLOs are substantially slower to respond to African American clients 
than they are to whites.  Among MLOs that responded to both inquiries, whites received a 
response in 8 hours and 20 minutes on average.  MLOs took an average of an hour and three 
minutes longer to respond to African Americans, a result that is statistically precise at the ten 
percent level.  In terms of the length of response, a measure of response intensity, we find no 
difference in the number of characters in a response when examining all e-mails.  Examining a 
sub-set of responses that differ by at least 10 characters (to eliminate short generic, or form 
responses), we do find that whites are favored and receive a response that is about 4 percent 
longer. 
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Table 24. Intensity of Mortgage Loan Originator (MLO) Response 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  White African American (1)-(2) 
Panel A: Time Elapsed until Response 
Time until response (h:mm) 8:20 9:23 1:03 
 (29:50) (34:04) p=0.0879* 
    
Panel B: Length of Response 
Character count, all audits 426.00 431.84 2.52 
 (356.35) (388.34) p=0.3890 
    
Character count, dropping audits with equal (within  448.74 431.84 16.90 
10 characters) length replies (347.55) (361.01) p=0.0986* 
    
Panel C: Follow-up Response 
Follow-up e-mail received 6.91% 5.17% 1.74% 
 [358] [268] p=0.0001*** 
    
Number of follow-up e-mails received 2.19 2.25 -0.06 
 (0.51) (0.71) p=0.9014 
Note: Row 1 shows the average time elapsed between when an inquiry is sent and when a MLO reply is 
received, reported in h:mm format, these averages do not include e-mails where no reply was made. Rows 2 
and 3 examine the character count for MLO responses. Row 2 examines all audits and includes counting non-
response as zero characters, Row 3 excludes replies that were of equal length and does not count non-responses. 
Row 4 and 5 examine additional genuine e-mail responses after the first genuine e-mail response. Row 4 shows 
the percentage of MLOs who sent a follow-up e-mail, Row 5 shows the average number of follow-up e-mails 
received. In all cases, p-values are from standard difference in means z tests. Standard Deviations are reported 
in (), number of MLOs shown in [].  *** p<.01  ** p<.05  * p<.10 
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The propensity to attempt a follow up with white potential clients was much greater than 
for African American clients.  We find that about 7 percent of MLOs sent at least a second reply 
to whites, while only 5.2 percent sent a second reply to African Americans.  Statistically, this is 
one of our strongest results, as it is statistically meaningful at the one percent level.  We find, 
however, that the average number of replies sent to the two groups is not different.      
Content of Response: Side by Side Comparisons 
We designed a side-by-side analysis tool that allows us to make a direct comparison of 
the response from a single MLO to clients with a different race.  Appendix 2 shows a screen shot 
of the side-by-side analysis tool used to grade the difference between two e-mails sent by the 
same MLO to different clients.  To ensure an unbiased grading, all identifying information from 
both MLOs and clients was masked when using the side-by-side analysis tool. 
We conducted both an internal (author examined) and external67 (a team that did not 
include any authors) reviews of e-mail pairs using this tool.  We designed the analysis tool to 
randomly assign a left-side and right-side e-mail, to guard against any ordering effects in grading 
responses.  Graders were instructed to indicate if they thought the responses were “Neutral”, 
meaning they were similar in content, language, and nature; they felt one was “Preferred” in 
some way over the other, or they thought that one was “Strongly Preferred” over the other.  
Graders were instructed to strictly record their opinion about the response, and that they did not 
have to justify their feelings.  In addition to an opinion about how favorable the responses were 
relative to one another, we also offered a series of check boxes for the reason.  Graders were 
instructed that they were not required to use a reason, and there was also a place to write in other 
reasons.  Reasons for favoring included:  offering more favorable terms, friendliness, and 
                                                 
67 We used a team of 10 different reviewers. 
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facilitation of the transaction.  Appendix 3 provides the instructions given to graders and the full 
list of reasons for preference. 
We graded all responses from MLOs replying to both inquires for mortgage assistance.  
For white/African American matched pairs, this was 1,932 pairs of responses or 3,864 e-mails.  
Panel A of table 25 shows the results of the side-by-side analysis for author graded responses.  
We find that even among MLOs that respond to both inquiries for mortgage assistance, some 
discrimination exists.  Blind grading shows that about 57 percent of e-mails were perceived as 
being neutral between the different inquiries.  Blind grading also shows that among e-mails 
where some preference was indicated, we were more likely to perceive e-mails sent to whites 
(22.6 percent) as being favorable to those sent to African Americans (20 percent).  The 
magnitude of this difference suggests that another 2.6 percent of MLOs discriminates by 
responding more favorably to whites- this is in addition to the 1.8 percent of MLOs that 
discriminate through non-response.  The side-by-side comparison results are statistically precise 
at the 10 percent level with a p-value of 0.0817. 
The most common reason for choosing an e-mail was preferred for white clients was that 
they were given more details (46.6 percent of white preferred e-mails), this reason was also the 
most common for preference given to African Americans, but occurred only 40.8 percent of the 
time.  The second most common reason for choosing a white client was preferred was that the 
tone of the e-mail was more friendly (33.56 percent), which was also the second most common 
reason African Americans were preferred (32.8 percent).  It was also fairly common to choose 
that preference was given to whites because the e-mail facilitated the loan transaction (27.8 
percent), although among MLOs that gave preference to African Americans this occurred more 
often (30.7 percent).  
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Table 25. Side-by-Side Comparison of Mortgage Loan Originator(MLO) Response Content 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Neutral 
Prefer 
White 
Prefer African 
American (2)-(3) 
Panel A: Author Blind Review 
MLOs Responding to Both Races 57.25% 22.67% 20.03% 2.64% 
(1,932 Matched Pairs) [1106] [438] [387] p=0.0817* 
Reason for Preference     
More Favorable Terms  5.94% 4.13% p=0.1200 
Friendliness  33.56% 32.82% p=0.4103 
Included More Details  46.58% 40.83% p=0.0484** 
Explained the Process  5.48% 7.24% p=0.8498 
Un-preferred E-mail was Negative  5.25% 8.01% p=0.9451 
Facilitated the Transaction  27.85% 30.75% p=0.8193 
Un-preferred E-mail Steered or was 
Pushy  1.37% 0.78% p=0.2059 
Other  9.82% 10.85% p=0.6873 
     
Panel B: Outside Reviewer Blind Review  
MLOs Responding to Both Races 43.94% 29.19% 26.40% 2.79% 
(1,932 Matched Pairs) [849] [564] [510] p=0.1058 
Reason for Preference     
More Favorable Terms  5.67% 5.10% p=0.3384 
Friendliness  47.16% 45.29% p=0.2698 
Included More Details  54.26% 51.57% p=0.1892 
Explained the Process  20.04% 18.82% p=0.3082 
Un-preferred E-mail was Negative  7.98% 7.45% p=0.6268 
Facilitated the Transaction  26.24% 26.47% p=0.5340 
Un-preferred E-mail Steered or was 
Pushy  2.13% 1.37% p=0.1743 
Other   3.90% 5.29% p=0.8628 
Note: Side-by-Side comparison uses the visual basic interface shown in Appendix 2 for all MLOs 
responding to both e-mails in matched pairs with clients of different race.  Column (2) totals includes 
all instances where whites were preferred or strongly preferred, Column (3) includes all instances 
where African Americans were preferred or strongly preferred.  All indications of preference in panel 
A are judged by the authors in a blind review where information about clients and MLOs is masked.  
All indications of preference in panel B are indicated by outside reviewers in a blind review where 
information about clients and MLOs is masked.  The p-value represented in column (4) is from a one-
sided t-test (alternative hypothesis of a positive difference) with a null hypothesis that the difference in 
average response rate is zero.   Percentages for reasons indicated for preference do not sum to one 
because graders were allowed to indicate multiple reasons for preference.  See Appendix 3 for 
instructions given to graders and definitions of reasons for preference.  Number of MLOs shown in [].  
*** p<.01  ** p<.05  * p<.10 
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It was less common for graders to indicate that preference was given to whites because of strong 
overt measures of discrimination like offering more favorable terms (5.9 percent) 68 or steering 
into a product or being pushy (1.4 percent). 
The side-by-side comparison done by outside reviewers is remarkably consistent with our 
internal grading.  Although outside reviewers graded e-mails as neutral less often than the 
authors (43.9 percent, as opposed to 57.2), the net level of discrimination for favoring whites is 
only 0.15 percentage points higher. Panel B of table 25 shows tests for discrimination in the 
content of response using the outside reviewer’s opinion of MLO replies.  The outside reviewers 
perceived that e-mails to whites were more favorable 29.2 percent of the time, while perceiving 
favorable e-mails for African Americans 26.4 percent of the time.  The net incidence of unequal 
treatment is 2.8 percent of MLOs, but this result is not quite statistically significant with a p-
value of 0.106. Outside reviewers were more likely to use friendliness and the inclusion of 
details as reasons why whites were favored and less likely to use the “other” category. 
Why do MLOs Discriminate? 
Although our experiment is not specifically designed to test for the reasons why MLOs 
discriminate against African American clients, the data generated from our experiment allows us 
to explore this question to some degree.  The standard theories behind why discrimination occurs 
fall into two basic categories: taste-based (Becker 2010), and statistical (Phelps 1972).  In 
statistical discrimination, an agent treats a minority client differently because they are making 
some assumption about their characteristics (typically this is described as assigning group 
averages), and find interacting with them to be less profitable in expectation.  Taste based 
                                                 
68 Graders were asked to indicate that more favorable terms were offered if the lender replied with more favorable 
loan terms to one recipient than the other.  This could be in a quoted or suggested interest rate, length of loan, type 
of loan, fees, or anything else that has to do with costs to the borrower. 
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discrimination reflects an agents preferences toward majority and minority groups.  List (2004) 
differentiates between statistical and taste based discrimination by carefully designing a series of 
experiments in the sports card market place, part of this design involves setting up a dictator 
game with market participants, which is not possible in our setting.  Therefore, we look toward 
other methods to attempt to explore the nature of MLO discrimination. 
Neumark (2012) proposes a method to disentangle statistical and taste based 
discrimination in audit and correspondence studies.  Neumark proposes to examine how the 
variance in observable characteristics (in our case credit scores) changes the probability of 
response, and that this variance should be identical across races in the absence of taste based 
discrimination.  Neumark therefore proposes that any difference in response in a correspondence 
study resulting from the variance of observables (which by assumption correlates to variance in 
unobservables) is statistical discrimination.  Neumark then shows how to estimate these effects 
separately using a probit regression. 
We use Neumark’s method to separate taste based and statistical discrimination among 
MLOs.  These estimates show a large and statistically significant (at the 10% level) taste based 
discrimination, and an insignificant effect of statistical discrimination, using credit score to 
create the variance in observed quality for response.  The magnitude of these results suggest the 
true effect of taste based discrimination is about 21 percentage points or about a 30 percent 
decline in e-mail response rates (given a white overall response rate of 68 percent).  Using this 
method, the magnitude of the taste based discrimination we find is similar to what Neumark 
finds using data from the famous Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) resume experiment.   
Ewens et al. (2013) propose an alternative, but related model to distinguish between taste 
based and statistical discrimination.  The basic premise in Ewens et al. is that positive or negative 
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information will be viewed differently by agents possessing limited information, resulting in 
differences in treatment between groups across information types.  Their formal hypothesis is 
that if agents practice taste based discrimination, then including positive information with an 
inquiry will amplify the racial gap that exists when no such information is given.  According to 
their model, including negative information should narrow the gap, regardless of the type of 
discrimination practiced. 
We examine the data from our experiment using the Ewens et al. framework, by testing 
for differences in treatment of African Americans with high and low credit scores relative to a 
baseline with no credit score reported.  Our results show that low credit score African Americans 
are treated worse and high credit score African Americans are treated better than the omitted 
credit score group, which is suggestive that MLOs are not practicing taste-based discrimination 
in our experiment. 
Bertrand et al. (2005) suggests an alternative to the standard taste-based and statistical 
explanations for discrimination.  They suggest that agents may not make a conscious choice 
when discriminating, but instead discriminate unintentionally or implicitly because of an 
unconscious association between a person of a certain type and some identified attribute.  This 
type of discrimination is tested in the laboratory by showing subjects photographs of people in a 
rapid manner and requiring that they assign them to some category (e.g. good or bad).  Requiring 
quick reaction attempts to identify the subconscious thoughts of the subject.    
Our experiment does not lend itself to a formal test of implicit discrimination, but the 
nature of the timing in MLO responses is suggestive.  Table 24 shows a large gap between the 
average time it takes an MLO to respond to our subjects- they respond faster to whites.  This is 
suggestive that on the margin, more MLOs are making the quick decision to respond to whites 
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and to set aside the e-mail from the African American until later, which suggests the motivation 
for discrimination may be implicit rather than conscious discrimination. 
Overall, the differences we find between the Neumark and Ewens et al. methods, and the 
weak evidence in support of possible implicit discrimination does not lead us to any strong belief 
about the type of discrimination we find.   
6. Robustness of Findings  
Identifying discrimination in correspondence experiments relies on the choice of names 
being representative of race groups.  The birth certificate data we use demonstrates that the 
names in our experiment are highly correlated with either race, but they leave open the 
possibility that particular names are treated differently for other reasons.  While we do not have 
the ability to infer why this might be, we can examine how our choice of names may affect our 
results.   
We consider two sets of robustness checks with the names in the experiment.  First, we 
examine response rate differences between each name and other names of the same race, and 
exclude names that are treated statistically different.  Next we examine national data on name 
popularity and exclude the most and least popular names in each race. 
Table 26 shows the response rate by name in the experiment.  Since our findings show 
that African Americans experience lower response rates, most of the top response rates come 
from white names.  We preform t-tests of the response rate differences between each name and 
the average within-race response rate; these results are shown in the second column of table 26.  
There are only two statistically distinguishable (among own race) names in our experiment: Jake 
Krueger has a higher response rate than other whites (p=0.0422) and Maxwell Baker has a lower 
response rate than other withes (p=0.0901). 
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Table 26. Name Robustness and National Popularity 
Name Response Rate Different than own race National Popularity 
Jake Krueger 72.62% p=0.0422 140 
Brett Nelson 70.92% p=0.2304 84 
Brendan Nelson 70.09% p=0.3988 155 
Ethan Schmitt 69.70% p=0.5146 58 
Luke Krueger 69.65% p=0.5215 118 
Tyrone Washington 68.80% p=0.1324 260 
Jermaine Booker 68.01% p=0.2948 306 
Zachary Miller 67.98% p= 0.8761 22 
Reginald Jackson 67.96% p=0.3082 230 
Darnell Jackson 67.42% p=0.4379 353 
Conor Schmitt 67.13% p=0.5834 458 
Spencer Miller 66.26% p=0.3510 105 
Jamal Washington 66.08% p=0.8533 247 
Seth Baker 65.77% p=0.2352 102 
Kadeem Jefferson 64.71% p=0.6751 538 
Maxwell Baker 64.66% p=0.0901 188 
DaQuan Booker 63.54% p=0.3184 709 
Jerome Jefferson 63.05% p=0.2101 264 
Terrell Banks 62.93% p=0.2110 282 
DaShawn Banks 62.62% p=0.1599 732 
Source: National popularity ranking comes from the Social Security Administration 
website using counts of baby names from 1990 at: http://www.ssa.gov/cgi-
bin/popularnames.cgi 
Note: P-value is for a difference in means t-test between the response rate for each name 
and names of the same race.   
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Excluding white names with a higher than average response rate (Jake Krueger) narrows 
the gap between white and African American response rates, as shown in column 1 of table 27.  
We are somewhat confident in these results as both tests show a similar (albeit smaller) gap 
between whites and African Americans, and the response rate tests maintain statistical 
significance.  The within MLO results do not maintain statistical significance, but this is likely 
due to sample size restriction that comes with excluding 10 percent of the already smaller 
sample.  Results excluding the other name that showed statistically different outcomes, Maxwell 
Baker, are in line with our primary results, and in fact show a slightly larger response rate 
difference.  The third row shows that if we exclude white name with the highest, and African 
American name with the lowest response rate the magnitude of our results is smaller but still 
statistically meaningful for the response rate difference, but loses marginal statistical significance 
for the MLO level test.   
We also examine differences in general popularity of the names in our experiment using 
Social Security Administrative data.  This data reports counts of name for babies born nationally 
each year (unconditional on race) for the 1,000 most common names.  All names in our 
experiment are in among the 1,000 most common in popularity for the year of our birth 
certificate data (1990).  As a result of population shares, white names are necessarily more 
popular among the general population, but one of the white names (Conor) is quite unpopular 
nationally relative to other white names.  The third column of table 27 shows popularity ranks 
for all names in our data.  
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Table 27. Results excluding popular or unique names 
 Overall response rate  Response at MLO level 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  White 
African 
American (1)-(2)  
Respond 
to 
neither 
Respond 
to both 
White 
only 
African 
American 
only (6)-(7) 
Exclude Jake Krueger (5% level 
different than own race) 
67.83% 65.68% 2.15%  16.41% 49.71% 17.53% 16.35% 1.18% 
[3158] [3402] p=0.0119**  [571] [1730] [610] [569] p=0.2440 
          
Exclude Jake Krueger and Maxwell 
Baker (10% different than own race) 
68.46% 65.68% 2.78%  15.87% 50.31% 17.75% 16.07% 1.68% 
[2835] [3402] p=0.0023***  [490] [1553] [548] [496] p=0.1144 
          
Exclude DaShawn Banks and Jake 
Krueger (highest white, lowest AA) 
67.83% 66.02% 1.81%  16.27% 49.98% 17.61% 16.14% 1.47% 
[3158] [3072] p=0.0321**  [508] [1561] [550] [504] p=0.1657 
          
Exclude Zachary Miller and DaShawn 
Banks (most popular white, least 
popular AA) 
68.35% 66.02% 2.33%  16.02% 50.94% 17.43% 15.61% 1.82% 
[3194] [3072] p=0.0083***  [503] [1599] [547] [490] p=0.0820* 
          
Exclude Zachary Miller and Ethan 
Schmitt (2 most popular) 
68.18% 65.68% 2.50%  16.29% 50.47% 17.27% 15.97% 1.30% 
[2826] [3402] p=0.0054***  [503] [1558] [533] [493] p=0.2234 
          
Exclude DaShawn Banks and DaQuan 
Booker (2 least popular) 
68.31% 66.35% 1.96%  15.62% 50.36% 17.85% 16.17% 1.68% 
[3540] [2727] p=0.0224**  [482] [1554] [551] [499] p=0.1155 
          
Note: The p-value represented in column (3) is from a one-sided t-test (alternative hypothesis of a positive difference) with a null hypothesis 
that the difference in average response rate is zero.  The p-value reported in column (8) is from McNemar paired difference in proportions test.  
This test is designed for testing the difference in proportion of respondents for paired subjects, the test statistic is 𝜒2 =
(𝑁𝑂𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝑊 − 𝑁𝑂𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝐴𝐴)
2
/ (𝑁𝑂𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝑊 + 𝑁𝑂𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝐴𝐴), where 𝑁 represents the number of MLOs only responding to one group.  The test statistic has a 
chi-squared distribution, and we calculate all p-values accordingly.  Number of MLOs shown in [].  *** p<.01  ** p<.05  * p<.10 
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Excluding the most popular white name (Zackary Miller) and the least popular African 
American name (DaShawn Banks) does not affect either the response rate or MLO level results, 
as shown in table 27.  In each case, the magnitude of the difference is extremely similar and we 
maintain the same level of significance as our primary results.  We also explore excluding the 
two most popular white names, and (separately) excluding the two least popular African 
American names.  In either case the response rate results are similar in magnitude to our primary 
results and maintain statistical significance.  The MLO level results also show a similar 
magnitude to the primary results, but lose statistical significance. 
Our overall interpretation of the robustness checks is that our results are fairly robust to 
excluding particular names, especially when the choice is based on popularity of the names and 
not directly a function of response. 
7. Conclusion 
We find evidence of discrimination against African Americans in the market for 
mortgage loans.  The discrimination we find occurs at the initial information gathering stage for 
borrowers in response to a simple e-mail inquiry about assistance with obtaining a mortgage.  
We find that MLOs, the primary contact person for a borrower looking to obtain a mortgage, are 
less likely to respond to inquiries from clients with African American names that they are to 
clients with white names.  We also find that MLOs responding to inquiries from both races are 
more likely to write a preferential e-mail to white clients.  The level of discrimination we find is 
large for a characteristic that should not matter (race) relative to one that should matter (credit 
score). 
Finding discrimination in the information gathering stage is likely to influence outcomes 
for minority borrowers throughout the lending and home buying process.  If African American 
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borrowers are less likely to receive communication from an MLO and the MLO treats them 
differently when communication does occur, it makes submitting a loan application more 
difficult, and the remainder of the home purchase more arduous.  In addition, our work shows 
that the growing importance of e-mail communication between clients and lenders, where in-
person meetings are less and less common, does not mean that discrimination on the basis of race 
will not occur. 
The magnitude of discrimination we find is smaller than the most recent in-person study 
(Ross et al. 2008); however, the standard for compliance is much lower in our most basic test: 
we only examine if MLOs are willing to respond to an e-mail.  Our findings confirm that 
discrimination still exists in the lending industry, and that it exists across a larger sample, and 
geographic scope than previous studies have examined.  We are also able to compare the 
difference in treatment between whites and African Americans with the difference in treatment 
across credit score groups.  Our average differences suggest an African American name reduces 
the probability that an MLO responds by the same magnitude as does reporting a credit score that 
is 71 points lower.     
Our results suggest that examining lending outcomes is not sufficient to uncover the level 
of discrimination that minorities face in the lending process.  Our work also suggests that to 
uncover the full extent of discrimination in this market, multiple types of communication should 
be used in addition to in-person audits, and that enforcement of Fair Lending Laws would be 
more robust if audits included other means of communication.   
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Appendix 1. Correspondence Construction 
 
[GREETING] [FIRST NAME]69, 
I’m interested in [PRODUCT]. 
[SOURCE] 
[PLEASANTRY]  
[If score known, then CREDIT SCORE] [RANDOMLY ASSIGNED SCORE] 
[QUESTION #1a or QUESTION #2a, depending on question set type] 
[QUESTION #1b or QUESTION #2b, depending on question set type] 
[VALEDICTION] 
[RANDOMLY ASSIGNED NAME from table 17] 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
69 We use actual MLO first names given on the webpage where we found contact information. 
GREETING 
Hello 
Hi 
Hi There 
Hey 
Dear 
 
PRODUCT 
a home loan. 
a mortgage. 
getting a home 
loan. 
getting a loan. 
information on 
mortgages. 
SOURCE 
I found your information on-line, and thought you 
could help. 
I got your contact information on-line, and hope you 
can help me. 
I looked you up on-line, hopefully you can help. 
I found you on-line, and think you can help. 
I got your information on the web, and thought you 
might be able to help. 
PLEASANTRY 
I just have a few questions. 
I have a few questions for you. 
I'm curious about a few things. 
I'd like to ask you a couple of 
questions. 
I'm wondering about a few things. 
CREDIT SCORE 
I know that my credit score is  
My credit score is  
I have a credit score of  
I already know my credit score 
is 
 
QUESTION #1a 
How are interest rates looking? 
What interest rate can I expect? 
Can you tell me about current interest rates? 
What do interest rates look like right now? 
How should I expect interest rates to look? 
QUESTION #1b 
What sort of fees are involved? 
What fees should I expect? 
How do the fees work? 
Are there fees that I need to worry about? 
What are the typical fees? 
QUESTION #2a 
What types of loans might be available for me? 
Can you tell me about the types of loans you have? 
What sort of loans are available for someone like me? 
Can you offer advice on what type of loans are available? 
What kind of loans do you have available? 
QUESTION #2b 
What other information do you need from me? 
Do you need any other information to start the process? 
What sort of information do you need to move forward? 
What more do you need from me to proceed? 
Do you know what else I need to begin the process? 
VALEDICTION 
Thank you for your time, 
Thanks in advance, 
I look forward to hearing from 
you, 
I look forward to your reply, 
Thanks for taking the time, 
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Appendix 2. Side-by-Side Comparison Tool 
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Appendix 3. Grader Instructions for Side-by-Side Comparison 
Thank you for agreeing to help out with this research project.  Your task is simple- to review a set of e-
mail responses we received from mortgage lenders and compare them.  We are interested to know if 
you feel the responses you read tend to be more favorable toward one set of recipients than another, or 
if they are treated approximately the same.  Essentially, we want to know your opinion.  Please use the 
format we’ve supplied by enabling external content in excel and simply clicking on the “Open Form” 
button.  After entering the form, please start by typing your name in the ID box.  Next, read both e-mails 
carefully.  After reading both e-mails, please indicate if you thought the mortgage lender strongly 
preferred one, preferred the other, or treated the recipients neutrally using the check box indicator. 
If you thought that the mortgage lender expressed a preference, please use the next section of check 
boxes to indicate why you felt this way.  Feel free to use the “other” check box in the event that your 
opinion does not match a reason listed, or if you can’t quite describe why you feel that way.  You can 
also fill in a reason for “other” to describe your reasoning.  Please use the following as guidance when 
checking boxes for your reasons: 
More favorable terms (interest rate, etc.):  Check this box if the lender replied with more favorable loan 
terms to one recipient than the other.  This could be in a quoted or suggested interest rate, length of 
loan, type of loan, fees, or anything else that has to do with costs to the borrower. 
Friendliness:  Check this box if you feel the lender was more ‘friendly’ to one recipient than the other.  
Again, this is your opinion, we will not hold it against you. 
Included more details:  Check this box if you feel the lender gave a more detailed description of the 
products, application materials needed, or generally gave answers with more depth to one recipient 
than the other. 
Explained the process:  Check this box if you feel the lender offered more guidance on the lending 
process, the application process, or the home purchase process to one recipient than the other.  This 
might include offers on how to improve credit, or necessary paper work to complete an application. 
Un-preferred email was more negative: Check this box if you thought that one of the e-mails was 
negative, even if the other e-mail was neutral.  This might include negative language, unusually short 
replies (relative to the other), or a rude tone in writing. 
Facilitated the transaction: Check this box if you feel the lender attempted to facilitate a successful 
transaction more with one recipient than the other.  This might include offers for future communication, 
providing application materials, encouraging an application, or offering help with credit issues or home 
search. 
Un-preferred email steered into a product or was pushy: Check this box if you feel the lender was being 
pushy about selling a loan, or suggested a specific product that was “right” for the recipient and not the 
other.  Differentiating between this box and facilitating a transaction will largely depend on your 
interpretation of the language of the e-mail.  Remember, this is your opinion.  
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Conclusion 
 This work examines the effects of tax policy and institutions on behavior in the housing 
market.  The first essay measures the sensitivity of consumers to the price of mortgage debt 
using state variation in the price of mortgage debt.  By analyzing IRS data using weighted least 
squares and IV estimation we find that a one percentage point increase in the MID raises the 
amount of mortgage interest claimed by $303-590.  This approach implicitly captures the variety 
of margins into which consumer choice runs with respect to mortgage finance, which in turn 
describes more completely the impact of MID policy on efficiency and tax expenditures than do 
single-choice measures.  By highlighting the effect of the policy on tax expenditure by income 
class, we emphasize the distributional impact of each reform. 
 The second essay continues to examine the MID, but in this case for its impact on local 
home prices.  I employ localized parameters across a variety of markets, including twenty-seven 
cities (and ZIP-code neighborhoods within a subset of those cities) to simulate changes to home 
price in a user cost model were the MID to be reformed.  I show there is high spatial disparity in 
the impact of the MID, chiefly deriving from differing marginal tax rates, itemization rates and 
mortgage balances across space.  Because the benefits of the MID vary by income, I present the 
policy as a potential reinforcement to income class sorting across space.  I present suggestive 
evidence that MID reform could reduce the cost of mobility across neighborhoods of differing 
income class by reducing what I term the “affordability gap.” 
 This essay also explores an alternative to the traditional method of calibrating the user 
cost model, a need which became clear in the course of using it to investigate changes to local 
housing markets.  I present a calibration technique to identify two parameters which have been 
taken on assumption in prior work.  Rather than assuming key values in the model, I assume that 
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imputed rents for owner-occupied housing are sufficiently related to actual market rents in order 
to estimate the degree to which property taxes and historic home price appreciation affect user 
cost.  This change in paradigm deserves further investigation in future work. 
 The final essay describes a field experiment in which we test whether mortgage loan 
officers respond differently based on client race.  The test involves an audit-pair technique 
borrowed from the literature on labor economics in which race is indicated by name in email 
inquiries about mortgage loans.  We find that MLOs discriminate on net by 1.8 percentage points 
in favor of white clients.  In addition, we test the marginal effect of low credit scores on response 
rate.  MLOs discriminate on credit score, and direct comparison of the results suggests that the 
effect of being African American is equivalent to that of having a credit score that is 71 points 
lower. 
 Taken together, this work suggests that the impact of policies is not uniform, and 
policymakers could benefit from considering the differential impacts of public policy on 
different groups in these markets going forward.  In the first two essays, this is seen in the 
distributional impacts of the MID; the market distortions introduced by the policy do not fall 
evenly across income class or space.  This distribution of impacts may or may not be preferable 
to a policymaker, but awareness of that distribution is key to forming effective housing policy 
that do not produce unintended consequences.  For example, if the MID is not meant to induce 
income sorting across neighborhoods, this work can help policymakers to consider the full 
impact of the existing policy and whether it achieves its goals. 
 In the third essay we see evidence that outcomes in the mortgage market may still differ 
by race despite strong public policy (in the form of legislative prohibitions) designed to eliminate 
such differences.  Once again, the work presented here can serve to inform policy makers about 
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the nature of the different outcomes experienced in the mortgage market so that future policy can 
be better aligned with policymakers’ goals. 
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